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Abstract 
Strand, Bridget Nicole (Ph.D. , Economics, Department of Economics at the 
University of Colorado) 
 
Essays on Topics in International Trade and Affiliate Production of Business 
Services 
 
Thesis directed by Professor James Markusen, Ph.D. 
 
Trade in services and foreign affiliate sales of services have grown tremendously over the last 
decade. The chapters within this thesis look at the differences needed in modeling trade and investment 
in professional and business services (Chapter 3), the impacts of country level regulatory and investment 
barriers (Chapter 2), methods of utilizing CGE modeling to simulate welfare gains from changes to the 
various types of regulatory costs (operating costs, entry costs, fixed costs for establishment abroad) while 
incorporating the observed complex investment and trade (Chapter 4) and finally also looking at the 
relationship between trade, foreign affiliate sales and the barriers to supplying services abroad (Chapter 
5).   
Barriers to trade in services are higher than for trade in goods. These include restrictions on 
foreign investment, restrictions on temporary movement of natural persons and regulatory measures that 
affect the entry and operations of foreign firms.  Regulation can be discriminatory or non-discriminatory, 
but even in the latter case foreign services providers may face higher costs than local firms in complying 
with regulation.   
The papers in this dissertation contribute new modeling techniques as well as new methods of 
looking at the available data. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Trade in services and foreign affiliate sales of services have grown tremendously over 
the last decade. The chapters within this thesis look at the differences needed in modeling trade 
and investment in professional and business services (Chapter 3), the impacts of country level 
regulatory and investment barriers (Chapter 2), methods of utilizing CGE modeling to simulate 
welfare gains from changes to the various types of regulatory costs (operating costs, entry costs, 
fixed costs for establishment abroad) while incorporating the observed complex investment and 
trade (Chapter 4) and finally also looking at the relationship between trade, foreign affiliate sales 
and the barriers to supplying services abroad (Chapter 5).   
Barriers to trade in services are higher than for trade in goods. These include restrictions 
on foreign investment, restrictions on temporary movement of natural persons and regulatory 
measures that affect the entry and operations of foreign firms.  Regulation can be discriminatory 
or non-discriminatory, but even in the latter case foreign services providers may face higher costs 
than local firms in complying with regulation.   
The papers in this dissertation contribute new modeling techniques as well as new 
methods of looking at the available data. 
 From an empirical analysis and policy point of view services trade is different from 
goods trade.  The barriers to trade in services are not well defined.  They are usually related to 
behind the border regulation, bureaucratic red tape, and various forms of imperfectly competitive 
service production. These barriers often take the form of fixed costs that cannot meaningfully be 
translated into a tariff equivalent or marginal costs which vary significantly across industries and 
countries.  Furthermore, services are heterogeneous, local non-traded inputs are used intensively 
in their production and the service is often produced in direct interaction with the customer, which 
can be a firm or an individual consumer. Therefore there is no such thing as a world market price 
for services.  
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Another complication is that it is not straight forward to aggregate trade costs in services.  
Fixed costs from complying with regulatory measures may not be additive, and one binding 
barrier may render the elimination of other barriers irrelevant.  If modes of supply are 
complementary, trade barriers that restrict one mode of supply will in effect affect all modes, while 
if modes of supply are substitutes, restrictions on one mode can induce a shift to a less restricted 
mode, and have little effect other than diverting trade from the preferred mode of supply and 
increase costs.  Identifying and quantifying the binding trade barriers are therefore the major 
challenge and most important goal for my dissertation.  Binding trade barriers differ between 
sectors and modes of services delivery and need to be estimated by sector, based on in-depth 
sector studies. This type of analysis is out of scope for my own research due to the lack of 
available data, however, it will be a logical next step to undertake with the assistance of 
academic, governmental, and international organizations that are concerned with the implications 
of services trade barriers for growth, development, welfare, and competition. 
Since most barriers to trade in services are behind-the-border regulatory measures, the 
challenges for the papers within my dissertation include:   
1. Distinguishing between trade enhancing and trade restricting regulatory 
measures;  
2. For the latter set of measures, distinguish between entry barriers and regulation 
that affects operating costs of companies;  
3. Establish whether regulation affecting operating costs increases foreign services 
providers’ costs more than local service providers’;  
4. Quantify entry barriers and operational costs due to regulation if possible, and if 
not, model the effects of these barriers through a CGE analysis.  
The most important mode of trade in services in terms (by volume) is mode 3, 
commercial presence.  Only a few OECD countries gather data on sales by foreign affiliates in a 
systematic way, and a comprehensive dataset on this mode from official sources is probably 
years away. The presence of vertical and horizontal services providers mandates obtaining the 
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highest level of sales data desegregation possible and BEA data for US bilateral trade in services 
is used in three of the four chapters to follow.  
The identification and estimation of binding barriers to entry and trade flows requires 
detailed knowledge of the industry in question. My research focuses on business and 
professional services only as service sectors such as travel, tourism, transportation, 
telecommunications, and construction all warrant individual analysis of the barriers and regulatory 
restrictions.  Within the business and professional services sector I complete industry level 
studies to identify the sources of barriers for that particular industry. While these are analyzed in 
Chapter 2 at a somewhat aggregated level, they are further looked at in Chapter 5 with the 
following questions in mind. 
Questions of interest for the various service sectors/industries are:  
• Are the services restricted for certain customers? How? Why? At the country 
level, what kind of market concentration exists? What is the import penetration and export shares 
for the industry? If there is a high level of import penetration, are there significant barriers to 
establishing commercial presence? It’s likely as most firms would want to access markets with 
high demand. (OECD has this data) 
• What is the predominant mode of supply? Why? Does it vary due to the 
characteristic of the destination country (other than barriers)? With the country of origin? 
• How do the characteristics of firms in this industry vary from other industries? 
• Are modes of supply complements, substitutes or independent? 
A useful methodology for linking conceptual work and practical measures is to use 
theoretical models.  Recent trade models that explain trade and investment patterns, including 
trade in intermediate goods and services, are typically complex and often impossible to solve 
analytically.  A common strategy has been to solve the models numerically for various 
assumptions of parameter values and exogenous variables such as trade costs.  Depending on 
the purpose of the analysis, partial equilibrium and general equilibrium models can be used.  The 
former is often useful for sector studies and for estimating the impact of trade costs on trade, 
investment and labor flows, while general equilibrium models are more useful for analyzing 
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welfare effects of e.g. regulatory reform.  Such work can start with guesstimates of entry barriers 
and trade costs and gradually introduce estimated trade costs as information becomes available. 
This is the path that my dissertation research takes and while the initial work involves rough 
empirical analysis, this moves to theoretical CGE modeling, and in the future to a more detailed 
empirical analysis of existing data on bilateral services trade and foreign affiliate sales data with 
specific variables measuring trade and establishment barriers for each industry across countries 
and time. 
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Chapter 2: The internationalization of services: effects of liberalization on 
U.S. FDI in producer services 
I. Introduction 
The relationship between multinational enterprises (MNEs), foreign direct investment 
(FDI), and trade has predominantly been focused on manufactured goods. Theoretical and 
econometric models have addressed issues such as trade barriers, intermediate goods, location 
choice, factor endowments, technology transfer, and human capital among others. Research on 
the service industry side of these issues however, has largely remained in the theoretical realm 
only. Empirical analysis has only become more accessible over the last five years and is still 
difficult due to incomplete and nonexistent trade and affiliate sales data at a country/sector level 
as well as the existence of behind the border barriers which are complex and not easily quantified 
once they are identified.   
Issues surrounding trade and investment in services make up some of the more 
significant areas in international economics for current and future research and analysis. The 
topics range from liberalization negotiations to offshore outsourcing to technology and knowledge 
transfer in developing countries and have implications for studies in environmental and 
development economics as well.  
In this paper, I provide a significant literature review highlighting the contributions, 
shortcomings, and areas of further work.  Once I identify the goals for an analysis of the barriers 
to services trade and affiliate production, I will then describe how the current data restrictions 
make this paper a first step in the process of a panel study on services trade and FDI 
liberalization. My data analysis in this paper will test BEA data on U.S. FDI in services with an 
augmented knowledge capital model to determine the effects of size, endowments, investment 
restrictions, and political institutions on outward U.S. FDI in services 
Investment in services is the largest component of global and U.S. FDI and is also the 
fastest growing. Over the period 1990-2002 FDI in the primary sector doubled, tripled in the 
manufacturing sector, and quadrupled in services. Over the same period the share of 
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manufacturing FDI fell from 42% to 32% while the share of services rose from 49% to 62%. 
(UNCTAD, 2004)  
The large size of the service sector is not unique to the U.S. Services make up 57%% of 
middle income countries’ GDP, compared to 72% of high income countries’ GDP (UN WIR, 
2005). This has facilitated multinational enterprises’ decisions to locate service affiliates in 
countries all over the world. Motivations for FDI in services are encompassed by the same 
general categories as FDI in goods: market-seeking, resource seeking, efficiency-seeking, and 
asset seeking. (Dunning, 2002) For U.S. outward FDI in services, most location decisions by 
MNEs were made for market or efficiency seeking reasons. FDI in producer services is seen to 
be fulfilling both of these goals. (Dunning, 2002)  
The general sectors I will be analyzing are financial services and professional, technical, 
and scientific services. These encompass legal, insurance, accounting, engineering, advertising, 
information, and marketing among others. These all are within the category of producer services 
due to their intermediate nature as well as their intensive use of skilled labor and other knowledge 
based assets. This area of investment is increasing in value and importance in world trade. 
Business services accounted for over one third of FDI stock in 2002, up from about 15 percent in 
1990. (UNCTAD, 2004) The unique element for FDI in producer services in that they serve both 
foreign and domestic companies and manufacturers. This range of firms utilizes these services 
creates a significant market for the MNEs supplying producer services.  
Services investment is a source of debate at the national and global level. While a large 
percentage of FDI in services is between developed countries (similar to manufacturing FDI) 
there are a lot of potential welfare improvements that could be realized through services FDI in 
developing countries. This North-South type FDI in services has a lot of public fear and negative 
public perception. Developed countries have industry lobbies, media pundits, and labor groups 
that all voice their opposition to FDI in services industries. Their concerns range from intellectual 
property protection, skilled labor outflow abroad replacing jobs in the US to a “race to the bottom” 
argument about exploiting lower labor standards in developing countries. Developing countries 
are concerned with retaining control over national industries and utilities, as well as the fear that 
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an inflow of foreign skilled labor will increase wage gaps, hurting unskilled domestic laborers, and 
take away potential opportunities for domestic workers to gain valuable experience. The papers I 
discuss below all find support for the liberalization of trade and investment of services and 
illustrate where I am going to endeavor to contribute something new. 
There are a number of theoretical models which attempt to model FDI. Usually the 
models consider a two country setting and manufactured goods. There are models which address 
horizontal investment and some that address vertical investment by MNEs. Markusen developed 
the Knowledge-Capital (KK) model (Markusen 1984, 1997) where both horizontal and vertical 
multinationals can exist and where country characteristics determine the type of FDI that is 
successful. Empirically Carr, Markusen, and Maskus (2001) tested the KK model with U.S. data 
on manufacturing FDI and found significant support for the theoretical model’s results. I will be 
using the KK framework, with a few changes to assumptions, with my data on U.S. FDI in 
services. While I will argue that both vertical and horizontal investment in services exists in 
today’s globalized world, vertical services FDI is very new and much smaller in size. Therefore I 
will assume that FDI in producer services is horizontal investment. With this setup I can 
determine whether an augmented KK model also describes the pattern of FDI in business 
producer services.  
In addition to testing the KK model and measuring the effects of service liberalization, I 
will also examine the effects of various political institutional indicators on the level of FDI in 
services. It may be the case that certain political systems restrict services trade and investment 
more vigorously than others and that the political environment may influence the decision of a 
U.S. multinational when they are deciding where to invest. Initial investment in services is 
significant due to the need of commercial presence in the host country and the fixed costs 
associated with establishing one. Political risk and corruption are legitimate concerns when 
making such an investment abroad. The fear is not so much outright expropriation but rather the 
risk of policy changes that negatively affect the firm’s revenue stream. The potential for a 
government to ex poste enact distortive taxation, domestic content regulations, or additional 
regulatory measures may be correlated with the political institutions of a country. The inclusion of 
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some political variables may give some interesting results about determinants of FDI in services 
outside of the traditional economic sources.  
Data availability is the most significant constraint on the empirical analysis of FDI in 
services. While UNCTAD and the OECD maintain very in depth databases on trade in services, 
data on FDI in services is lacking. UNCTAD country investment reports include annual stock and 
flow values for inward and outward FDI for either the destination/home country or industry of 
investment. There is no annual data broken down to the country by industry or industry by country 
level which is needed to avoid aggregation bias. The OECD database has similar aggregation 
problems. FDI stocks and flows are available for every OECD country at either the country level 
or at the industry level for individual countries but are not given for both the industry and country 
of origin/destination. U.S. inward and outward FDI, defined as sales of non-bank foreign affiliates, 
is detailed by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) through their extensive survey process. 
The BEA not only compiles annual data on sales of foreign affiliates by industry and country of 
origin/destination but also collects data on the employment, compensation, value added, imports, 
exports, and R&D of affiliates. The variety of available data is important for the decomposition of 
U.S. FDI determinants and impacts. 
The most important contribution of my empirical analysis is the construction of measures 
for various barriers to investment in services for each country. As a first step this is going to be a 
rather rough measure due to the overwhelming amount of research required for a truly accurate 
measure. However, in order to be able to conduct future studies that can quantify monetary 
welfare benefits of liberalizing restrictions to investment in services it is necessary to begin with a 
more general analysis.  
The literature reviewed in the section II outlines some of the difficulties with this type of 
analysis and the problems with creating rough measures of barriers to FDI in services. The 
intuition is that the countries that liberalize elements of their service sector during the time period 
studied will experience an increase in relative inward FDI, measured by sales of majority owned 
foreign affiliates in that country. Also, I predict that after controlling for size and other country-
specific characteristics, the coefficient for service liberalization will remain positive and significant 
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eliminating the claim that developed countries are biasing the results. Section III covers the 
theoretical background and model, Section IV describes the empirical analysis, Section V details 
the data used in the analysis, Section VI discusses the results from the empirical analysis and 
Section VII concludes. 
 
II. Literature Review 
Investment in producer services has been modeled theoretically by Markusen, 
Rutherford, and Tarr (2005) and empirically by Raff and von der Ruhr (2001). These papers 
introduce restrictions in host countries on trade and investment in services. Their studies are an 
important first step in understanding the effects that service sector liberalization has on U.S 
outward FDI in services; however they do not employ any empirical measures for the level of 
liberalization or restriction.  
The task of quantifying the possible benefits from liberalization is overwhelming due to 
the nature of the types of restrictions on services. Dee and Hanslow (2000) complete an 
ambitious analysis of the estimated gains from eliminating barriers to trade and investment in 
services and comparing them to the estimated gains from eliminating barriers to trade in 
agriculture and manufacturing. They use a version of the Global Trade Analysis Program (GTAP) 
allowing for the addition of FDI, capital accumulation, and international borrowing and lending. 
They rename it FTAP for the foreign direct investment component and the model uses actual data 
to simulate firms’ decision making and provides estimates for the gains from liberalization of the 
various sectors. The CGE model also incorporates increasing returns to scale and large-group 
monopolistic competition which Markusen, Rutherford, and Tarr (2005) also use when modeling 
FDI in producer services. Additionally, the model includes capital accumulation, and international 
borrowing and lending into the computer analysis.  
Konan and Maskus (2005) also use a CGE model to quantify the different impacts from 
liberalization in services. They conduct an in depth study of goods and services liberalization in 
Tunisia and compare the different effects on welfare, outputs, and factor prices. This paper is one 
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of the first to move from theory to empirics. My initial contribution will build on this work and 
estimate the general effects on U.S. FDI of services liberalization across countries with different 
political institutions, factor endowments, levels of development, and sizes. The implications of my 
empirically analysis of the KK model will also help bridge the theory-empirical gap. Eventually, I 
hope to be able to quantify the effects on welfare through factor price changes as well as lost 
productivity through barriers to services investment and the informal sector in these industries.  
The other area of literature that is relevant to my research concerns the relationship 
between FDI and political institutions.  Janeba (2002) lends theoretical support for the claim that 
politically risky economies discourage investment. The combination of political stability, FDI, and 
economic growth is analyzed by Bengoa and Sanchez-Robles (2003). The most comprehensive 
study lending solid empirical evidence to the claim that political institutions play an important role 
in a multinational firm’s decision to invest is the cross-sectional and panel estimates in Jensen 
(2003). He uses a sample of 114 countries over the period 1970-1997 and obtains the result that 
democratic governments attract as much as 70 percent more FDI as a percentage of GDP, even 
after controlling for other political and economic factors remains significant across all the various 
model specifications. Robustness tests confirm the relationship between democratic governance 
and FDI while the causal links are explored by testing the effects of democratic institutions on 
sovereign debt ratings. The belief behind Jensen’s claim is that democratic governance reduces 
country risk which encourages FDI. The causal relationship is found to be significant, lending 
further support to the relationship between governmental institutions and FDI.   
My analysis will include a few variables to try and assess the impact that political 
institutions has on U.S. outward FDI for both developing and developed countries and the 
simultaneous impact of the level of liberalization within the service sectors of the host economies. 
The theoretical links between FDI liberalization and aggregate welfare gains are well documented 
within the literature while solid empirical results at the country level are sparse. In the current 
global environment with concerns about offshoring and GATS, empirical studies of liberalization 
of restrictions to investment are important.  The claim that political institutions are linked to FDI is 
also not without contention but has definite implications for policymakers, especially those 
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concerned with the size of the informal sector. The complex nature of these issues requires a 
careful look at the assumptions and methods used in any analysis.  
The theoretical modeling of FDI in services requires some significant assumptions in 
order to capture the differences between goods and services FDI. Markusen, Rutherford, and 
Tarr (2005) use both static and dynamic simulation models to estimate the benefits that accrue 
through FDI in producer services. The basic assumptions in their have set the standard for this 
area of analysis: producer services are non-traded internationally, a larger variety of services 
reduces the costs for downstream industries, firm and national level differentiation exist, and 
conditions of increasing returns to scale and monopolistic competition categorize the production 
of these services. Additionally, Markusen et al. assume that producer services are intensive in 
skilled labor and knowledge based assets, which is a channel of technology and knowledge 
transfer to the host economy leading to productivity gains in domestic companies. Investment in 
these services is assumed to be subject to high transaction costs from various barriers to foreign 
involvement within the potential host economy, many of which are difficult to observe, measure, 
and quantify.  
The simulation results for the initial comparative static model found that liberalization of 
producer services can lead to gains of 3 to 15 percent of GDP. The range of these gains depends 
on the parameters chosen for the simulation. The price difference between the supply price and 
the import price of Knowledge Capital (KK) is varied in this analysis, capturing the different levels 
of restrictions countries have on service imports. This increase in the price could come from red 
tape, regulatory fees, or other import costs. This is a pretty general way of modeling restrictions to 
investment. The immobility of labor is an assumption that hurts this model because foreign skilled 
labor will be used in affiliate production and it’s imprecise to combine all foreign inputs into a 
single variable and give it one price.   
The interesting result from the static model has to do with the prices of domestic skilled 
labor.  Markusen et al. find that real wages increase as liberalization occurs and foreign firms 
enter. In the equilibrium this result implies that domestic skilled labor and the specialized foreign 
input are complements. This result also supports the theory of technology and knowledge transfer 
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accommodation through FDI. If the wages are being driven up by increases in productivity, 
domestic skilled workers at affiliates have benefited from the technology and knowledge transfers 
that are driving these productivity increases.  
In order to estimate the impact of liberalization for the producer services for an extended 
time horizon Markusen, Rutherford, and Tarr (2005) create dynamic model. Liberalization is an 
unanticipated policy reform which allows FDI in the previously closed economy. This dynamic 
model assumes that the growth rate in the workforce, the rate of retirement, and the interest rate 
are all exogenous. In this dynamic setting, new workers can choose to enter the unskilled 
workforce or go to school where they become skilled workers. New skilled workers can choose to 
work for the domestic or foreign firms while a fraction of the existing skilled workers are immobile.  
The dynamic simulations find that while the number of firms and the total factor 
productivity of the economy increase steadily from the point of liberalization, the income in the 
domestic industry declines for the first 5 years when domestic labor is largely immobile. Once the 
domestic industry stabilizes, wages are once again equalized across firms and the economy has 
experienced aggregate gains from liberalization. The domestic industry’s catch up period follows 
the theoretical predictions from Markusen’s knowledge capital model where the foreign 
knowledge capital spills over into the domestic industry increasing productivity and shifting 
resources toward the more efficient firms. 
Moving from the purely theoretical models, Raff and von der Ruhr (2001) use U.S. data 
on both manufacturing and service FDI to test theoretical predictions of their model. In addition to 
the same assumptions that Markusen et al. made about producer services, Raff and von der Ruhr 
make an additional assumption that the quality of the service provided is most important 
characteristic for the competitiveness of a foreign service affiliate. Observing the quality of a 
service is complicated and problematic and there is significant potential for the firm to 
misrepresent the quality of the services they provide. The risk of a low quality service is one that 
local customers are initially unwilling to take. The value of this risk is considered to be the 
informational barrier for foreign service providers in the model. Risk mitigation occurs when 
customers in the host country are informed about quality of a foreign provided service. Rather 
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than model this quality and information issue in a theoretically complex manner the authors claim 
that downstream multinational firms from the same home country are assumed to be the channel 
through which customers become informed.  
The substantiation behind this is that downstream firms are more likely to use services 
provided by firms from their home country. While information barriers to foreign direct investment 
are indeed a problem, the claim that prior FDI in manufacturing is the sole determinant of the 
level of recognition is improbable and the inclusion of proxy variables for informed consumers 
would improve the model’s plausibility. The authors formally hypothesize that the stock of 
producer-service FDI in equilibrium increases at an increasing rate with the number of informed 
local customers. The percentage of informed customers is proxied by the ratio of inward 
manufacturing FDI from the service firm’s home country to total manufacturing. In constructing 
their model this ratio must exceed a critical level in order for FDI to be increasing in the 
equilibrium.  
Raff and von der Ruhr perform separate panel regressions for business services and 
FIRE (financial, insurance, and real estate services). Various interaction terms are also tested to 
determine whether or not initial critical levels of manufacturing FDI impact FDI in services. They 
use a random effects specification and add serial correlation corrections in additional robustness 
tests. A fixed effects model is not used due to missing observations; however, they also exclude 
time and country fixed effects which are an important method of eliminating bias in a cross-
country time series of data. The model used assumes that all effects have a mean of zero and 
that the random error associated with each cross-section unit is uncorrelated with the other 
regressors, something that is not likely to be the case in a panel analysis of this data.  
The results from the panel analysis show that the informational barrier to entry is easier 
to overcome in markets with a significant home country presence of downstream multinationals. 
They found that if U.S. - owned manufacturing exceeded 2% of host country GDP, the impact of 
host market size on U.S. business-service FDI is increasing. This is in line with the theoretical 
model which claims the critical share of informed customers is a major determinant of the 
success of foreign service providers within a host economy. The basic regressions in the 
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empirical analysis do advance the economic literature on FDI in services. However, the simple 
treatment of the barriers to FDI in services is clearly inadequate and the specification is 
problematic as well.  Measuring and quantifying barriers to services is an integral part of 
understanding the impact of service liberalization on multinational firms’ decisions to locate in a 
particular country.  
In a widely cited and influential study, Dee and Hanslow (2000) compare estimates of the 
gains from eliminating barriers to trade and investment in services with the gains from eliminating 
all post-Uruguay Round barriers to trade in agriculture and manufacturing. They use an advanced 
computer program in order to integrate a large database into a complex model. The model, called 
FTAP, incorporates bilateral FDI, capital accumulation, international borrowing and lending into 
GTAP, a trade modeling program which already has a large database imbedded in it that includes 
all post-Uruguay round tariffs and NTBs on manufacturing and agricultural goods. The model 
disaggregates firms by location and then by ownership, which captures the existence of foreign 
affiliates. Each firm ownership type then makes its choice of intermediate inputs and investment 
goods from various sources. Investors in each economy divide their wealth between bonds, real 
physical capital, and land and natural resources in their country of residence. They then choose 
an industry to invest in and whether they want to invest in that industry at home or abroad. 
Investors who choose the foreign industry must decide on a specific country or region for their 
investment. Therefore, in line with the model in Markusen, Rutherford, and Tarr (2005) the FTAP 
model incorporates the firm-level product differentiation that is associated with monopolistic 
competition. The authors admit that the elasticities were chosen with the final elasticity of 
transformation in mind and also were chosen in order to obtain results that were comparable to 
experiments done with the GTAP model analyzing liberalization in agricultural and manufacturing 
trade.  
The influential nature of their paper is not the model, but the analysis of real data on 
observed barriers to trade and investment, bilateral trade flows, bilateral FDI stocks by sector, 
rates of return, the existing GTAP data on cost and structures of firms, and many country level 
characteristics.  The program utilizes all this information and provides estimated gains from 
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liberalization. Other than the elasticities the only other unobserved variable is a quantitative 
measure of the barriers to services trade and investment which involved numerous steps to arrive 
at its final measure. The authors begin with estimates of price differentials for telecommunications 
and banking sectors compiled Findlay and Warren (2000) as an estimate for all services sectors 
in their analysis. It is not clear which direction the bias is in from this assumption as the authors 
do not clarify if the barriers in these two industries are higher or lower than other service sectors.  
The results from the FTAP model estimates that the world gains at least US$260 billion 
annually as a result of eliminating all post-Uruguay trade barriers in services, agriculture, and 
manufacturing. Of this, US$50 billion and US$80 billion are the estimates from liberalizing trade in 
agriculture and manufacturing, respectively. These results lend support to those committed to 
WTO liberalization talks concerning the traditional sectors. The remaining US$130 billion in world 
gains result from the liberalization in services. This considerable amount is a bit misleading, as 
US$100 billion of the gains are realized when China fully liberalizes. The agricultural and 
manufacturing gains attributed to China are not made explicit but intuitively the manufacturing 
gains could be a large percentage of the US$80 billion in global gains.  
The US$260 billion in gains is calculated from the results of the FTAP model which states 
the percentage of GDP gained after liberalization. Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, China, and 
Taiwan are the biggest gainers from a percentage of GDP perspective while the EU, USA, 
Canada, Australia see very small percentage gains and Singapore experiences a loss. These 
results show that Southeast Asian countries seem to be driving the global gains from 
liberalization in services as well as in manufacturing and agriculture.  
While the estimation of gains from the liberalization in services is an important piece in 
understanding the relationship between FDI in services and barriers to trade and investment in 
services, my analysis is more concerned with the realized impacts that liberalization in services 
has on FDI. Therefore, measuring the liberalization in service sectors is a vital issue. One of the 
most thorough analysis which attempts to quantify liberalization in services is a case study of 
Tunisia by Konan and Maskus (2005). They compare goods versus services liberalization using a 
CGE model which provides results for welfare, outputs, and factor prices. Liberalization in 
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services results in gains from two general sources: increased economic activity nationwide, and 
increased real returns to both labor and capital.  
Konan and Maskus begin with a general model of a small open economy (Tunisia) with 
restrictions to foreign investment in the production of services. The distortions are assumed to 
raise the entry costs for foreign multinational firms who want to establish an affiliate in Tunisia 
and limit the rights of the foreign multinationals who are able to establish a commercial presence. 
The results from this benchmark environment are compared to a simulation that removes the 
barriers to investment. One distortion is defined as a cartel effect that effectively involves a 
markup on the price of the services due to market power of local firms. The excessive regulation 
of service providers within the sector or government ownership of the sector is the cause for this 
effect. The second distortion is a cost inefficiency effect which captures the resource loss due to 
barriers to services. This waste factor results in higher marginal costs. These two distortions 
combine to create the wedge between price and true marginal costs. Unfortunately, there is no 
way to separate the waste factor and the ad valorem markup components of the wedge. Konan 
and Maskus address this issue by varying the share of each distortion in the price-cost wedge in 
various simulations. 
The data used in the model consists of import and export trade flows by region, sectoral 
tax and tariff rates, and elasticities of substitution and transformation. The benchmark trade 
elasticities are not provided in the data so the authors use values calculated in Konan and 
Maskus (2000) and Rutherford, Rustrom, and Tarr (1995). All data is for 1995 and is assembled 
into relationships which model intermediate demand, final demand, and value added amounts. 
The barriers to trade and investment in services are measured through industry level studies and 
extensive discussions with industry experts and government officials, as well as economists 
studying the Tunisian economy.  
Initially, they consider the liberalization of investment barriers in services with various 
weights for the ad valorem markup versus the resource loss components of the price-cost wedge. 
Welfare gains to liberalization are found to be increasing with the initial share of the resource loss 
component of the wedge. This is consistent with the fact that there are rents accruing to some 
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individuals in the economy from the markup, while the inefficiency causing barriers result in pure 
economic loss. The authors then compare investment barrier liberalization and border barrier 
liberalization to determine if one type of barrier is more costly than another. Investment barrier 
liberalization is found to be responsible for 75 percent of the total gains to service liberalization. 
Again, this result is in agreement with the theoretical predictions as most services are non-traded 
and border barriers and are likely to affect trade more than investment. The empirical 
confirmation of this theoretical suspicion has definite policy implications for governments 
worldwide.  
A disaggregated analysis is performed next at the sector level to determine differences in 
gains to liberalization across sectors. From this analysis the results show that 41 percent of the 
welfare gains in liberalization are attributed to the transportation and financial sectors alone, 
which again has policy implications. The final analysis Konan and Maskus undertake is a 
comparison of goods liberalization and services liberalization. The results find additive gains with 
liberalization of both goods and services and surprisingly little change to the structure of the 
economy lending credibility to modeling services as an intermediate input. Overall, the potential 
welfare gains to liberalization of trade and investment in services are significant and positive for 
Tunisia. The conservative estimates show an increase in welfare and GDP of more than seven 
percent, which is more than three times the gains to goods liberalization only. Konan and Maskus 
set the bar for further country case studies of measuring the impacts of liberalization and in their 
combination of theory and data in a complex and elegant analysis.  
All of these papers have diverse and valuable contributions to the literature on 
liberalization of trade and investment in services. In addition to the large impacts of liberalization, 
the political environment in host countries not only is endogenous to liberalization itself but also 
may independently affect a firm’s decision to invest. This area of research is very meager. The 
theory of the effects of political risk on FDI is discussed in Janeba (2002). His analysis consists of 
adding the option to invest in multiple countries to the traditional two country model of 
multinational location choice and profit maximization with taxes and subsidies imbedded in it as 
well. The claim that non-credible governments can compensate by offering subsidies or tax 
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breaks to foreign firms is found to be weak when you allow the multinational firm to invest in other 
countries.  Bengoa and Sanchez-Robles (2002) do an empirical analysis of FDI, economic 
freedom, and growth. They examine a panel of 18 Latin-American countries from 1970-1999 in 
order to estimate the effects of economic freedom on both inward FDI and GDP growth. Their 
results show a significant and positive relationship between the index of economic freedom and 
FDI as a share of GDP. This is related to the empirical findings that multinationals do not take 
advantage of low cost environments when there are higher levels of exogenous risk due to a lack 
of government credibility or stability.  
Jensen (2003) executes a more detailed analysis in order to empirically attempt to 
quantify the relationship between political institutions and FDI. The majority of studies in this area 
try to estimate the effects of political institutions on overall economic growth. However, Jensen 
points out that the potential effects of these institutions on FDI are significant on their own. He 
claims that the credibility associated with democratic regimes is attractive to MNEs due to the 
smaller risk of nationalization, expropriation or distortive taxation. The initial investment required 
to establish a foreign affiliate is substantial and immobile. Expropriation is not a common 
occurrence; however, governments do renegotiate tax rates, vary tariff rates, impose capital 
controls, and endorse other policies which affect the profitability of foreign affiliates. The number 
of checks and balances associated with democratic institutions is a clear advantage to minimizing 
these risks.  
The centerpiece analysis in this paper is a panel analysis with 114 countries for the 
period 1970-1997 with time and country fixed effects and panel-corrected standard errors and 
finds that the coefficient for democracy is again significant and positive and increases in FDI 
inflows as a percent of GDP range in value from 1.9% to 2.1%.  For robustness, Jensen excludes 
OECD countries, drops the variable on GDP growth (it may be correlated with democracy), and 
uses a different democracy variable from an alternative source. The results are unchanged. While 
the regressions use aggregated data, which has the usual aggregation bias, the results show that 
democratic regimes have a significant and positive effect on inward FDI. 
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The political nature of liberalization makes the addition of these variables both intuitive 
and interesting. Their inclusion also lends an additional aspect to potential policy 
recommendations for host countries. This paper is only a first step in a multilateral analysis of the 
effects of restrictions to investment in services and it may raise more questions than it answers. It 
remains an important step in the direction of understanding this undeveloped research area. 
III. Theoretical Background  
In the examination of the relationship between U.S. FDI in services and the liberalization 
of investment and trade in services abroad it is necessary to perform both a theoretical and an 
empirical analysis.  The theoretical foundation and model underlying U.S. FDI in services and the 
effects of barriers to investment are an important part of my project even though my analysis is 
primarily empirical.  
The theoretical intuition behind the relationship between the liberalization of service 
industries abroad and U.S. FDI in services comes from the literature relating to FDI in producer 
services (Markusen, Rutherford, and Tarr; 2005) as well as models of liberalization for specific 
economies (Konan and Maskus, 2005).  Additionally, Markusen’s knowledge capital (KK) model 
(Markusen, 1997) provides both insight and a theoretical foundation for my econometric model. 
Using a framework developed by Markusen, Rutherford, and Tarr (2005), professional and 
financial services are modeled as intermediate inputs in the production of a final good. The 
services are differentiated from one another and are also differentiated by firm origin. The 
knowledge intensity of services and subsequent productivity gains from technological innovation 
gives support to the claim of increasing returns to scale as characterizing service firms.  Faini 
(1984) presents evidence for IRS in producer services and finds strong support for it; however, he 
does point out that the quantitative magnitude of the scale economies will vary across countries 
and firms.  
It is assumed that there are only three inputs in the production of the final goods. These 
are skilled labor, a composite labor/capital factor, and business/producer services. Service 
production is skilled labor intensive regardless where it takes place. Unlike vertical manufacturing 
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FDI, the majority of MNE service production serves all types of firms in the host market and 
imports back to the U.S. are assumed to be negligible.  In this context, the multinational service 
firm makes a cost minimizing decision on where to establish a foreign affiliate. This decision 
depends on the factor endowments, market size, political environment, barriers to investment and 
trade in services, factor prices, and firm specific issues such as global geographic strategies. 
Obviously, additional country characteristics will affect a firm’s decision and these can be thought 
of as country-specific effects. 
The knowledge capital model (Markusen, 1997) lends theoretical background to my 
analysis in various ways. Although services are intuitively and historically non-traded there is 
existence of both vertical and horizontal service affiliates abroad. As the information and 
communication technologies (ICT) revolutionized the way firms do business the benefits of 
vertical FDI became apparent. This is largely a new phenomenon as it requires significant levels 
of technology. Information intensive services which do not require personal contact can now be 
done anywhere in the world with an ICT infrastructure and workers with the necessary skills. 
Offshoring elements of production to foreign affiliates are no longer unique to manufacturing and 
are beginning to be utilized for a wide range of services. Some MNEs will outsource services 
abroad to non-affiliated companies and this is an area I will not be discussing and the data on 
such investment is not included in my data. Any vertical FDI in producer services is contained in 
my dataset and therefore while the values are a very small percentage of overall FDI their 
existence identifies an area for future analysis and data disaggregation. This idea is further 
supported by the fact that during the period 1997-2002 more than 70% of the imports of business, 
professional, and technical services into the U.S were imported from a foreign affiliate by the 
parent company. (UNCTAD, 2004) This indicates a significant relationship between FDI and trade 
in professional services in recent years and the likelihood of an even greater one going forward. 
Over the period of study in this analysis, the majority of FDI in services is market seeking and 
therefore horizontal. While the separation of vertical and horizontal MNEs is not possible in my 
empirical analysis I feel that it is important to substantiate my discussion of the KK model in the 
context of U.S. FDI in services.  
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The initial establishment of a service affiliate is going to be affected by investment 
barriers much more significantly than by trade costs because they are not facing competition from 
other importers in many cases where services cannot be provided through cross-border trade. 
This fact is why Markusen’s traditional KK model can not fully apply in this analysis. The empirical 
estimation of the KK model in Carr, Markusen, and Maskus (2001) find that U.S. outward FDI is 
increasing in the sum of economic size between the parent and the host (similarity in size), the 
relative skilled labor abundance of the host country and the higher level of trade costs. They also 
find that U.S. foreign affiliate sales are decreasing with investment costs. Higher levels of trade 
costs reduced overall FDI but were offset by the market size effect which significantly increased 
horizontal FDI. Restrictions on the establishment of a service affiliate as well as the operations of 
a foreign service affiliate are hypothesized to have negative effects on U.S. FDI in services to that 
country. It is possible, however, that higher trade costs could have a positive effect on FDI in 
services as well due to the likely correlation between manufacturing FDI and FDI in producer 
services.   
Considering the various types of restrictions and their applications is essential when 
modeling the cost effects of barriers to investment. Konan and Maskus (2005) disaggregate the 
total price wedge between the world market price/fair trade price and the actual price of for a 
specific service in order to determine the effect of various restrictions. They consider two different 
effects; the first of these is a cartel effect from establishment restrictions. This arises most often 
from excessive regulation that limits domestic and/or foreign participants in a service industry 
resulting in significant market power for the existing firms. The resulting market power leads to 
inefficiency, cartel behavior, and significant rents accruing to the owners of these firms and any 
officials they may be bribing, as the firms are able to charge a price above marginal cost. 
An additional effect of restrictions to FDI in services is related to the firm’s utilization of 
resources. Restrictions on domestic content, nationality or citizenship, percentage of foreign 
ownership allowed, reinvestment restrictions, excessively corruptive/time wasting bureaucratic 
procedures and any other barriers to investment which cost the firm time, money, or other 
resources are all elements of this waste factor. These added costs increase the marginal cost to 
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the firm and rather than the price differential leading to rents, it is a pure economic loss due to the 
reduction of resources in production. 
Obviously, varying levels of enforcement and severity of restrictions will have more or 
less of a cartel effect or a resource loss effect. The magnitude of these effects is important for the 
explanation and discussion of the econometric results. My initial analysis of the data will quite 
basic as I will not include prices. At this stage in my research these are unobtainable for the entire 
panel but are needed to make quantitative claim about restrictions’ effects on consumers’ welfare, 
factor prices, and GDP. The various effects of different types of restrictions has been obvious to 
policy makers through anecdotal evidence but the liberalization of resource wasting restrictions 
may lead to larger aggregate gains than liberalizing the monopolized but efficient sectors (Konan 
and Maskus, 2005). 
Political institutions and overall environment is also likely to affect the attractiveness of a 
particular country as a host location for US FDI. It is intuitive that government credibility is 
appealing to MNEs due to the perceived smaller risk of nationalization, expropriation or distortive 
taxation. (Jensen, 2003) Whether or not this credibility is associated with specific observable 
political variables is something I will try to begin to determine. The lack of international investment 
agreements for services results in many governments having the ability to affect the market 
power of firms in certain industries, enact discriminatory regulations (waste factor increased), and 
pursue further policies that negatively affect service affiliate’s productivity and/or profitability. The 
slow process of GATS has not even addressed the absence of a dispute settlement process for 
service investment related issues, which only increases government’s legal leverage to pursue 
discriminatory or “creeping expropriation” policies.  
Certain service affiliates are more sensitive to political risk in that they require a presence 
in the country (non-tradability assumption holding) and the initial fixed costs of establishment are 
a significant sunk cost once undertaken. U.S. parent MNEs want to maximize the profits of their 
affiliates and will weigh the political risk of potential host countries’ as it relates to the riskiness of 
recouping and profiting from their initial investment. The policy changes and restrictions 
discussed above may be thought to be more frequent in non-democratic countries due to fewer 
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checks on the power of the executive branch. In practice, it’s crucial that the degree of democracy 
used in an empirical analysis is not be self-reported but is a combination of observed 
characteristics within the country’s social, political, and judicial environments. In this respect, I 
expect that FDI in services will have a negative relationship with the “market power” within the 
government. 
IV. The Theoretical Model 
In order to account for both the ad valorem and fixed cost effects that arise from 
restrictions on FDI in services they must be integrated into the cost functions for multinational 
firms. Once this is achieved it is possible to make some theoretical assumptions about the signs 
of the variables in the empirical analysis. Following basic KK theory, a multinational firm in the 
home country i (US) is more likely to choose to invest in country j if country j has a larger market 
(GDP) and more skilled workers. In manufacturing affiliate production, high trade costs often lead 
to establishing an affiliate to serve the foreign market rather than satisfy demand through exports. 
Producer services on the other hand, are largely non-traded and therefore FDI in services 
responds most dramatically to changes in host country characteristics because the firm does not 
have the option of exporting to the market. Restrictions to investment in services are 
hypothesized to have a significant negative effect on FDI; however, the prevalence of a certain 
level of barriers to services investment in most countries may actually result in conflicting effects. 
While high levels of restrictions should deter FDI, low levels of restrictions may lead to increases 
in FDI. This possibility has implications for my data analysis as well as the theoretical predictions 
for certain variables and will be addressed. 
While the theoretical model discussed here is not formally developed to the level that it is 
solvable in a complex general equilibrium sense, it does provide structural framework for my 
empirical analysis. I will specify a model that is very similar to the model in Markusen, Rutherford, 
and Tarr (2005) with adjustments to the cost functions for the foreign produced service and the 
removal of traded inputs.  
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Producer services are modeled as intermediate inputs which can be differentiated by type 
and by firm origin. There are two final goods in the model, X and Y, which are produced with two 
domestic factors, skilled labor(S) and a composite factor (L) and X is skilled labor intensive 
relative to Y. The factor endowments of S and L are assumed to be fixed and immobile across 
countries. The two final goods in the economy are X and Y, while the combination of domestic 
(ZD) and foreign (ZM) provided services enters into the production of X. The foreign provided 
service is a function of domestic skilled labor as well as the domestic composite factor and a 
foreign knowledge capital component. The prices for these are r , w and PH respectively.  
The production functions for this model are as follows: 
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The production of X is assumed to be skilled labor intensive relative to Y and therefore 
αx> αy. The elasticities of substitution are assumed to be symmetric across varieties of services 
and across domestic and foreign services in the baseline scenario. The costs for producing the 
domestic and foreign services determine the demand for the foreign services as well as whether 
a foreign affiliate would succeed in the market. These cost functions are as follows: 
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The demand for the foreign input H
 
depends on the partial derivative of the cost function 
CD with respect to PH respectively as well as the number of foreign firms producing services. This 
foreign input H includes knowledge capital such as technical expertise, engineering degrees, as 
well as physical capital such as computer systems, that the parent company exports to the 
affiliate for use in services production. In equilibrium, marginal revenue will equal marginal cost. 
The marginal revenue for foreign services is equal to the value of the service within the 
production of the final good X and is therefore straightforward to calculate. 
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While these equilibrium equations are by no means a formal model they do provide the 
theoretical structure for my empirical analysis, lend support to the essence of my study.  
 
V. Empirical Analysis 
The empirical analysis in the following section utilizes a database of panel data for 39 
countries over the period 1984-2002. The data on services FDI (sales by US majority owned 
foreign affiliates-MOFAs) is collected by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) on an annual 
basis through extensive surveys of all U.S. multinational firms. While disaggregated data for FDI 
in services is available at the industry level for seven countries, in order to have information on a 
larger number of countries the data is aggregated into four categories of services. These are: 
wholesale services; professional, scientific and technical services (PST); financial services 
(except depository); and the remaining is simply labeled other services. In order to examine the 
effects of liberalization on U.S. FDI, I am only concerned with professional, scientific, and 
technical services and non-depository financial services. These services can all be identified as 
business services and are typically intermediate producer services such as insurance, 
accounting, engineering, legal, information, financial (non-depository), research and development 
and others. These categories represent a significant amount of the increase in FDI in services 
over the last decade. In fact, information services became their own category in 1999 after being 
26 
 
separated from the other professional services. These industries are also increasingly targeted 
for liberalization negotiations due to traditionally being highly restricted.  
The dependent variable in the econometric model is U.S. foreign affiliate sales in the 
financial and PST service categories. It is generally accepted that market size is a consistent 
determinant of FDI and I will follow Carr, Markusen, and Maskus (2001) and use both the sum 
and the difference (or the difference squared) between US GDP and the host country’s GDP as 
measures of how similarity and difference in economic size affect FDI in services. Following the 
theoretical assumption that services are more skilled labor intensive, I include another variable 
used by Markusen, Maskus, and Carr (1998) which is the difference between the share of skilled 
labor in the US and the host country. These shares are constructed using occupational 
employment data from the ILO.  Following the results obtained by Raff and von der Ruhr (2001) I 
will also include a specification with the current or lagged value of U.S. foreign affiliate 
manufacturing sales as an independent variable. This variable could represent a level of 
information the multinational firm has about the host country market and will pick up the amount 
of FDI in services that may be following manufacturing FDI in order to supply intermediate 
services to those operations.  
The dataset includes 741 country-year observations for the dependent variable. As one 
would expect there is a significant amount of variance in U.S. FDI in producer services across 
countries. This is essential to obtaining any interesting results; however, it also can result in 
econometric issues during analysis. Table 1 contains the sample mean for each country of U.S. 
FDI in producer services in millions of 1995 U.S. Dollars and Figure 1 illustrates the same data. 
Clearly, the level of investment to the United Kingdom is well above that of any other country, 
including the other major investment recipients such as Japan and Canada. For this reason I will 
exclude the United Kingdom from some specifications in order to determine whether it is driving 
any of the other results by being such a significant outlier. 
TABLE 1 
Host Country and Sample Mean of U.S. FDI in Producer Services for 1984-2002 
ARGj 1238.39 DENj 454.42 INDOj 229.22 PHIj 208.50 
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AUSj 5437.90 EGYj 515.89 INDj 356.21 PORj 321.47 
AUTj 601.16 ESPj 1440.71 IREj 3216.61 ROKj 823.44 
BELj 3271.00 FINj 2403.11 ISRj 746.05 SAFj 363.63 
BRAj 3169.47 FRAj 15929.37 ITAj 3031.21 SINj 1959.74 
CANj 17329.89 GBRj 37540.05 JAPj 20228.89 SWEj 1328.42 
CHIj 843.67 GERj 10682.53 MALj 808.84 SWIj 3117.37 
CHNj 355.00 GREj 1003.89 MEXj 2153.94 TURj 124.56 
COLj 222.58 HKOj 5500.32 NORj 437.21 VENj 514.56 
COSj 219.58 HOLj 7748.31 NZEj 444.72 TOTAL 4021.34 
 
FIGURE 1: Sample Mean of Majority Owned US Affiliates’ Sales in Producer Services 
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In addition to the mean level of U.S. foreign affiliate sales having a significant range 
across the countries in the sample, the change in the level of FDI over the period 1984-2002 is 
undoubtedly also important for research in this area. Table 2 contains the percent change in the 
dependent variable, which is total foreign affiliate sales in producer services, for each country 
over two different time periods. The percentage change in U.S. FDI in producer services is 
calculated for the entire sample period as well as a sub-period of 1990-1998 which can help 
illustrate some of the patterns in the level of investment for a particular country. 
TABLE 2 
Percent Change in US FDI in Producer Services 
Country 1984-2002 1990-1998 
Argentina 874.883 4225.633 
Australia 284.068 131.423 
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Austria 316.126 176.072 
Belgium 365.006 43.656 
Brazil 1109.090 519.809 
Canada 104.366 13.455 
Chile 1310.106 680.329 
China 8955.641 2306.343 
Columbia 1135.378 456.467 
Costa Rica 688.584 86.116 
Denmark 119.667 100.393 
Egypt -88.478 49.291 
Finland 529.033 15.931 
France 49.903 163.746 
Germany 483.998 156.978 
Greece 143.922 72.450 
Hong Kong 34.825 107.004 
India 235.283 87.996 
Indonesia 286.014 3396.720 
Ireland 274.365 1303.263 
Israel 46.776 38.647 
Italy 8518.302 342.994 
Japan 723.200 234.735 
Korea 2894.026 305.915 
Malaysia 5131.452 4346.098 
Mexico 963.699 327.948 
Netherlands 104.910 57.756 
New Zealand 380.572 216.341 
Norway 311.977 451.874 
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Philippines 1204.109 715.767 
Portugal 109.475 146.304 
Singapore 1317.549 111.100 
South Africa 576.211 3713.180 
Spain 33.374 74.891 
Sweden 239.620 482.730 
Switzerland 267.419 110.063 
Turkey 62.355 -4.092 
United Kingdom 89.017 119.163 
Venezuela 554.617 970.770 
 
The countries which have large differences in these two statistics are often those who 
enjoyed large increases in U.S. FDI in the years since 1999, endured a crisis in one of the years 
used in the calculation (Argentina), or had either very low or unusually high values of FDI in 1984 
and then experienced a jump or drop in FDI for various reasons. While the use of country fixed 
effects is obviously necessary for this type of panel analysis, these statistics give some additional 
information about the emerging importance of this type of investment in countries all over the 
world.   
The contribution of my analysis is dependent on assembling a dataset various restrictions 
to foreign direct investment in services. I am not attempting to provide new industry or sector 
benchmark data; however, all new areas of analysis must begin with an initial analysis of the 
issue in question.  
 
VI. Data for Analysis 
VI.1 Measuring Restrictions to Investment in Services  
To attempt to estimate the effects of liberalization I have to construct measures of 
existing barriers to investment and trade in services that will serve as the variables of interest in 
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this analysis. There is no single source for data on barriers to trade and investment in services 
and a desired result of all my work is a coherent compilation of restrictions to foreign involvement 
in the service industries I am examining. For this project I will use GATS schedules of 
commitments, as well as documents from the UN, World Bank, and the USTR on each country in 
my dataset in order to create a general services investment restrictions variable for my analysis. 
There are many types of restrictions in service industries, any many are not easily 
observed or quantified. The major restrictions and their sub-categories include: 
Foreign ownership restrictions 
• No foreign equity 
• Less than 30% foreign ownership 
• Between 30-50% foreign ownership 
• Between 50-100% foreign ownership 
Citizenship and/or residency restrictions 
• All workers 
• Chairman and all the Board of Directors 
• Required for professional license/certification 
• Percentage of board/managers 
Anti-Competitive practices 
• Monopolies in service industries 
• Cartel behavior 
• No new firms allowed 
Discriminatory practices 
• Licenses and/or number of foreign firms restricted differently from 
domestic 
• Restricted to certain economic zones 
• Full access restricted in other ways 
• Economic needs test for foreign firms 
Financial restrictions 
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• Capital controls 
• Restrictions on reinvestment 
Resource waste and/or inefficiency causing restrictions  
• Rampant corruption 
• Excessive bureaucratic red tape 
Other resource wasting restrictions (lack of transparency, bribery, etc) 
• Programs affecting services provision (0=best, 1=none) 
• Privatization of service industries (0=best, 1=none) 
• Liberalization of services industries 
• Economic reform affecting service industries  
Carefully specifying the barriers to investment in services is essential in determining the 
magnitude of the cost to the multinational firm or to the host country consumers due to lack of 
efficiency and/or market power. Therefore, an important element of any analysis is to attempt to 
aggregate with as little bias as possible the various types of restrictions for a given country in a 
given area of analysis. 
Different types of barriers to foreign direct investment in services affect firms in various 
ways. Restrictions can either be concerned with the establishment of a firm (commercial 
presence is necessary for the provision of many services) or with the operation of a firm that is 
already established. Additionally, restrictions can be discriminatory in nature, applying only to 
foreign firms, or they can be nondiscriminatory and apply to the domestic firms as well. Within 
these general classifications each restriction is unique in its application and enforcement, creating 
further difficulties in measurement and application. Each type of restriction results in diverse 
market effects and this is ideally accounted for in the construction of these measures. In this initial 
analysis, it is not possible to quantify the different cost and productivity effects of the various 
restrictions specified; however, it is possible to identify the sign and significance of individual 
restrictions effects on the level of U.S. FDI in producer services. I leave for future work the task of 
incorporating factor and services prices into the analysis. 
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Once the work of identifying restrictions on foreign investment in services is completed to 
the best of my ability, the next step is choosing weights to represent the restrictiveness of a 
particular barrier. Previous work in this area has generally modeled barriers to trade and 
investment in services as imposing an additional cost on the firm or the consumers which 
appears as a price wedge. This is often referred to as the tariff equivalent of a restriction. 
Unfortunately, these studies often use only one sector to represent the price wedge for all 
business service industries.  
 
In my research I gathered and read documents on laws, treaties, published research, 
international agreements or disputes and any other information from legitimate sources 
concerning a wide range of industries. Due to the available of usable data I focused on the 
following industries: accounting, legal, engineering, architecture, computer software, data 
management/processing, communications, financial services (non-retail depository banking), 
insurance, and general scientific R&D. In order to weight each barrier for each country-year I 
used the available data to capture not only the restrictiveness of a barrier but also its coverage to 
the sectors listed above. Due to incomplete data for all sectors for all countries I only accounted 
for the data I did have. This is a significant issue for the residency/citizenship requirements in 
particular. Many countries have residency and/or citizenship restrictions on members of the Board 
of Directors, CEOs, and even for any licensed professionals in their accounting, legal, and 
engineering sectors that are much more restrictive than for other business services. While there 
are certainly discrepancies and subjective elements in this initial effort at creating a panel dataset 
on services restrictions I feel it is complete enough to perform an econometric analysis and 
hopefully obtain results that direct the next step in this area of research.  
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VI.2 Political Institution Variables 
The second part of the econometric model is measuring the effect of host country political 
variables. Using data from the Polity IV database, I will look at whether a country’s degree of 
democracy or autocracy affects the level of U.S. FDI in services. The two variables of interest are 
Democracy which ranges from 1 to 10 (strongly democratic) and Autocracy which also ranges 
from 1 to 10 (strongly autocratic). These variables depend on the regulation and competitiveness 
of “recruiting” and electing the country’s chief executive, the constraints on the chief executive 
(judicial, legislative, etc.) and the ability for the public to participate in the political system 
(regulation, class discrimination, corruption, etc). There is no overlap of categories for the two 
variables however there are coding issues when there is missing data or a war and the Polity IV 
database eliminates these and creates a Polity2 variable which has a scale from -10 to 10 and 
eliminates the potential for data analysis problems with their coding.  In addition to including the 
Polity2 variable I will also include a variable Durable that is the number of years since the last 
regime change, which is defined as a change in the regime variable (Democracy or Autocracy) of 
3 points or more. This variable may capture some the effects of political crises, coups, and other 
regime changing events on the level of FDI in services industries.  
 
VII. Econometric Model 
Using panel data for the econometric estimation creates additional issues in this analysis 
but is the desired estimation technique for the data being utilized. Fixed time (year) and country 
specific effects must be included in the model to control for proper error handling and elimination 
of outlier effects. These are especially important for countries which underwent serious changes 
during the period in question. To improve the fit of the model, and account for widely differing 
variances across variables, I use a weighted least squares technique with the country and time 
specific fixed effects. 
 While I previously explained the weighting of the variables for each restriction I also 
created an indicator variable for each restriction in order to do some preliminary regressions. 
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These regressions may provide early inference as to whether the existence of a restriction affects 
the level of U.S. FDI. While these regressions will not lend any robust results they are useful in an 
analysis of this undeveloped research field. After displaying these preliminary regressions I will 
discuss a series of nine regressions using the weighted restriction variables.  For each series of 
regressions I first include all the variables with some level of variance and then use a stepwise 
method of eliminating insignificant variables to arrive at what I call a refined analysis. 
In addition to the baseline and refined regressions I also include the value of U.S. foreign 
affiliate manufacturing sales in a third specification. I then perform the same three specifications 
replacing country fixed effects with geographical regional effects that cover North America, Latin 
America, the European Region, and Asia. While the geographic regional coefficients are included 
in these results the country fixed effects are suppressed. The final three regressions exclude the 
United Kingdom but include country fixed effects in order to identify potential outlier effects on the 
results from the full sample.  
 
VIII. Results of the Econometric Analysis 
The existence of variance in both the values of the independent variables as well as the 
dependent variable is the foundation for this regression analysis.  In the previously discussed 
tables (Tables 1 and 2) the summary statistics for the dependent variable are presented. As 
previously mentioned I initially perform regressions using indicator variables for each of the 
restrictions. While these results may exhibit correlation among the variables due to the existence 
of many of the same restrictions across most of the sample, I feel it is interesting to see if these 
results contribute to my notions of what is necessary for a more in depth analysis. 
Table 3 below includes the regression results using the indicator variables on the full 
sample with country fixed effects as will as a specification using the geographical variables in 
place of the country fixed effects. The results for the country fixed effects model are not very 
conclusive because much of the information was picked up by the country effects. The regional 
model produces much more encouraging results where restrictions to establishment (residency 
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requirements for all workers, the entire Board of Directors, or all professionally certified workers) 
are found to have negative effects on FDI in producer services. In addition, less than full access 
to consumers and firms, severe foreign equity/ownership limitations, and reinvestment restrictions 
for foreign firms also have significant negative influences on U.S. FDI in this simple analysis. An 
interesting result from this is that monopoly and cartel behavior deter investment while corruption 
does not. Behaviors or policies that more directly affect establishing or operating an affiliate in a 
producer service industry are going to have much more influence on the decision to operate a 
foreign affiliate by the parent company in the U.S. than political parties or the overall political 
ideals. This idea as well as the possibility that some restrictions may actually increase investment 
due to: their existence conveys some level of institutional development, or that they were enacted 
after a period of increasing investment in order to protect against risky capital that may flow into 
the country. Obviously, these are country specific issues that can only be touched on in a 
multilateral analysis such as this one, however, they are important and will play a significant role 
in future research in this area of study. 
TABLE 3 
Dependent Variable: Total Sales in Services by U.S. Foreign Affiliates 
Country Fixed Effects Regional Indicator Variables 
Number of obs = 680 R-Squared: 0.8758 Number of Obs: 661 R-Squared: 0.7151 
Variable Coefficient P-Value Variable Coefficient 
P-
Value 
Privatization of Services 
Industries 46161.43 0 
Privatization of Services 
Industries 856.9646 0.391 
Liberalization of  
Services Industries 2857.887 0.212 
No foreign 
ownership/equity -1716.973 0 
Economic reform 
affecting services 1099.669 0.507 Less than 30% 519.6308 0.36 
Sum of reform variables -49736.01 0 Less than 50% 766.8831 0.051 
No foreign 
ownership/equity 1756.835 0.503 More than 50% -330.4141 0.518 
Less than 30% 84.13994 0.945 All workers must be -557.9743 0.216 
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residents/citizens 
Less than 50% 2965.205 0.089 Board members -2882.206 0 
More than 50% -2408.628 0.037 
Residency/Citizenship for 
prof. cert. -2230.965 0.003 
All workers must be 
residents/citizens 874.0428 0.519 Chairman/President  4187.178 0 
Board members 886.8905 0.761 
Monopolies in service 
industries -5138.218 0.005 
Residency/Citizenship 
for prof. cert. -4063.632 0.308 Cartel behavior -4120.356 0 
Chairman/President  7065.67 0.003 No new firms allowed 2392.998 0 
Cartel behavior -8886.921 0.054 Discriminatory licensing 1642.858 0.008 
No new firms allowed 4598.165 0.035 Restricted access -4589.112 0.002 
Discriminatory licensing 9277.207 0 Full access -552.7669 0.118 
Restricted access 1254.543 0.802 Economic needs tests 567.8938 0.254 
Full access 1723.834 0.316 Rampant corruption 1004.003 0.099 
Economic needs tests 548.4011 0.751 
Excessive bureaucratic red 
tape 553.9989 0.486 
Rampant corruption -3184.351 0.476 Other resource wasting 1734.88 0.001 
Excessive bureaucratic 
red tape 1982.918 0.552 Capital controls -325.7459 0.477 
Other resource wasting 4240.851 0.12 Reinvestment restrictions -2049.956 0 
Reinvestment 
restrictions 1497.401 0.446 Diff. in skilled labor endow. 2780.999 0.258 
Diff. in skilled labor 
endow. 4403.359 0.328 Diff in GDP -2.646927 0 
Diff in GDP -0.7769959 0.073 Sum of GDP 3.426778 0 
Sum of GDP 1.999075 0 Latin America -1559.68 0.142 
Constant -13856.7 0.01 Asia  -2542.382 0.003 
     North America 4492.097 0 
     European Region -2318.132 0.004 
      Constant 1176.097 0.502 
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The rest of the regressions presented and discussed in this paper include the weighted 
variables (0-1) for each restriction. All regressions use the weighted least squares technique and 
include time and country fixed effects except for the specifications 4-6 which contain regional 
dummies instead. Table 4 contains the first three specifications. The baseline specification does 
not support the KK model predictions for the difference in GDP and skilled labor endowments with 
insignificant coefficients for both variables. This is likely due to country fixed effects picking up the 
GDP and labor endowment differences. Privatization programs, restrictions of more than 50% 
foreign ownership, citizenship/residency restrictions for the CEO and board, and full access to the 
market are all found to have significant positive effects on the level of U.S. FDI in producer 
services. Restrictions of less than 50% ownership, mandatory chairman residency, professional 
licensing residency requirements, cartel behavior, and restrictions blocking any new foreign firms 
have significant negative effects. These results do make sense and are a good start in 
determining where to work on disaggregating the restrictions to the industry level as well as which 
restrictions to focus on obtaining better quantitative data for. It is also true that the baseline 
results have statistically insignificant coefficients for some variables that should have effects on 
the level of foreign affiliate sales from an economic point of view,.  Hopefully, once these 
restrictions can be quantified, economic and statistical significance will be in line with one 
another.  
The refined regression has the same significant variables as above but also finds that 
corruption, capital controls, GDP sum, and skilled labor difference have significant positive effects 
while bureaucratic red tape and GDP difference have negative effects. This seems to support the 
KK model assumption that U.S. FDI flows largely to similar sized countries. It’s my opinion that 
the positive coefficients for corruption could be due to substituting foreign affiliate production for 
cross border trade in services.  A corrupt government may be more easily dealt with from within 
rather than afar where bureaucratic red tape is cost increasing for the affiliate and its negative 
effect is also expected. The results are quite encouraging that certain restrictions on residency, 
ownership, establishment, as well as particular government/administration behaviors that affect 
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foreign service providers, have significant negative effects on the amount of FDI in producer 
services that flows into a specific country.  
The final specification in Table 4 includes manufacturing affiliate sales as an additional 
independent variable. This follows the theory that some services investment is following 
manufacturing investment into a country in order to provide the producer services necessary for 
those manufacturing affiliates. The results show that manufacturing FDI does have a strong 
positive influence on services FDI and there are similar results for the restriction variables as 
were in the previous specifications.  
Table 4 
Full Sample: Time and Country Fixed Effects, Weighted Least Squares 
Dependent Variable: Total Affiliate Sales in Producer Services (millions of 1995 USD) 
Baseline Regression Stepwise Refined Baseline Regression 
Affiliate Sales in Goods Included: 
Baseline 
Number of 
Obs: 646 R-Squared: 0.815 
Number of Obs: 
646 R-Squared: 0.822 
Number 
of Obs: 
636 R-Squared: 0.823 
Independent 
Variable Coef. t-stat p 
Independent 
Variable Coef. t-stat p 
Indepen
dent 
Variable Coef. 
t-
stat P 
Constant -34476 -4.5 0 constant 9906.95 1.49 0.14 Constant -15103 -2.2 0.03 
privatization 
program in 
place 2802.45 2.51 0.01 
privatization 
program in place 3069.15 2.93 0 Rsales 0.18955 6.88 0 
lib_prgm -802.22 -0.3 0.74 
less than 50% 
foreign ownership -7915.1 -3.7 0 
privatizat
ion 
program 
in place 2552.16 2.55 0.01 
zero foreign 
equity/owners
hip allowed -1608.9 -0.5 0.64 
less than 100% 
foreign ownership 11798.9 2.89 0 
less than 
30% 
foreign 
ownershi
p -1556.3 -0.9 0.38 
less than 50% 
foreign 
ownership -6177.9 -2.4 0.02 
all employees must 
be residents 5783.26 2.43 0.02 
less than 
50% 
foreign 
ownershi
p -9812.2 -4.3 0 
less than 
100% foreign 
ownership 14119.9 2.83 0.01 
CEO and Board of 
Directors must be 
residents 12454.4 4.82 0 
all 
employe
es must 5796.67 2.09 0.04 
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be 
residents 
all employees 
must be 
residents 6957.07 2.59 0.01 
residency required 
for professional 
license -9353 -3 0 
CEO/Bo
ard of 
Directors 
must be 
residents 9754.01 3.56 0 
CEO and 
Board of 
Directors must 
be residents 12995.2 4.7 0 
Chairman/CEO/Pre
s.  only must be a 
resident -17213 -4.6 0 
residenc
y 
required 
for 
professio
nal 
license -11329 -3.6 0 
residency 
required for 
professional 
license -9411.9 -2.6 0.01 
cartel behavior 
observed -11103 -4 0 
monopoli
es 
present 1272.88 0.53 0.6 
Only 
Chairman/CE
O/ 
President 
resident -16058 -4 0 
no new foreign 
firms allowed -10746 -2.8 0.01 
cartel 
behavior 
observed -7791.8 -2.5 0.01 
monopolies 
present 672.415 0.25 0.8 
full access for 
foreign firms 6601.21 1.9 0.06 
no new 
foreign 
firms 
allowed -8972.9 -2.3 0.02 
cartel 
behavior 
observed -12467 -4 0 
rampant corruption 
observed/noted 9540.91 2.89 0 
licensing 
discrimin
ation 
against 
foreign 
firms 1233.98 0.55 0.58 
no new 
foreign firms 
allowed -10875 -2.3 0.02 
bureaucratic red 
tape 
observed/noted -10229 -4.2 0 
full 
access 
for 
foreign 
firms 1058.97 0.32 0.75 
licensing 
discrimination 
against 
foreign firms -214.55 -0.1 0.93 
level of 
democracy/autocra
cy (+ is democracy) -695.78 -6.7 0 
economi
c needs 
test 
required 
for 
establish
ment 2087.4 1.02 0.31 
restricted 4282.37 0.76 0.45 capital controls 4582.91 2.7 0.01 rampant 8368.2 2.58 0.01 
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areas of 
operation for 
foreign firms 
corruptio
n 
observed
/noted 
full access for 
foreign firms 9589.2 2.58 0.01 
Sum of US and 
host country GDP 2.85174 6.23 0 
bureaucr
atic red 
tape 
observed
/noted -8078.4 -3 0 
economic 
needs test 
required for 
establishment -305.84 -0.1 0.89 
Difference between 
US and host GDP -0.0001 -3 0 
other 
resource 
wasting 
restrictio
ns exist -5062.4 -1.7 0.09 
rampant 
corruption 
observed/note
d 11690.9 3.22 0 
trade cost index for 
host country 41.2352 1.13 0.26 
level of 
democra
cy/autocr
acy (+ is 
democra
cy) -590.25 -5.9 0 
bureaucratic 
red tape 
observed/note
d -10107 -3.5 0 
overall investment 
cost index for host 
country -8.8594 -0.4 0.72 
capital 
controls 4911.08 2.94 0 
other resource 
wasting 
restrictions 
exist 1924.94 0.49 0.62 
difference in skilled 
labor between US 
and host 11777.9 2.09 0.04 
sum of 
US and 
host 
country 
GDP 0.11075 0.21 0.83 
level of 
democracy/au
tocracy (+ is 
democracy) -721.42 -6.3 0         
Differenc
e 
between 
US and 
host 
GDP 0.91327 1.65 0.1 
regime 
durability 1.8452 0.07 0.95         
trade 
cost 
index for 
host 
country 25.029 1.01 0.31 
capital 
controls 5725.82 2.13 0.03         
overall 
investme
nt cost 
index for 
host 
country 31.9808 0.88 0.38 
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reinvestment 
restrictions -2556.3 -0.8 0.43         
Diff. in 
skilled 
labor 
between 
US and 
host 12728.3 2.36 0.02 
sum of US 
and host 
country GDP 1.77859 3.83 0                 
Difference 
between US 
and host GDP -0.0816 -0.2 0.88                 
trade cost 
index for host 
country 25.6416 0.7 0.49                 
overall 
investment 
cost index for 
host country 9.71802 0.38 0.7                 
difference in 
skilled labor 
between US 
and host 17862.5 3.22 0                 
 
Table 5 includes a similar three specifications using regional dummies instead of country 
fixed effects. The baseline and refined results do not vary much in terms of significant variables 
but do vary a bit in the coefficients’ values. All ownership restrictions, monopoly prevalence, cartel 
behavior, residency requirements for both the CEO AND the Board of Directors, GDP difference 
and capital controls all have negative effects on FDI in producer services. In contrast, corruption, 
residency requirements for the CEO and for professional licensing, discriminatory licensing 
procedures and the sum of the two countries’ GDPs have positive effects on US foreign affiliate 
sales in services. Durability of the political regime also has a positive effect while the polity 
variable has a negative effect. While we may expect a positive effect for democracy over 
autocracy the specification of the variable (-10 to 10) may have an effect. The positive influence 
of a stable government illustrates the possibility that it is the risk of change in rule and not the 
political regime that concerns investors. The regional dummies all have positive and significant 
coefficients and these do not change from the baseline to the refined regression results in their 
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magnitude. The third specification includes foreign affiliate sales as an independent variable with 
much less significant results which is not that surprising with the exclusion of country fixed 
effects. Overall, the use of regional dummies with the investment restrictions has excellent 
potential and the results are quite promising. 
Table 5 
Regional Dummies: Time Fixed Effects, Weighted Least Squares 
Dependent Variable: Total Affiliate Sales in Producer Services (millions of 1995 USD) 
Baseline Regression Stepwise Refined Baseline Regression Affiliate Sales in Goods Included: Baseline 
Number of Obs: 646 R-Squared: 0.598 
Number of 
Obs: 646 R-Squared: 0.601 Number of Obs: 636 R-Squared: 0.699 
Independ
ent 
Variable Coef. t-stat P 
Independent 
Variable Coef. t-stat p Independent Variable Coef. t-stat P 
Constant 
7242.9
2 2.09 0.04 Constant 5470.06 1.87 0.06 Constant 7010.03 2.38 
0.0
2 
Privatization program 
in place -555.68 -0.5 0.63 
less than 30% 
foreign 
ownership -5526.5 -4.8 0 Rsales 0.24362 14.2 0 
zero foreign 
equity/ownership 
allowed 
2818.1
9 1.51 0.13 
less than 50% 
foreign 
ownership -6110.3 -4.6 0 
privatization program 
in place -1370.5 -1.4 
0.1
7 
less than 30% 
foreign ownership -8049.4 -5.4 0 
less than 
100% foreign 
ownership -12055 -5.8 0 
less than 30% foreign 
ownership -5929.8 -4.7 0 
less than 50% 
foreign ownership -9699.5 -5.5 0 
CEO and 
Board of 
Directors must 
be residents -10030 -7 0 
less than 50% foreign 
ownership -6539 -4.2 0 
less than 100% 
foreign ownership -18080 -7 0 
residency 
required for 
professional 
license 7629.73 5.4 0 
less than 100% foreign 
ownership -14177 -6.4 0 
all employees must 
be residents -1705.6 -0.9 0.35 
only 
Chairman/CE
O/President 
must be a 
resident 8488.32 7.22 0 
all employees must be 
residents 239.168 0.15 
0.8
8 
CEO and Board of 
Directors must be 
residents -10654 -7.1 0 
monopolies 
present -10885 -6.5 0 
CEO and Board of 
Directors must be 
residents -6777.2 -5 0 
residency required 
for professional 
11879.
1 6.71 0 
cartel 
behavior -5236 -3.6 0 
residency required for 
professional license 8519.37 6.02 0 
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license observed 
only CEO/President 
must be a resident 
6439.7
4 4.65 0 
licensing 
discrimination 
against 
foreign firms 4727.97 4.81 0 
only  CEO/President 
must be a resident 240.253 0.19 
0.8
5 
monopolies present -8426.2 -3.6 0 
corruption 
observed 10875.5 7.18 0 monopolies present 873.048 0.46 
0.6
5 
cartel behavior 
observed -7585.9 -4.4 0 
level of 
democracy or 
autocracy (+ 
democracy) -383.77 -4.4 0 
cartel behavior 
observed 1458.72 0.89 
0.3
8 
no new foreign firms 
allowed -9202.3 -4.5 0 
regime 
durability 94.3685 9 0 
no new foreign firms 
allowed -8733 -5 0 
licensing 
discrimination 
against foreign firms 
6741.5
6 5.31 0 
capital 
controls -6745.4 -6.8 0 
licensing 
discrimination against 
foreign firms 4359.26 4.02 0 
restricted areas of 
operation for foreign 
firms 
4282.6
4 1.05 0.29 
reinvestment 
restrictions 3599.62 3.44 0 
restricted areas of 
operation for foreign 
firms -245.88 -0.1 
0.9
4 
full access for foreign 
firms -1743.1 -1.2 0.25 
sum of US 
and host 
country GDP 3.58276 13.3 0 
full access for foreign 
firms 2244.02 1.68 
0.0
9 
economic needs test 
required for 
establishment -1384.1 -1.1 0.26 
Difference 
between US 
and host GDP -3.815 -14 0 
economic needs test 
required for 
establishment -4677.2 -4.3 0 
Corruption observed 
11020.
9 6.3 0 
overall 
investment 
cost index for 
host country -57.771 -1.7 0.09 corruption observed 1475.51 0.91 
0.3
6 
bureaucratic red tape 
observed/noted 
51.253
7 0.03 0.98 
difference in 
skilled labor 
between US 
and host -10473 -2.2 0.03 
bureaucratic red tape 
observed/noted -4158.3 -2.7 
0.0
1 
other resource 
wasting restrictions 
exist 
1569.3
4 0.81 0.42 Latin America 10377.2 7.48 0 
other resource wasting 
restrictions exist 848.466 0.51 
0.6
1 
level of democracy or 
autocracy (+ is 
democracy) -460.06 -4.3 0 North America 10521.7 7.1 0 
level of democracy or 
autocracy (+ is 
democracy) -336.68 -3.6 0 
regime durability 
119.75
5 8.99 0 Asia 4806.16 3.54 0 regime durability 84.261 7.5 0 
capital controls -4678.5 -4.3 0 
European 
region 9015.28 7.75 0 capital controls -2362 -2.4 
0.0
2 
reinvestment 
restrictions 
2909.5
2 2.18 0.03      
reinvestment 
restrictions 1940.39 1.81 
0.0
7 
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sum of US and host 
country GDP 
3.2333
5 10.6 0       
sum of US and host 
country GDP 0.17032 0.49 
0.6
2 
Difference between 
US and host GDP -3.4281 -12 0       
Difference between 
US and host GDP -0.5863 -1.8 
0.0
7 
trade cost index for 
host country 
13.421
4 0.44 0.66       
trade cost index for 
host country 10.2064 0.38 0.7 
overall investment 
cost index for host 
country -117.5 -2.8 0.01       
overall investment cost 
index for host country -60.026 -1.6 
0.1
1 
difference in skilled 
labor between US 
and host -14725 -2.8 0.01       
difference in skilled 
labor between US and 
host -7277.3 -1.6 
0.1
1 
Latin America 
13458.
2 8.43 0       Latin America 7221.6 5.05 0 
North America 
11434.
7 6.72 0       North America -7052.2 -3.7 0 
Asia 
7210.7
8 4.41 0       Asia 7770.61 5.41 0 
European region 
9368.1
1 7.96 0         European region 4637.21 4.34 0 
 
The final set of regressions exclude the United Kingdom from the sample in order to see 
if there are any observable outlier effects within the regression results. Table 6 includes three 
specifications: baseline, refined, and including manufacturing foreign affiliate sales. The 
interesting element that is immediately clear is that there is very little difference between the 
results of the specifications. Additionally, there does not seem to be any glaring differences 
between the signs of the significant variables with the earlier regressions. Ownership restrictions, 
cartel behavior, licensing discrimination, bureaucratic red tape, other resource wasting 
restrictions, and capital controls all have negative effects on FDI in producer services. Residency 
requirements for CEO and Board of Directors and professional licensing, monopoly prevalence, 
full access to the market, economic needs tests, corruption, and GDP sum all have positive 
effects.  These positive influences may seem initially counterintuitive although clearly they are 
rather consistent throughout the various samples and specifications. Furthermore, they support 
the reality that all economies have some restrictions to services investment and these do not 
deter a multinational because they are widely recognized and accepted (until GATS is completed 
at least).   
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Again, further research may be able to isolate the types of regulations that signal strong 
institutions in the producer service industries from those which do not really threaten investment 
due to lack of price/cost effects. Undoubtedly, the inclusion of prices will allow for a much more in 
depth analysis as well as identify and quantify various welfare effects from the removal of 
restrictions. 
Table 6 
Full Sample excluding UK: Country and Time Fixed Effects, Weighted Least Squares 
Dependent Variable: Total Affiliate Sales in Producer Services (millions of 1995 USD) 
Baseline Regression Stepwise Refined Baseline Regression Affiliate Sales in Goods Included: Baseline 
Number of Obs: 627 R-Squared: 0.813 Number of Obs: 627 R-Squared: 0.814 
Number of 
Obs: 617 R-Squared: 0.816 
Independent Variable Coef. t-stat p 
Independent 
Variable Coef. t-stat p 
Independent 
Variable Coef. t-stat P 
Constant -12695 -2.9 0 constant -17508 -4.6 0 constant -15679 -4 0 
privatization program in 
place -546.46 -0.9 0.36 
less than 30% 
foreign ownership -7339.6 -7.6 0 rsales 0.05667 3.19 0 
less than 30% foreign 
ownership -7240.4 -6.2 0 
less than 50% 
foreign ownership -4650 -3.6 0 
less than 30% 
foreign 
ownership -6967.3 -6.8 0 
less than 50% foreign 
ownership -4962.9 -3.5 0 
CEO and Board of 
Directors must be 
residents 2786.4 1.8 0.07 
less than 50% 
foreign 
ownership -4501.6 -3.4 0 
less than 100% foreign 
ownership -224.37 -0.1 0.94 
residency required 
for professional 
license 6854.55 3.71 0 
CEO and 
Board of 
Directors must 
be residents 2913.17 1.83 0.07 
all employees must be 
residents 1389.2 0.89 0.37 monopolies present 3119.73 2.38 0.02 
residency 
required for 
professional 
license 6069.2 3.24 0 
CEO and Board of 
Directors must be 
residents 2862.86 1.77 0.08 
cartel behavior 
observed -8658.3 -5 0 
monopolies 
present 2516.25 1.75 0.08 
residency required for 
professional license 5764.49 2.72 0.01 no_new -8813.7 -4.1 0 
cartel behavior 
observed -7986.4 -4.4 0 
only 
Chairman/CEO/President 
must be a resident 1717.72 0.7 0.49 
no new foreign firms 
allowed 3729.54 2.07 0.04 
no new foreign 
firms allowed -8164.2 -3.3 0 
monopolies present 2670.25 1.73 0.09 
licensing 
discrimination 
against foreign firms -6051 -4.9 0 
licensing 
discrimination 
against foreign 
firms -5146.4 -4 0 
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cartel behavior observed -8808.9 -4.9 0 
economic needs test 
required for 
establishment 4928.83 4.25 0 
full access for 
foreign firms 2800.76 1.51 0.13 
no new foreign firms 
allowed -8848.3 -3.4 0 
rampant corruption 
observed/noted 9133.76 5.1 0 
economic 
needs test 
required for 
establishment 5860.9 4.87 0 
licensing discrimination 
against foreign firms -5809.1 -4.5 0 
bureaucratic red tape 
observed/noted -3026.6 -2 0.05 
rampant 
corruption 
observed/noted 8799.2 4.7 0 
full access for foreign 
firms 3639.53 1.78 0.08 
other resource 
wasting restrictions 
exist -8785.7 -5.1 0 
bureaucratic 
red tape 
observed/noted -3438.3 -2.2 0.03 
economic needs test 
required for 
establishment 5643.11 4.46 0 
level of 
democracy/autocracy 
(+ is democracy) -356.49 -6.2 0 
other resource 
wasting 
restrictions 
exist -8502.3 -4.7 0 
Corruption observed 9071.52 4.68 0 capital controls -1697.1 -1.7 0.08 
level of 
democracy or 
autocracy (+ 
democracy) -361.52 -6.3 0 
bureaucratic red tape 
observed/noted -2550.9 -1.6 0.12 
sum of US and host 
country GDP 0.8392 3.18 0 capital controls -2204.3 -1.5 0.14 
other resource wasting 
restrictions exist -9639.2 -5 0 
Difference between 
US and host GDP 0.1694 0.58 0.56 
reinvestment 
restrictions 1051.91 0.58 0.56 
level of 
democracy/autocracy (+ 
is democracy) -348.96 -5.2 0 
trade cost index for 
host country 31.0872 1.66 0.1 
sum of US and 
host country 
GDP 0.34429 1.15 0.25 
regime durability -1.6077 -0.1 0.92 
overall investment 
cost index for host 
country 8212.79 2.71 0.01 
Difference 
between US 
and host GDP 0.56181 1.76 0.08 
capital controls -2599.5 -1.7 0.09 
difference in skilled 
labor between US 
and host -17508 -4.6 0 
trade cost 
index for host 
country 17.7939 1.24 0.22 
reinvestment restrictions 1541.87 0.83 0.41         
overall 
investment 
cost index for 
host country 19.1484 0.92 0.36 
sum of US and host 
country GDP 0.7427 2.71 0.01         
difference in 
skilled labor 
between US 
and host 8429.36 2.75 0.01 
Difference between US 
and host GDP 0.30514 0.97 0.33                 
trade cost index for host 
country 21.7533 1.49 0.14                 
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overall investment cost 
index for host country 20.4935 0.97 0.33                 
difference in skilled labor 
between US and host 7717.23 2.43 0.02                 
 
 
V. Summary and Conclusions 
This analysis is a first step in the emerging area of foreign direct investment in business 
and producer services and the subsequent effects that country specific restrictions have to this 
investment. There are a number of potential welfare gains from increased levels of investment in 
these services as they serve as important channel of technology and knowledge transfer to 
developing economies. FDI in services is the largest and fastest growing area of international 
investment and liberalization in these industries has only begun in the last couple of decades for 
the most developed countries and is just getting started in emerging markets and developing 
economies. I use data on U.S. foreign affiliate sale in producer services for a panel of 39 
countries and for the years 1984-2002.  
Using an econometric model with country fixed effects and weighted least squares I am 
able to identify certain restrictions which negatively affect the level of U.S. investment in producer 
services as well as identify those restrictions which either send a positive signal or simply do not 
concern the multinational firms which are choosing to invest in these sectors. 
Excessive restricting of foreign ownership, residency requirements for the CEO and 
Board of Directors, cartel behavior, monopoly power, and resource wasting barriers to FDI are all 
found to have significant negative effects on U.S. FDI in services across varying econometric 
specifications. Corruption, residency requirements for professional licensing, economic needs 
tests, residency for chairman only, durability of the political regime and financial restrictions do 
not seem to statistically deter U.S. FDI in this analysis. The lack of significance of other 
restrictions should not necessarily be interpreted as a lack of importance. Cross-correlations, 
omitted variables and misspecification could all be responsible for the insignificance of these 
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variables. More likely, the inability to accurately capture the intensity of these restrictions on a 0-1 
weighted scale is accountable.   
Obviously the addition of factor and service price data would allow for a much more 
complex analysis and one which can quantify the welfare gains to removing effectively prohibiting 
restrictions to investment. Also, the results for the political variables are disappointing, and future 
analysis either needs to find better variables for political institutions or perhaps analyze more 
completely where the countries in the sample fall in the -10 to 10 scale of the Polity2 variable. 
Clearly, data is the most imperative issue in this analysis and the next step includes incorporating 
factor prices where possible and refining the variable for the restrictions with additional data. The 
incorporation of intellectual property rights protection may also yield interesting results due to the 
technology intensive nature of some of producer services, and especially in the decision to export 
rather than invest.  Relationships between producer services affiliate sales, technology licensing, 
and intellectual property rights protection have such potential for future work. I feel that this rough 
initial analysis is nevertheless a contribution to this field of research as it identifies more clearly 
where to focus research in the future. Additionally, the economic intuition behind the effects of 
restrictions to foreign investment in producer services is by and large confirmed at this early level 
of analysis and significant effects of particular effects are acknowledged and discussed. 
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Chapter 3 
 
Adapting the Knowledge-Capital Model of the Multinational Enterprise to 
Trade and Investment in Business Services 
 
Co-authored with James Markusen 
I. Introduction 
Trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) in business services has received a lot of 
attention from economists, politicians, and business journalists.   It is not quite clear why this is 
the case, but we suspect that there is a concern about the loss of skilled and semi-skilled white-
collar jobs to developing countries.  There was a certain level of controversy and resistance to 
low-skilled manufacturing jobs being offshored, but the potential loss of skilled jobs in information 
technology to foreign workers is an even greater perceived threat to workers in developed 
countries. 
It is indeed the case that trade and FDI in business service have increased greatly in the 
last few years.  Statistics are presented in Table 1 and will be discussed more below.   It is also 
clear that much of the increased activity is mediated by multinational firms, whether that is actual 
FDI (we measure sales of foreign affiliates) or intra-firm trade between parent and affiliate.   
Economists have wondered, discussed, and argued for years about how to define 
services and even more so when determining how to incorporate services into international trade 
and investment analyses.  They have also pondered whether services sectors require any new or 
different theory as opposed to those used for goods trade and investment analysis.  At the 
general level of Debreu-type general-equilibrium models, the abstract theory does not need to 
make a distinction between goods and services, whatever the latter might be.  An objective of this 
paper is to enquire about an appropriate theory of trade and FDI in services.  It is quite possible 
that no particularly new theory is required, that an adaptation will do, and this is indeed our view.   
The motivation for our inquiry into this issue is twofold.  First, trade and FDI in services has 
become an important policy issue, so it deserves to be examined not only empirically but also 
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theoretically as the latter gives structure to the former.  Second, the types of restrictions that 
impede trade and FDI in services and subsequently raise costs to potential service providers are 
generally quite different from those that impede trade in goods and they have different effects on 
service providers’ decisions to enter a foreign market in a particular manner (cross-border trade 
versus establishing a commercial presence).    We will duck the issue of defining services entirely 
by concentrating on what the US Bureau of Economic Analysis defines to be business services in 
their actual data. 
Specifically, we are going to use Markusen’s (2002) knowledge-capital model of the 
multinational enterprise (discussed later) to try to fit many of the stylized facts about trade and 
investment in business services.  We argue that this model is relevant and that straightforward 
adaptations of the model make it a good candidate for analyzing services.   
Throughout the paper we focus on the offshoring of services to foreign affiliates.  We will 
not differentiate effects on captive offshoring (within the ownership of the firm) to offshore 
outsourcing (outside the boundaries of the firm’s ownership). This is an old question which has 
been revitalized recent by new approaches (e.g., Antrás 2003) and it is unfortunately beyond the 
scope of this paper.  The structure of the paper is as follows. Section two presents a short primer 
on barriers to trade and investment in services.  Then we present a general discussion about the 
characteristics of trade in business services that are essential to modeling services and how they 
differ from those in goods trade.  The model itself follows, and the paper concludes by presenting 
a set of simulation results and their interpretations.   
II. Barriers to Trade and Investment in Services: A Primer 
Trade in services encompasses a wide variety of industries, different modes of supply, 
and both intermediate and final demand. Analyses of trade in services often focuses on the role 
of services as an input into manufactured goods production and where the role of the 
multinational in trade in services is likely to be an important one. In addition, services are also 
intermediate inputs into final service production. There is also an increasing large and important 
range of services provided directly to the consumer which is experiencing continual expansion 
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due to constant increases in global internet access. 
Barriers to trade and investment in services can be roughly broken down into what we 
could call “natural” economic costs and “policy-imposed” costs.  For the former, we are thinking of 
things like communications and transport costs (workers flying between countries), language, 
customs, time zones, the need for face-to-face interaction and so forth.  Clearly great 
improvements in communications technology and more speculatively the wide spread adoption of 
English as a shared second language have reduced these natural barriers and have been 
responsible for much of the great increase in trade.  Our discussion here will concentrate on the 
second category, since they are more under the control of governments and consistently 
prevalent across developed and developing countries.  A much more in depth and exhaustive 
treatment of these issues is found in Hoekman (2006). 
Policy-induced barriers, henceforth “barriers” for this section, to trade in services take 
diverse forms and therefore affect service suppliers’ cost functions differently. Regulatory policies, 
in addition to explicit and implicit barriers to trade in services, generally fall into one of five basic 
categories. First, there can be quantity-based restrictions imposed on services suppliers that 
explicitly restrict the volume of services imported, similar to a quota. The use of a fixed number of 
licenses available or access to only certain firms or sectors also falls into this category. If a 
“quota” type policy is only applied to imported services, then we would expect to see more 
multinationals establishing affiliates in the market (all other things equal).  This is similar to a 
“tariff jumping” activity discussed in traditional theories of the multinational firm. On the other 
hand, price control restrictions can be implemented which affect a firm’s variable costs. These 
may take the form of a price floor or ceiling and not affect foreign suppliers differently than 
domestic firms; however, they are still costly and create an inefficient level of services supplied.  
Thirdly, there are numerous barriers to establishment that restrict foreign supply of 
services due to the high costs of establishing a commercial presence. Policies regarding licensing 
procedures, requirements and fees can be prohibitive. Bureaucratic red tape, requirements for 
local management or lack of transparency all have detrimental effects on the fixed costs of 
establishing commercial presence for multinationals. These may create a substitution effect with 
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multinationals supplying the service from abroad rather than establish an affiliate. In addition to 
fixed costs increases firms may also be concerned about risks from opacity of the government or 
regulators. For instance, governmental departments which control license allocation can decide 
how difficult or easy it is to obtain information surrounding licensing procedures and 
requirements. These concerns may create additional incentives for firms to serve the market via 
cross-border trade. However, it is possible that these policies may also affect the ability to supply 
the services across the border, which would complicate the firm’s decision. 
Fourthly, barriers to trade and establishing commercial presence in services may take the 
form of restricting the use of inputs. This category can include restrictions on workers, required 
percentages of locally produced material inputs, as well as barriers or limits on the use of 
networks or media for promotion and/or marketing purposes. These policies can greatly increase 
the costs of operations for foreign suppliers and may be prohibitive to entering the market. Even 
with economies of scale the increased cost of production is likely to be a deterrent to establishing 
an affiliate. If the majority of restrictive services trade policies fall into this category we would 
expect multinational firms to prefer cross-border trade rather than establish an affiliate in order to 
supply services to that particular market.  
The last category of restrictions encompasses the various domestic regulatory barriers 
that take many forms and are often overlooked when discussing impediments to trade and 
investment. These include policies regulating professional qualification, residency and citizenship 
restrictions, obligatory membership in local professional association, juridical requirements, and 
limitations of inter-professional cooperation.  While the policies and regulations may not explicitly 
target foreign firms they often have this effect in practice. Regulations on professional 
qualifications are important domestic policies to have so as to guarantee a level of skill and 
professionalism to consumers. However, when these policies require residency, citizenship, or 
involve re-certification for professionals with comparable certifications from another country, they 
become costly. While they are not explicit barriers to trade these policies severely increase the 
fixed costs (time and money) for a firm establishing commercial presence and may be prohibitive 
as well. A number of regulatory policies also restrict foreign service suppliers through the lack of 
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transparency and other difficulties encountered through the bureaucratic process of obtaining 
licenses. Particularly in developing countries, the licensing processes are complex and non-
transparent. These processes are barriers to foreign firms in terms of added costs and increased 
risk. The fixed costs of entry and market access are increased and depending on the licensing 
allocation, variable operating costs may also be affected from required paperwork or reoccurring 
licensing fees.  
Another set of issues (or subset of point three above) prevalent in both developing and 
developed countries are legal policies governing the form of establishment for foreign service 
suppliers. These act as barriers to firms wanting to establish a foreign affiliate and often reflect 
market power distortions within the sector. Policies often prevent wholly owned subsidiaries and 
instead allow specific numbers and locations of branches. They also serve to regulate 
partnerships, joint-ventures, and foreign ownership percentages. This genre of regulatory policies 
may have significant effects on a firm’s decision to serve a market through cross-border trade or 
an established affiliate. It is also possible that very open regulatory policies may lead to a firm 
establishing an affiliate to provide services for the host market and for other markets in the region 
(export-platform FDI). Overall, it should be stressed that regulatory polices are needed in 
professional industries in order to insure against fraud and to protect consumers. The problems 
arise when regulatory policies impose significant fixed and operational costs on foreign entrants 
into the market. At that point the regulators are creating or exacerbating market inefficiencies and 
distortions leading to welfare and productivity losses.  
Undeniably, foreign service suppliers encounter barriers from explicit trade policies, 
establishment and market access policies, domestic regulation, as well as other internal policies 
affecting the costs of supplying services in a country. The effects that these have on the supply of 
services are intricate and difficult to filter out. Unlike tariffs, most restrictions to services trade are 
behind the border and are not clearly quantifiable. Additionally, the effects of policies restricting 
services trade and affiliate production have complex interactions. They can affect the choice of 
mode of supply, the quality of the services provided, additional investment in complimentary 
industries, as well as productivity and economic growth within the economy in question. This 
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complex nature of issues surrounding trade in services is motivating the plethora of research into 
this area; however, the lack of data makes analysis arduous.  
Data on barriers are largely non-existent and furthermore, data on trade flows and foreign 
affiliate sales at a disaggregated level are unavailable for the majority of trading partners. There 
have been recent attempts to improve data collection on cross-border trade in services among 
OECD countries; nevertheless, data on foreign affiliate sales in services is limited to very few 
countries and are not disaggregated at the sector level. Pressure on national statistical offices to 
collect and disseminate services data at the sector level must continue to be applied by 
academia, international organizations, and the private sector. Without data it is impossible to 
make any real analysis of the effects that regulatory and trade policies have on the sale and 
import of services from foreign suppliers. Likewise any potential effects on welfare, growth, or 
productivity are indiscernible with any accuracy.   
Trade in services is different from trade in goods in many different ways. The most 
obvious distinction is that freight and transportation costs are not a core cost for services 
suppliers. Additionally, trade in services often requires face to face interaction with the consumer 
or client, which is why establishing commercial presence or the temporary movement of 
personnel is almost always necessary. Therefore, foreign affiliate sales of services are a 
significant portion of total trade in services, and further, affiliate imports from and exports to 
parents (intra-firm trade) also constitutes a large amount of producer services trade. The US 
Bureau of Economic Analysis publishes data on affiliated and unaffiliated cross-border trade as 
well as US foreign affiliate sales in services.  
Table 1 takes a quick look at the data from 1999 and 2005 and it is clear that the role of 
the multinational in trade in services is a significant one. The first set of numbers is sales totals in 
millions of 2000 US dollars for US majority-owned foreign affiliates for all industries, private 
services and the private services sub-sectors of information, financial and professional services. 
The following set is the sales of foreign majority owned affiliates in the US for the same set of 
industries. The next two sets of data are the values of cross-border trade in the same industries, 
also in millions of 2000 US dollars. Exports and imports are broken into affiliated and non-
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affiliated trade. Business, professional and technical services (BPT) includes advertising, 
management and technical consulting, computer system design, architecture, engineering, 
accounting, legal services and other business services. These are industries that are often highly 
regulated and are the exact same industries included in the professional, scientific, and technical 
(PST) category of services within the foreign affiliate sales data. The BEA collects data on foreign 
affiliate activity separately from how trade accounts are recorded which is why the names are 
different; however the data is completely comparable.  
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Table 1 
Outward US Foreign Affiliate Sales-all countries 
  1999 2005 % change 
Total Sales-All Industries 2316654.8 3276024.4 41.41% 
Total Private Services 353200.0 528000.0 49.49% 
Information 63236.5 97069.9 53.50% 
Finance & Insurance 86337.1 140341.6 62.55% 
Finance   32330.4 43847.0 35.62% 
Insurance 54006.6 96495.7 78.67% 
PST  65290.2 97490.9 49.32% 
Sales in Total Private Services = 15.25% and 16.12% of All Industries Sales in 1999 and 2005 
respectively 
PST- Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services 
All data are in millions of 2000 US dollars 
        
Inward Foreign Affiliate Sales-all countries 
  1999 2005 % change 
Total Sales-All Industries 1831561.1 2213172.5 20.84% 
Total Private Services 293500.0 389000.0 32.54% 
Information 46440.3 48138.5 3.66% 
Finance & Insurance 95840.7 104308.3 8.84% 
Finance   15651.8 25458.9 62.66% 
Insurance 80188.9 78849.4 -1.67% 
PST  15757.0 49648.7 215.09% 
Sales in Total Private Services = 16.02% and 17.57% of All Industries Sales in 1999 and 2005 
respectively 
PST- Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services 
All data are in millions of 2000 US dollars 
        
Cross-Border Trade- All countries-Exports 
  1999 2005 % change 
All Industries 1287247.6 1586285.5 23.23% 
All Industries-Affiliated 194697.1 186463.5 -4.23% 
All Industries-Unaffiliated 1092550.5 1399822.0 28.12% 
Total Private Services 265100.0 368000.0 38.82% 
Total Private Services-Affiliated 32952.4 44441.2 34.86% 
Total Private Services-Unaffiliated 73245.5 101278.7 38.27% 
Financial Total 17789.3 31626.3 77.78% 
Financial-Affiliated 4087.2 4312.0 5.50% 
Financial-Unaffiliated 13702.2 27314.3 99.34% 
Insurance Total* 3119.2 6011.5 92.73% 
BPT Total 54683.1 73911.2 35.16% 
BPT-Affiliated 26379.5 37062.1 40.50% 
BPT-Unaffiliated 28303.5 36849.1 30.19% 
 Imports of total private services = 20.59% and 23.19% of trade in all industries in 1999 and 
2005 respectively 
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*Insurance transactions are considered unaffiliated by BEA 
BPT-Business, Professional, and Technical Services 
        
        
(Table 1 continued)       
        
Cross-Border Trade- All countries-Imports 
  1999 2005 % change 
All Industries 1543920.8 2177244.7 41.02% 
All Industries-Affiliated 186215.3 231946.0 24.56% 
All Industries-Unaffiliated 1357705.5 1945298.8 43.28% 
Total Private Services 183000.0 282000.0 54.10% 
Total Private Services-Affiliated 25670.2 35340.6 37.67% 
Total Private Services-Unaffiliated 31048.8 53285.4 71.62% 
Financial Total 9623.2 11105.6 15.40% 
Financial-Affiliated 6130.7 5192.0 -15.31% 
Financial-Unaffiliated 3492.5 5913.6 69.32% 
Insurance Total* 9593.9 25064.2 161.25% 
BPT Total 28238.2 42913.2 51.97% 
BPT-Affiliated 19462.0 29868.1 53.47% 
BPT-Unaffiliated 8776.1 13045.1 48.64% 
 Imports of total private services = 11.85% and 12.95% of trade in all industries in 1999 and 
2005 respectively 
*Insurance transactions are considered unaffiliated by BEA 
BPT-Business, Professional, and Technical Services 
 
The data on foreign affiliate sales illustrates the importance of services in all affiliate 
activity. Private services represent about 15-17 percent of total sales by all foreign affiliates. Over 
the period 1999-2005 affiliate sales in information, insurance, and professional services have all 
experienced growth above that of the overall average for all industries. Sales by foreign owned 
affiliates in the US have experienced higher than average growth for finance and professional 
services but have not seen growth in insurance or information. Interestingly, affiliated exports 
overall have had negative growth while affiliated services exports have grown significantly. This 
may be representing the ability of multinationals to utilize home country services in their 
manufacturing and services operations abroad. Home country bias has always been an 
assumption in trade models, but it also plays a role in multinational production processes.  
The trade data shows that the share of affiliated trade in business, professional and 
technical services is much greater than the shares for finance, private services, or all industries. 
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Combined with the increased growth in both exports of these services and foreign affiliate sales in 
the same industries (professional, scientific, and technical for the foreign affiliate data) this 
illustrates the importance of multinational companies in the supply of professional and business 
services worldwide. Unaffiliated services trade has increased as well in this area and the fact that 
there has been all this growth in affiliate sales and trade in these highly regulated sectors 
stresses the need for research into trade restricting policies.  
The data on financial services reveals patterns that follow multinational theories about 
location of production. Outward sales of financial services (US owned foreign affiliates’ sales 
abroad) are growing much more rapidly than affiliated financial services exports. On the other 
hand, exports of unaffiliated financial services are growing rapidly, likely due to the availability of 
online financial services and final consumption abroad by households. Additionally, domestic 
firms in foreign countries have been granted more access to foreign financial services through 
deregulation and this also likely contributes to the significant growth in unaffiliated trade in 
financial services.  Similarly, inward sales (foreign owned affiliates’ sales in the US) and 
unaffiliated imports of financial services are experiencing significant growth while affiliated imports 
are actually decreasing. The importance of final demand at the household level is apparent in the 
huge rates of growth in unaffiliated imports and exports of financial services. Therefore, the 
patterns of affiliate supply of financial services seem to follow the theory that horizontal 
investment displaces affiliated trade. The figures also support a complimentary relationship 
between commercial presence and cross-border trade; US firms may establish commercial 
presence to services firms abroad and then supply additional services via cross-border trade. In 
terms of offshored financial services, the levels of affiliated imports are actually decreasing, which 
clearly does not support fears of increased levels of US jobs going abroad. 
The data on trade and foreign affiliate sales in insurance also shows evidence of the 
effects of deregulation. Trade in insurance services have skyrocketed over the period looked at in 
the table and outward sales of insurance have also increased very significantly, while inward 
sales have decreased. Insurance providers have also been able to capitalize on the growth of 
global internet access and household consumption of insurance products is likely a large 
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determinant of the increases in traded insurance services.  
The role of cross-border services trade for multinationals enters into this discussion as 
many US manufacturing MNEs demand many different producer services. Horizontal MNEs 
demand services at home and abroad, and they prefer to use the same service supplier for cost 
and reputation reasons. This demand has driven US service providers to expand abroad in 
similar fashion as manufacturing MNEs have for the past 25 years. Certain industries, such as 
telecoms and financial services have largely become deregulated in most developed countries. 
There is a great deal of foreign affiliate activity in these industries. Professional services are more 
regulated and foreign ownership is often restricted or prohibited. In these industries there can be 
an increase in cross-border trade to supply services to home country firms abroad. In addition it is 
quite possible that firms established in another country may decide to provide additional service 
products to other firms or households. This occurs as the horizontal MNE gains knowledge of the 
market, regulatory issues, consumer demand, and the economy’s infrastructure. Rather than 
establish a new affiliate it may be easier and more profitable for the firm to provide the additional 
services from the home country headquarters. 
In terms of measuring the restrictiveness of a policy there are three approaches that have 
been used in the literature: frequency indexes, price impact measures, and quantity based 
measures. Frequency indexes are comprised by creating a list of barriers that are in place for 
each sector (ideally) for the import of each service (mode 1 or 3) in each country. The country 
with the most or least restrictive/protectionist regime for each sector and mode is chosen to be 
the benchmark for that sector. Tariff equivalents are calculated by comparing country coverage 
ratios to the benchmark country. The problems with this approach are the arbitrary establishment 
of benchmark tariff equivalent, the inability to differentiate between barriers that are binding 
(restrict trade) and those which are not binding due to their redundancy, and most problematic is 
that the importance of barriers and therefore the level of restrictiveness of a particular barrier 
does not vary as there is no weighting.   
Price impact measures assume that world prices should be equal and therefore one can 
use econometric methods to estimate price gaps due to restrictions. If data on prices is actually 
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available this is an excellent case study technique however this is not the case. Other than the 
lack of data there are other issues:  differences in quality that will be captured by price 
differentials as well, price changes from barriers depend on the elasticity of demand and of supply 
of that service which also vary, lastly it has been shown that the resulting price wedge often has a 
rent component and a waste component. The rent component is the increased profits enjoyed 
due to imperfect competition while the waste component is the resource waste accruing from the 
restrictions and welfare claims depend on the magnitude of these components. Finally, quantity 
based approaches compare actual levels of trade flows to potential (or benchmark) levels. This 
approach often uses the gravity equation, controlling for many of the knowledge-capital model 
variables as well as measures of “cultural distance”. The problems encountered with this 
approach again arise from the lack of data on bilateral services trade or foreign affiliate sales. 
Even with accurate data calculating tariff equivalents from an observed gap in trade is flawed as 
omitted variables unquestionably also contribute to the difference in observed and predicted trade 
flows.  
III. Characteristics of Trade in Business Services to Capture in a Formal Model  
Here is a wish list of characteristics we might like to have in theoretical models of 
offshoring and trading white-collar services.  Much of this is a revision and extension of a similar 
section in Markusen (2006), since the focus and objectives of the present volume are quite similar 
to those of the 2005 Brookings Trade Forum.  Readers are referred to that volume (Brainard and 
Collins 2006) for a wide-ranging set of papers on offshoring white-collar services. 
 (A)  Expansion of trade at the extensive margin: new services produced and 
traded due to innovations in communications and technology or institutions (e.g., 
legal restrictions, privatization, and GATS commitments).   
This poses a number of challenges to theory, especially the fact that we are talking about 
non-marginal changes and discrete movements of something being non-traded to potentially lots 
of trade.  Traditional comparative-static analysis is of little use: it focuses on marginal changes in 
activities which are already in use in the benchmark.  This problem has attracted a lot of recent 
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interest in trading intermediate goods as well, for example Hummels, Ishii and Yi (2001), Yi 
(2003), and Markusen and Venables (2007).  Related work motivated by income distribution 
effects is found in Feenstra and Hanson (1996, 1997). 
 (B)  Vertical fragmentation of production: the new traded services tend to be 
intermediates, but may be upstream, downstream, or not part of a sequence.   
Traded white-collar services often have a number of important characteristics that cannot 
be captured in the simplest off-the-shelf models which assume a set of final goods.  One is that 
they may be firm-specific transactions rather than bought and sold on arm’s-length markets.  
Another is that they may form part of a particular production sequence, such as being a well-
defined upstream (design) or downstream (after sales service) component of overall production.   
 (C) Location-specific and other complementarities 
Thirdly, there may be crucial complementarities among different elements of the 
production chain, such as between skilled labor and telecommunications equipment and 
infrastructure.   In some cases, it may be the case that services must be produced in the same 
location as where they are used in downstream or upstream manufacturing activities.  Markusen 
(2006) coined the term “location-specific complementarities” to describe this.  This doesn’t mean 
that services, or at least the downstream end product, cannot be traded.  It does suggest 
however, that a national presence may be required; that is, a firm has to open a local office or 
branch in a foreign country in order to service firms and consumers in that country.  These 
considerations may also imply another type of complementarity, one that is between liberalization 
in services and increase trade in goods (Markusen, 1983). 
 (D) Clear distinction between trade and foreign investment in services 
Much of international service activity is carried out by multinational firms with local offices 
abroad. For this reason there must be a clear and plausible distinction between what is trade and 
what is affiliate production.  Similarly, there needs to be a clear distinction between what is a 
barrier to trade and what is a barrier to foreign investment (establishing a foreign commercial 
presence). In some cases a particular policy may be only a barrier to one form of entry while 
others may be a barrier to both types of entry and there will be different outcomes for the market 
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depending on how the policy/regulation effects entry decisions. 
 (E) Agglomeration of complementary intermediate services 
Related to, but somewhat distinct from point (C), is the issue of whether or not the 
intermediate business services themselves are more productive when located near to each other, 
as opposed to just being located near the final user. It might be beneficial for a user firm to be 
located close to a firm specializing in networking hardware as well as one specializing in the 
networking software. It may also be beneficial for the latter firms to be located near one another 
as they require similarly skilled workers and service many of the same clients.  This relationship 
can be modeled using an input-output structure among the service firms, as in Venables (1996).  
This issue is somewhat beyond the scope of this paper, but it does raise some concerns for small 
economies.  In particular, it raises the possibility of multiple equilibria and that whatever location 
gets a head start remains ahead.  There is a potentially large market failure here that could call 
for strong government support for creating a local agglomeration (e.g., the business park 
concept).  Related ideas are found in Markusen (1989), Francois (1990a,b) and Markusen, 
Rutherford and Tarr (2005). 
IV. Adaptation of the Knowledge-Capital Model  
Markusen’s (2002) knowledge-capital model is a framework which allows national firms, 
horizontal multinationals, and vertical multinationals to arise endogenously depending on country 
and technology characteristics.   Firms are assumed to possess knowledge-based assets which 
are alternatively called knowledge capital.  Three central assumptions define the model.  First, the 
services of knowledge-based assets can be easily used in foreign location (transportability or 
fragmentation).  Second, the creation of knowledge capital is skilled-labor intensive relative to 
production.  Third, knowledge capital has a jointness (non-rivaled) property in that it can be used 
in multiple locations simultaneously without reducing the value of the capital in any particular 
location.  Although this was originally conceived in the context of manufacturing, it seems 
perfectly appropriate for studying trade versus foreign investment in services. 
Suppose we begin with a simple two-final-good, two-factor, two-country Hecksher-Ohlin 
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model and then allow each good to geographically fragment into two separate production 
activities.  Further, one of those two activities, denoted services (S) may be allowed to 
geographically fragment into a more skilled-labor-intensive “headquarters” activity and a less-
skilled-labor-intensive “office” activity.   
 If we assume free trade in goods, just considering free versus prohibitive fragmentation 
costs in services means that we do not need to specify which is the upstream and which is the 
downstream activity.  For a much more comprehensive treatment of this case, see Markusen and 
Venables (2007).  Here are the principal features of the model. 
(1) Two factors of production: skilled (H) and unskilled (L) labor 
  Direct use of H and L in production is referred to as value added (VA) 
 (2) Two final goods, three production activities  
  AG - unskilled-labor intensive agriculture 
  MAN - skilled-labor intensive manufacturing 
  SER - intermediate services used in MAN and AG 
 (3) SER - can fragment into  
 HQ headquarters, may serve several offices 
 OF office, produces the deliverable for the client    
(4) Two economies, country i and country j 
(5) There are three generic “types” of services firms, each of which may be located 
in either country, hence there are six firm types in total 
 N - national firms, provide services to domestic 
manufacturers, may possibly be allowed to “export” to other country   
 M - multinational firms, have physical production presence in 
both countries, essentially a “horizontal” multinational 
 V - vertical firm, with headquarters in one country, a single 
office located in the other, may possibly be allowed to export back to the 
home country. 
(6) There are “trade costs” for N and V firms supplying services abroad (skilled 
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workers have to fly abroad in one direction or the other).   
(7) There are firm-level scale economies arising from jointness of knowledge-based 
assets: fixed costs for an M firm are less than double the fixed costs of N or V 
firms. 
(6) Services are differentiated or “specialized”, each produced with increasing 
returns to scale.  A wider range of available services increases real productivity 
for final manufacturers, or lowers their price index for composite services.  
To expand on the last point a bit, it is assumed that one unit of two different services is 
more beneficial to X firms than two units of only one of the services. For example, using two 
specialized lawyers for a day (e.g., one taxation and one contracts specialist) is better than 
having two days from a general-purpose lawyer than does many types of legal work including tax 
and contract law.  Fixed costs limit the degree of specialization and diversity than can exist in 
equilibrium for a small country, and thus access to the larger world market is always productive.   
Our modeling of services as differentiated intermediate goods follows Ethier (1982) and 
Markusen (1989). 
The model with the two types of fragmentation is illustrated in Figure 1.  Consumption 
comes from the agricultural and manufactured final goods.  Manufacturing and agriculture are 
composed of “value added” (direct contributions of skilled and unskilled labor) and services.  It 
may be possible to do these in different locations, implying that trade in services is feasible.  
Services consist of a headquarters and an office.  It may be possible to do these in different 
locations, implying that foreign investment in services is feasible.   
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Figure 1: Structure of production 
 
               
  
      
                        
                  
  
    
                        
                        
                        
                        
                      
  
                        
                        
  
  
              
  
    
                        
                        
                      
  
                        
                        
                        
                        
          
  
            
                        
                        
                        
                        
  
                      
                        
                        
                        
 
We are interested in four equilibria, referred to as “regimes”.  Some regimes may not be 
technologically feasible or profitable, or they may not be allowed by regulation.  Thus when we 
refer to trade and investment costs, we will generally be using these terms broadly to include 
technological and other (e.g., the requirement of face-to-face interaction) “natural” factors and 
also government rules, regulations, and taxes.  In all four regimes, final goods can be traded for a 
small cost of 0.1%.   The four are as follows: 
 NN - No trade, no foreign investment (i.e., no M or V firms) allowed 
 TN - Trade in services (exports by N firms) allowed, no investment 
allowed 
 NI - No trade in services feasible or allowed, but investment 
feasible/allowed. 
final consumption  
agriculture  
manufacturing  
value added by skilled and unskilled labor  
business 
services  
headquarters  office  
     geographically  
     separation 
 =  trade in     
   services  
    geographical  
     separation 
 =  foreign investment  
     in services  
 geographically  
     separation 
 =  trade in 
     services  
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 TI - Trade and investment in services both allowed 
By “trade in services allowed”, we do have a small trade costs of one percent, otherwise 
we have the well-known problem of indeterminacy with three goods and one factor being traded.  
This one percent is actually important as we will note shortly.  By investment allowed, we similarly 
have a small added fixed cost, set at 2.5%, for a type-V firm over a type-N firm (about 0.6% of 
total costs), also to prevent some amount of indeterminacy, plus it seems an eminently 
reasonable assumption that setting up a foreign firm incurs added fixed costs.  Fixed costs for a 
two-office horizontal firm are set at 1.25 times the fixed costs of a type-N firm. 
We can think of TN as allowing geographic fragmentation between services and 
manufacturing, but not allowing fragmentation within a service into headquarters and office.   
Under NI trade but not investment is feasible/allowed.  Regime TI allows both to occur.  TN 
permits what WTO terminology refers to as Mode 1 trade in services: cross border trade that 
does not involve an investment and involves minimal movement of persons.  NI and TI permit 
what is called Mode 3, the establishment of a commercial presence (typically by a foreign direct 
investment) abroad.  NI could occur, for example, if there are no government restrictions, but 
face-to-face contact is required so that investment via a foreign office is possible but exports of 
services are infeasible.  So once again, when we use words like “permitted”, “allowed” or 
“liberalization” we are referring just as much to developments in technology and communications 
as to changes in government-imposed barriers.   
Figure 2 gives an example of the service provision by one firm, located in the North.  The 
top box is a manufacturing or agriculture firm located in the North and the bottom an 
manufacturing or agricultural firm located in the South.  The domestic service firm has a 
headquarters in North (middle box of the diagram).  It may have a domestic office in North which 
provides services to Northern firms (this is always allowed).  That Northern office may provide 
services to Southern manufacturing firms, if trade in services (Mode 1) is allowed.    The Northern 
firm may also establish a Southern office if investment in services is allowed (Mode 3).  It can 
then provide services to local firms under regimes NI or TI.  It can also provide exports services 
back to the Northern manufacturing firms under TI (both Modes 1 and 3 allowed), but not under 
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NI.  
 
Figure 2:  Types of trade in services for a North service firm 
          
 
 
        
          
 
 
    
  
  
   
 
      
          
          
 
      
 
  
          
          
       
 
  
  
    
 
   
          
          
          
          
 
         
          
 
This completes the general description of the model.  One crucial feature of the model is 
choice of factor intensities for the different activities.  We have experimented with this a lot, and 
there are some differences in results of course.  In this paper, we use a very “symmetric” 
calibration, such that manufacturing and agriculture both devote an equal share of expenditure to 
services (20 percent), manufacturing and services have factor intensities symmetrically located 
around the average world endowment, and (integrated) services factor intensities are exactly at 
the world average endowment.   
Headquarter factor intensities for services are very skilled labor intensive and office 
production unskilled labor intensive.  We calibrate to an elasticity of substitution among services 
of 4, which in turn implies that 25 percent of the value of services goes to fixed costs and 75 to 
variable costs.  For the factor intensities of these services to add up to the average world 
endowment ratio, this is going to imply that the intensity ratio for headquarters is more remote 
from the world average than the ratio of office production.   This is going to imply that symmetry 
will be broken when investment in services is allowed.  Numbers are the H/L shares (all functions 
Services provided to North MAN and AG industries  
Headquarters of a  
service firm 
headquartered in North  
South office  North office  
Services provided to South MAN and AG industries  
always 
feasible  
feasible 
under TI  
feasible 
under NI 
and  TI  
feasible under TN 
and  TI  
mode 1 
trade in S  
mode 3 
trade in S  
mode 1, 3 
trade in S  
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Cobb-Douglas) used in the numerical simulation model to follow, with the overall “world” 
endowment normalized to 1.0 
 Fixed costs of service firm headquarters     4.00 
 Value added in manufacturing (direct use of H and L)    3.00 
 Overall manufacturing (value added plus intermediate services)   2.33 
 Overall service provision (headquarters plus office)    0.67 
 Overall agriculture (value added plus intermediate services)   0.43 
 Value added in agriculture (direct use of H and L)    0.33 
Note that the overall factor intensities in manufacturing and agriculture are reciprocals 
(2.33 = 1/0.43).  Thus manufacturing and agriculture are symmetric around overall services which 
in turn equal the world endowment ratio. 
The second step is to calibrate a numerical model used to solve for these equilibria.  This 
is done by assuming that the countries are identical, and that foreign production (type M and V 
firms) is not allowed, and that trade in services by N firms is prohibitively costly.  This scenario is 
then a benchmark equilibrium in which there is no geographic fragmentation of service 
production.  Services are supplied solely to final-goods producers in the same country.   Units are 
chosen such that the number of national firms in each country is equal to one, and production of 
each final good and production of services in each country is equal to one.  There is no trade in 
services allowed and, since the countries are identical, there is no trade in final goods either in 
this benchmark.  Thus all trade quantities are zero in the calibrated equilibrium.   
Tables 2, 3 and 4 show the world Edgeworth box for our two-country model, where each 
point in the box is a division of the total world endowment between the two counties, with country 
i measured from the south-west (sw) corner.  Countries differ in size but have identical relative 
factor endowments along the sw-ne diagonal, and have similar sizes but different relative 
endowments along the nw-se diagonal.   
Table 2 shows the shares of service firms headquartered in country i, with the share 
headquartered in country j one minus this amount (alternatively, the share in country j is given by 
the cell which is a reflection through the center point).  Table 3 gives that share of services 
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produced in country i.  Four scenarios are computed in each case.  The first scenario does not 
allow trade or investment in services, so the active firm types are national firms Ni and Nj.  We 
see that both the share of firm headquarters and the share of services produced are related 
mostly to country size (and of course track one another closely), but are not equal across 
countries or between headquarters and output shares along the nw-se diagonal, once the 
countries are sufficiently different in size.  The points in which the shares are 50-50 are in fact 
part of the factor-price equalization set for the world economy.  Once outside of the set, the 
skilled-labor-abundant country will have a lower skilled wage, and hence will have a larger 
number of smaller-output firms: fixed costs are skilled-labor intensive and variable costs 
unskilled-labor intensive. For example, in the northwest corner, country i has 0.691 share of firms 
and 0.433 share of services output.  Therefore, product variety and hence productivity will be 
higher in country i which exactly balances the lower quantity in country i, and both countries have 
identical welfare along the nw-se diagonal as a consequence of the symmetry in the model. 
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Table 2: Share of service firms headquartered in country i (origin: sw corner) 
 
 No trade or investment in services    
 
0.9 0.691 0.728 0.755 0.777 0.795 0.812 0.829 0.858 0.910 
0.8 0.541 0.579 0.610 0.638 0.662 0.705 0.756 0.807 0.858  
0.7 0.458 0.485 0.500 0.551 0.603 0.654 0.705 0.756 0.801  
0.6 0.386 0.416 0.449 0.500 0.552 0.602 0.653 0.704 0.742  
0.5 0.320 0.352 0.398 0.449 0.500 0.551 0.602 0.648 0.680  
0.4 0.258 0.296 0.347 0.398 0.448 0.500 0.551 0.584 0.614  
0.3 0.199 0.244 0.295 0.346 0.397 0.449 0.500 0.515 0.542  
0.2 0.142 0.193 0.244 0.295 0.338 0.362 0.390 0.421 0.459  
0.1 0.090 0.142 0.171 0.188 0.205 0.223 0.245 0.272 0.309  
 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9  
      
I's share of unskilled labor 
 
           
 Trade but not investment in services    
 
 
0.9
 
0.691 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
0.8 0.106 0.579 0.810 1.000 0.842 0.796 0.860 0.919 1.000  
0.7 0.000 0.240 0.500 0.578 0.654 0.727 0.782 0.860 1.000  
0.6 0.000 0.000 0.422 0.500 0.578 0.621 0.727 0.796 1.000  
0.5 0.000 0.160 0.346 0.422 0.500 0.578 0.654 0.840 1.000  
0.4 0.000 0.204 0.273 0.379 0.422 0.500 0.578 1.000 1.000  
0.3 0.000 0.140 0.218 0.273 0.346 0.422 0.500 0.760 1.000  
0.2 0.000 0.081 0.140 0.204 0.158 0.000 0.190 0.421 0.894  
0.1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.309  
 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9  
      I's share of unskilled labor  
 
 Investment but not trade in services    
 0.9 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.654 0.570 
0.8 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.523 0.518 0.496 0.466  
0.7 1.000 1.000 0.527 0.526 0.526 0.525 0.523 0.465 0.000  
0.6 1.000 1.000 0.527 0.527 0.526 0.526 0.472 0.470 0.000  
0.5 1.000 0.710 0.527 0.527 0.500 0.473 0.473 0.290 0.000  
0.4 1.000 0.530 0.528 0.474 0.474 0.473 0.473 0.000 0.000  
0.3 1.000 0.535 0.477 0.475 0.474 0.474 0.473 0.000 0.000  
0.2 0.534 0.504 0.482 0.477 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
0.1 0.430 0.346 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9  
      I's share of unskilled labor  
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 Both trade and investment in services allowed   
 
 
0.9 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
0.8 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.790 0.853 0.920 0.930  
0.7 1.000 1.000 0.504 0.579 0.652 0.723 0.787 0.850 0.907  
0.6 0.938 0.102 0.428 0.504 0.579 0.632 0.717 0.785 0.623  
0.5 0.732 0.209 0.355 0.428 0.500 0.572 0.645 0.791 0.268  
0.4 0.377 0.215 0.283 0.368 0.421 0.496 0.572 0.898 0.062  
0.3 0.093 0.150 0.213 0.277 0.348 0.421 0.496 0.000 0.000  
0.2 0.070 0.080 0.147 0.210 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
0.1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9  
      I's share of unskilled labor  
           
 
 
The second box in Tables 2 and 3 lowers the costs for cross-border trade in services to 
one percent and again, of course, Ni and Nj are types of firms active.  As a consequence, firm 
headquarters and output move in the same direction for a given country, but not exactly (outside 
the FPE set) due to the difference in factor intensities of fixed and variable costs as just 
discussed in the previous paragraph.  What we see is that allowing trade in services leads to a 
big shift in service firm location and production away from the smaller country, regardless of 
whether it is skilled or unskilled-labor abundant.   This is the complementarity or agglomeration 
effect discussed above, combined with the one-percent trade costs.  With indeterminacy in 
production under completely free trade with three goods and two factors, the indeterminacy is 
broken by the small trade cost, and the services will agglomerate in the larger country, a result 
well-known in the economic geography literature.  An outcome with service firms divided in 
proportion to country size with equal relative endowments is not an equilibrium in the presence of 
even very small trade costs, since the aggregate productivity of the service sector will be higher in 
the country with more diversity (or the price index for the composite service good will be lower in 
the large country). 
 
Table 3: Share of total services produced in country i  (origin: sw corner) 
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 No trade or investment in services    
 
 
 
0.9
 
0.433 0.555 0.620 0.674 0.722 0.767 0.811 0.858 0.910  
0.8 0.354 0.473 0.547 0.602 0.653 0.704 0.756 0.807 0.858  
0.7 0.308 0.421 0.500 0.551 0.602 0.653 0.705 0.756 0.820  
0.6 0.272 0.380 0.449 0.500 0.551 0.602 0.654 0.704 0.790  
0.5 0.239 0.342 0.398 0.449 0.500 0.551 0.602 0.658 0.761  
0.4 0.210 0.296 0.346 0.398 0.449 0.500 0.551 0.620 0.728  
0.3 0.180 0.244 0.295 0.347 0.398 0.449 0.500 0.579 0.692  
0.2 0.142 0.193 0.244 0.296 0.347 0.398 0.453 0.527 0.646  
0.1 0.090 0.142 0.189 0.233 0.278 0.326 0.380 0.445 0.567  
 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9  
      I's share of unskilled labor  
 Trade but not investment in services    
 
 
0.9
 
0.433 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
0.8 0.054 0.473 0.778 1.000 0.842 0.796 0.860 0.919 1.000  
0.7 0.000 0.206 0.500 0.578 0.654 0.727 0.782 0.860 1.000  
0.6 0.000 0.000 0.421 0.500 0.578 0.621 0.727 0.796 1.000  
0.5 0.000 0.160 0.345 0.421 0.500 0.579 0.655 0.840 1.000  
0.4 0.000 0.204 0.273 0.379 0.422 0.500 0.579 1.000 1.000  
0.3 0.000 0.140 0.218 0.273 0.346 0.422 0.500 0.794 1.000  
0.2 0.000 0.081 0.140 0.204 0.158 0.000 0.222 0.527 0.946  
0.1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.567  
 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9  
      I's share of unskilled labor  
 
 Investment but not trade in services    
 
0.9 0.422 0.546 0.613 0.670 0.720 0.767 0.814 0.868 0.919 
0.8 0.346 0.463 0.540 0.597 0.650 0.713 0.766 0.820 0.872  
0.7 0.298 0.411 0.499 0.553 0.606 0.659 0.713 0.767 0.837  
0.6 0.260 0.368 0.446 0.499 0.553 0.606 0.661 0.714 0.805  
0.5 0.226 0.333 0.393 0.446 0.500 0.554 0.607 0.667 0.774  
0.4 0.195 0.286 0.339 0.394 0.447 0.501 0.554 0.632 0.740  
0.3 0.163 0.233 0.287 0.341 0.394 0.447 0.501 0.589 0.702  
0.2 0.128 0.180 0.234 0.287 0.350 0.403 0.460 0.537 0.654  
0.1 0.081 0.132 0.186 0.233 0.280 0.330 0.387 0.454 0.578  
 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9  
      I's share of unskilled labor  
 Both trade and investment in services allowed   
 
 
0.9
 
0.000 0.662 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
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0.8 0.000 0.227 0.660 1.000 1.000 0.790 0.853 0.920 1.000  
0.7 0.000 0.000 0.504 0.579 0.652 0.723 0.787 0.850 1.000  
0.6 0.000 0.000 0.428 0.504 0.578 0.632 0.717 0.786 1.000  
0.5 0.000 0.155 0.354 0.428 0.500 0.572 0.646 0.845 1.000  
0.4 0.000 0.214 0.283 0.368 0.422 0.496 0.572 1.000 1.000  
0.3 0.000 0.150 0.213 0.277 0.348 0.421 0.496 1.000 1.000  
0.2 0.000 0.080 0.147 0.210 0.000 0.000 0.340 0.773 1.000  
0.1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.338 1.000  
 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9  
      I's share of unskilled labor  
 
The third boxes in Tables 2 and 3 give the case where investment but not trade becomes 
feasible or allowed.  This regime type is common in many professional service sectors due to the 
prohibitive regulatory barriers imposed. In this case there are type Mi and Mj firms over much of 
the box, but also some national firms in the larger country when the countries are of very different 
sizes (sw and ne corners of the box).  Now we see quite a different pattern of where headquarters 
are concentrated (Table 2) and where service production is unconcentrated (Table 3).  
Headquarters are a fixed cost that depends only on factor prices: its services are a joint input 
across plants and thus the headquarters location for a type-M firm does not depend on market 
size.  Thus we see that headquarter concentration depends almost entirely on relative factor 
endowments in the third panel of Table 2, with concentration in the skilled-labor-abundant 
country.   
Table 3 shows that service production (panel 3) under investment liberalization follows a 
close relationship to country size as in the other cases.  But it is much less concentrated than in 
the trade-liberalization case (panel 2), and is much closer to the no trade, no investment case 
(panel 1).  A firm’s headquarters is in the skilled-labor-abundant country, and it has outputs in its 
two offices closely related to each market’s size.  The headquarters pattern in the Edgeworth box 
is opposite to that in the case of trade liberalization (panel 2, Table 2).   
The final experiment, the bottom panels of Tables 2 and 3, shows the effect of both trade 
and investment liberalization due to technical change or regulation.  Now type Vi and Vj firms 
dominate when the skilled-labor abundant country is relatively small (headquartered in that 
country) and national firms dominate when the countries are similar in relative endowments or the 
Oi  
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skilled-labor abundant country is large (headquarters in that country).  The pattern of production 
(panel 4,Table 3) and trade (not shown) in services closely resembles that in the case of trade but 
not investment in services allowed (panel 2, Table 3).   
Although the pattern of firm location and production of services varies quite a bit among 
our four scenarios, the gains from liberalization in all three scenarios are similar.  This is shown in 
the three panels of Table 4, where numbers are the proportional change in welfare relative to the 
no trade, no investment benchmark scenario.  It is interesting that in the great majority of cells, 
both countries are strictly better off.  We will return to this point in a minute.  The only significant 
difference is that the gains under investment but not trade in services (panel 2) are small than 
under the other two liberalizations.  This is easily understood.  Costless (or almost costless) trade 
is always preferred to having to invest a second fixed cost.  However, it is not very meaningful to 
compare the welfare under these scenarios, since it may be technical feasibility requires face-to-
face contact, such that trade in services is simply infeasible and branch-office production via 
investment is the best we can do.  Changes in factor prices are also similar in the three 
liberalization scenarios (not shown).  In the majority of cells both factors gain in both countries.  
However, the scarce factor can lose when the country is large.  This is discussed and explained 
more in Markusen (2006).   
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Table 4: Proportional welfare gains for country i over no trade, no investment in services( 
shaded cells:  welfare strictly increases for both countries 
 
 Trade but not investment in services    
 
0.9 0.043 0.239 0.103 0.049 0.036 0.026 0.018 0.011 0.007 
0.8 0.099 0.044 0.095 0.056 0.032 0.023 0.018 0.014 0.011  
0.7 0.050 0.000 0.044 0.039 0.033 0.027 0.022 0.018 0.018  
0.6 0.109 0.041 0.051 0.044 0.038 0.032 0.027 0.023 0.026  
0.5 0.108 0.060 0.058 0.051 0.044 0.038 0.033 0.032 0.036  
0.4 0.106 0.076 0.068 0.059 0.051 0.044 0.039 0.056 0.049  
0.3 0.103 0.090 0.078 0.068 0.058 0.051 0.044 0.095 0.103  
0.2 0.125 0.105 0.090 0.076 0.060 0.041 0.000 0.044 0.219  
0.1 0.153 0.125 0.103 0.106 0.108 0.109 0.050 0.129 0.043  
 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9  
      I's share of unskilled labor  
          
 
 
 
 
Investment but not trade in services    
 0.9 0.072 0.051 0.024 0.015 0.008 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.000 
0.8 0.034 0.061 0.037 0.027 0.018 0.011 0.006 0.002 0.000  
0.7 0.042 0.035 0.033 0.027 0.021 0.016 0.010 0.006 0.005  
0.6 0.052 0.042 0.039 0.033 0.027 0.021 0.016 0.011 0.014  
0.5 0.062 0.051 0.047 0.040 0.033 0.027 0.021 0.019 0.022  
0.4 0.075 0.065 0.057 0.048 0.040 0.033 0.027 0.030 0.031  
0.3 0.089 0.079 0.067 0.057 0.047 0.039 0.033 0.039 0.040  
0.2 0.097 0.094 0.079 0.065 0.050 0.047 0.042 0.021 0.050  
0.1 0.097 0.097 0.099 0.092 0.085 0.079 0.072 0.052 0.031  
 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9  
      I's share of unskilled labor  
          
 
 Both trade and investment in services allowed   
 
 
0.9 0.018 0.156 0.103 0.049 0.036 0.026 0.018 0.011 0.007 
0.8 0.012 0.026 0.083 0.056 0.033 0.023 0.018 0.014 0.010  
0.7 0.106 0.024 0.044 0.039 0.033 0.027 0.022 0.018 0.017  
0.6 0.106 0.040 0.051 0.044 0.038 0.032 0.027 0.023 0.026  
0.5 0.105 0.059 0.058 0.051 0.044 0.038 0.033 0.032 0.037  
0.4 0.103 0.076 0.068 0.059 0.051 0.044 0.039 0.055 0.052  
0.3 0.101 0.090 0.078 0.068 0.058 0.051 0.044 0.089 0.075  
0.2 0.122 0.105 0.090 0.076 0.061 0.041 0.020 0.091 0.182  
0.1 0.153 0.125 0.103 0.106 0.108 0.109 0.050 0.010 0.192  
 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9  
      I's share of unskilled labor  
 
 
Before closing, some comments on these welfare and factor-price effects are in order.  
The biggest caveat is that the optimistic scenario that almost every one gains except when the 
I's
 
sh
a
re
 
o
f s
kil
le
d 
la
bo
r 
 
I's
 
sh
a
re
 
o
f s
kil
le
d 
la
bo
r 
 
Oi  
Oi  
Oi  
Oj  
Oj  
Oj  
I's
 
sh
a
re
 
o
f s
kil
le
d 
la
bo
r 
 
 78
countries are very different in relative endowments or size is partly dependent on the symmetry of 
the model, in which services have a “neutral” factor intensity and both final goods use services as 
inputs equally.  Earlier work shows that when services enter only one sector, the ability to trade or 
invest in foreign service production has many more non-Pareto-improving outcomes, both 
between and within countries.  Typically, the country that is relatively specialized in the sector 
using services is the loser (if there is one) from introducing trade and/or investment in services.  
This trade causes a loss of effective monopoly power for this country, and it suffers a negative 
terms-of-trade effect (Markusen and Venables 2007). 
 
V. Summary and Conclusions 
This paper offers an approach for modeling trade and foreign investment in services and 
for both identifying and estimating the costs to the world economy of various barriers to services.  
We begin with a discussion about the various barriers to both cross-border trade and to 
establishing a foreign commercial presence via FDI.  We argue that the typical barriers are often 
quite different from those for trade and FDI in goods, and so a whole new empirical approach is 
needed.   
Paralleling the need to develop a data base, we need to think about a conceptual 
framework for the problem.  After identifying some of the characteristics that we think must be 
included in a modeling framework, we then argue that Markusen’s (2002) knowledge-capital 
model is a good vehicle for a start.  It captures and exploits many of the properties of knowledge-
based assets that are surely at least as important for services as for manufacturing (where 
physical capital is often more important). 
We contend that some simulations of that model are instructive.  Liberalizations, or 
technical improvements that reduce costs, may occur for cross-border trade and/or for FDI, in the 
latter case via lowering the fixed costs of establishing a foreign subsidiary.  Falling trade costs 
alone obviously encourage trade only, while falling investment costs encourage the creation of 
multi-office horizontal multinationals with local offices serving local customers.  When both fall, 
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vertical multinationals, with a skilled-labor intensive headquarters in one country and a less-
skilled-labor-intensive office in the other country serving both markets, can arise.   
Results are obviously dependent on a range of assumptions, especially factor intensities 
of various activities (true in any theory model).  The simulation results are thus suggestive and 
certainly not definitive.  In spite of this, we think that they are quite useful for further analyses and 
research.  Results indicate that the relocation of service firm headquarters and the relocation of 
offices varies a great deal whether it is trade costs, investment costs, or both that fall.  Some of 
the general results which we feel will hold up under many alternative parameterizations are as 
follows. 
Decreasing trade but not investment costs obviously moves the production of services 
and the number of service firms headquartered in a country in the same direction.  Services 
production and firm numbers tend to become more concentrated in the larger country, due to the 
complementarity among services (a larger range of services makes the final-goods sectors more 
productive).  We see this empirically at the city level, with places like London, New York, and 
Singapore becoming large business services centers.  Concentration of headquarters and service 
production reacts much less to differences in relative factor endowments between the countries.  
This is one result, however, that is clearly tied to our assumptions: in particular, that services are 
needed equally in both final-goods sectors.  See Markusen (2006) for an asymmetric case in 
which the services are only used in one final-goods sector. 
Decreasing investment costs but not trade costs has little effect on the location and 
concentration of services production, but a big effect on headquarters locations.  Headquarters 
become much more concentrated in the skilled-labor-abundant country, with difference in country 
size playing quite a minor role. 
Liberalizing both trade and investment in services leads to a pattern of service production 
that closely resembles that for liberalization in trade only; that is, service production is 
concentrated in the large country, with relative endowments playing a minor role.  The pattern of 
headquarters location could be characterized as “in between” the trade and investment only 
liberalization scenarios (bottom panel of Table 2).  Both differences in size and in relative 
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endowments play a role, with headquarters concentrated in large and/or skilled-labor-abundant 
countries.   
Interestingly however, the pattern of welfare and factor-price changes are much less 
sensitive to which mode of services supply is liberalized or where costs fall.  Regardless of 
whether it is trade costs or fixed costs of investment that are falling, the system finds very 
different channels of arbitrage, but rather similar welfare consequences in the end.  It is the case 
that the welfare benefits are greater for liberalization of trade than for liberalization of investment 
(Table 4).  This is due to the added fixed costs of a second office in horizontal investment 
whereas eliminating trade costs means that a firm can costlessly add supply to a foreign market.  
In a sense, the model is going to produce a finding that trade liberalization is more beneficial than 
investment liberalization by assumption.  However, this point is not very relevant if there are 
natural barriers to trade in services, such as the need for face-to-face contact, which cannot 
simply be eliminated by policy changes.  The welfare numbers we get for liberalization of both 
trade and investment in services (Table 4, bottom panel) look quite similar to the benefits we get 
from liberalizing trade alone (top panel).  To the extent that barriers to trade are policy imposed 
and not natural, this suggests that trade liberalization is particularly valuable as it avoids the fixed 
costs of establishing a foreign commercial presence. 
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COMPUTER CODE 
 
$TITLE: WE4.GMS  SIX FIRM TYPE, ITERATIVE SOLUTION 
* CALIBRATED TO COUNTRIES IDENTICAL 
* same as WE4.GMS except also sub elas  = 1 
 
 
PARAMETERS 
 
 ENDUKI 
 ENDSKI 
 ENDUKJ 
 ENDSKJ 
 TC 
 SUBSIDY 
 SIGMA 
 REALWI 
 REALWJ 
 REALZI 
 REALZJ 
  MK 
 INEFI 
 INEFJ 
 SCALE 
 EXT 
 TCS 
 SQ0, SP0 
 FNI, FNJ, FMI, FMJ, FVI, FVJ; 
 
 FNI=1; FNJ=1; FMI=1; FMJ=1; FVI=1; FVJ=1; 
 
ENDUKI = 1; 
ENDSKI = 1; 
ENDUKJ = 1; 
ENDSKJ = 1; 
TCS = 1; 
SUBSIDY = 0; 
SIGMA = 4; 
MK = 1/(SIGMA-1); 
INEFI = 1; 
INEFJ = 1; 
SCALE = 1.2; 
EXT = 1/(SIGMA - 1); 
 
SQ0 = 15/(6**(SIGMA/(SIGMA-1))); 
SP0 = 20/(SQ0*6); 
 
DISPLAY SQ0, SP0; 
 
$ONTEXT 
$MODEL:BASE 
 
$SECTORS: 
 YI  YJ 
 XI  XJ 
 SI  SJ 
 NI  NJ 
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 SMII SMIJ SMJJ SMJI 
 MI  MJ 
 SVI SVJ 
 VI  VJ 
 EYI EYJ 
 EXI EXJ 
 ESI ESJ 
 ESVI ESVJ 
 UI  UJ 
 
 
$COMMODITIES: 
 PYI PYJ 
 PXI PXJ 
 PSI PSJ 
 PSII PSIJ 
 PSJJ PSJI 
 PSVI PSVJ 
 PSEI PSEJ 
 PVEI PVEJ 
 FCI FCJ 
 FCMI FCMJ 
 FCVI FCVJ 
 PSKI PSKJ 
 PUKI PUKJ 
 PUI  PUJ 
 
$CONSUMERS: 
 CONSI CONSJ 
 ENI   ENJ 
 EMI   EMJ 
 EVI   EVJ 
 
 
$PROD:YI   s:1.0  a:4 
 O:PYI     Q:100.0 
 I:PUKI    Q: 60.0 
 I:PSKI    Q: 20.0 
 I:PSI    Q:SQ0  P:SP0 a: 
 I:PSII   Q:SQ0  P:SP0 a: 
 I:PSJI   Q:SQ0  P:SP0 a: 
 I:PSVI   Q:SQ0  P:SP0 a: 
 I:PSEJ   Q:SQ0  P:SP0 a: 
 I:PVEJ   Q:SQ0  P:SP0 a: 
 
$PROD:YJ   s:1.0 a:4 
 O:PYJ     Q:100.0 
 I:PUKJ    Q: 60.0 
 I:PSKJ    Q: 20.0 
 I:PSJ    Q:SQ0  P:SP0 a: 
 I:PSJJ   Q:SQ0  P:SP0 a: 
 I:PSIJ   Q:SQ0  P:SP0 a: 
 I:PSVJ   Q:SQ0  P:SP0 a: 
 I:PSEI   Q:SQ0  P:SP0 a: 
 I:PVEI   Q:SQ0  P:SP0 a: 
 
$PROD:XI  s:1 a:4 
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 O:PXI    Q:100. 
 I:PUKI   Q:20 
 I:PSKI   Q:60 
 I:PSI    Q:SQ0  P:SP0 a: 
 I:PSII   Q:SQ0  P:SP0 a: 
 I:PSJI   Q:SQ0  P:SP0 a: 
 I:PSVI   Q:SQ0  P:SP0 a: 
 I:PSEJ   Q:SQ0  P:SP0 a: 
 I:PVEJ   Q:SQ0  P:SP0 a: 
 
$PROD:XJ  s:1 a:4 
 O:PXJ    Q:100. 
 I:PUKJ   Q:20 
 I:PSKJ   Q:60 
 I:PSJ    Q:SQ0  P:SP0 a: 
 I:PSJJ   Q:SQ0  P:SP0 a: 
 I:PSIJ   Q:SQ0  P:SP0 a: 
 I:PSVJ   Q:SQ0  P:SP0 a: 
 I:PSEI   Q:SQ0  P:SP0 a: 
 I:PVEI   Q:SQ0  P:SP0 a: 
 
$PROD:SI   s:1 
 O:PSI    Q:(30*FNI**EXT) 
 I:PUKI   Q:18  A:ENI    T:MK 
 I:PSKI   Q:12  A:ENI    T:MK 
 
$PROD:SJ   s:1 
 O:PSJ    Q:(30*FNJ**EXT) 
 I:PUKJ   Q:18  A:ENJ    T:MK 
 I:PSKJ   Q:12  A:ENJ    T:MK 
 
$PROD:NI    s:1 
 O:FCI    Q:10 
 I:PUKI   Q:2 
 I:PSKI   Q:8 
 
$PROD:NJ    s:1 
 O:FCJ    Q:10 
 I:PUKJ   Q:2 
 I:PSKJ   Q:8 
 
$PROD:SMII s:1 
 O:PSII   Q:(30*FMI**EXT) 
 I:PUKI   Q:18  A:EMI    T:MK 
 I:PSKI   Q:12  A:EMI    T:MK 
 
$PROD:SMIJ s:1 
 O:PSIJ   Q:(30*FMI**EXT) 
 I:PUKJ   Q:18  A:EMI    T:MK 
 I:PSKJ   Q:12  A:EMI    T:MK 
 
$PROD:SMJJ s:1 
 O:PSJJ   Q:(30*FMJ**EXT) 
 I:PUKJ   Q:18  A:EMJ    T:MK 
 I:PSKJ   Q:12  A:EMJ    T:MK 
 
$PROD:SMJI s:1 
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 O:PSJI   Q:(30*FMJ**EXT) 
 I:PUKI   Q:18  A:EMJ    T:MK 
 I:PSKI   Q:12  A:EMJ    T:MK 
 
$PROD:MI    s:1 
 O:FCMI   Q:(10) 
 I:PUKI   Q:(1*SCALE) 
 I:PSKI   Q:(6*SCALE) 
 I:PUKJ   Q:(1*SCALE) 
 I:PSKJ   Q:(2*SCALE) 
 
$PROD:MJ    s:1 
 O:FCMJ   Q:(10) 
 I:PUKI   Q:(1*SCALE) 
 I:PSKI   Q:(2*SCALE) 
 I:PUKJ   Q:(1*SCALE) 
 I:PSKJ   Q:(6*SCALE) 
 
$PROD:SVI   s:1 
 O:PSVJ   Q:(30*FVI**EXT) 
 I:PUKJ   Q:18  A:EVI    T:MK 
 I:PSKJ   Q:12  A:EVI    T:MK 
 
$PROD:SVJ   s:1 
 O:PSVI   Q:(30*FVJ**EXT) 
 I:PUKI   Q:18  A:EVJ    T:MK 
 I:PSKI   Q:12  A:EVJ    T:MK 
 
$PROD:VI    s:1 
 O:FCVI   Q:10 
 I:PUKI   Q:(2*1.025) 
 I:PSKI   Q:(8*1.025) 
 
$PROD:VJ    s:1 
 O:FCVJ   Q:10 
 I:PUKJ   Q:(2*1.025) 
 I:PSKJ   Q:(8*1.025) 
 
$PROD:EYI 
 O:PYJ    Q:99.9 
 I:PYI    Q:100 
$PROD:EYJ 
 O:PYI    Q:99.9 
 I:PYJ    Q:100 
$PROD:EXI 
 O:PXJ    Q:99.9 
 I:PXI    Q:100 
$PROD:EXJ 
 O:PXI    Q:99.9 
 I:PXJ    Q:100 
 
$PROD:ESI 
 O:PSEI   Q:(30*FNI**EXT) 
 I:PSI    Q:(30*FNI**EXT*TCS) 
$PROD:ESJ 
 O:PSEJ   Q:(30*FNJ**EXT) 
 I:PSJ    Q:(30*FNJ**EXT*TCS) 
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$PROD:ESVJ 
 O:PVEJ   Q:(30*FVI**EXT) 
 I:PSVJ   Q:(30*FVI**EXT*TCS) 
$PROD:ESVI 
 O:PVEI   Q:(30*FVJ**EXT) 
 I:PSVI   Q:(30*FVJ**EXT*TCS) 
 
$PROD:UI  s:1.0 
 O:PUI    Q:200. 
 I:PXI    Q:100. 
 I:PYI    Q:100. 
 
$PROD:UJ  s:1.0 
 O:PUJ    Q:200. 
 I:PXJ    Q:100. 
 I:PYJ    Q:100. 
 
$DEMAND:CONSI 
 D:PUI    Q:200 
 E:PUKI   Q:(100*ENDUKI) 
 E:PSKI   Q:(100*ENDSKI) 
 E:PSI    Q:0.03 
 E:PSII   Q:0.03 
 E:PSJI   Q:0.03 
 E:PSVI   Q:0.03 
 E:PSEJ   Q:0.03 
 E:PVEJ   Q:0.03 
 
$DEMAND:CONSJ 
 D:PUJ    Q:200 
 E:PUKJ   Q:(100*ENDUKJ) 
 E:PSKJ   Q:(100*ENDSKJ) 
 E:PSJ    Q:0.03 
 E:PSJJ   Q:0.03 
 E:PSIJ   Q:0.03 
 E:PSVJ   Q:0.03 
 E:PSEI   Q:0.03 
 E:PVEI   Q:0.03 
 
 
$DEMAND:ENI 
 D:FCI 
 
$DEMAND:ENJ 
 D:FCJ 
 
$DEMAND:EMI 
 D:FCMI 
 
$DEMAND:EMJ 
 D:FCMJ 
 
$DEMAND:EVI 
 D:FCVI 
 
$DEMAND:EVJ 
 D:FCVJ 
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$OFFTEXT 
$SYSINCLUDE MPSGESET BASE 
 
 
BASE.ITERLIM = 5000; 
OPTION MCP = PATH; 
OPTION SOLPRINT = OFF; 
PUI.FX = 1; 
 
PSI.L = 1.25; 
PSJ.L = 1.25; 
PSII.L = 1.25; 
PSIJ.L = 1.25; 
PSJJ.L = 1.25; 
PSJI.L = 1.25; 
 
 
SETS I /1*90/ 
     J /1*9/ 
     K /1*9/; 
 
PARAMETERS 
 DEV, ITERN 
 REPORTN(*,J,K) 
 REPORTE(*,J,K) 
 REPORTI(*,J,K) 
 REPORTY(*,J,K); 
 
 
 
LOOP(J, 
LOOP(K, 
 
ENDSKI = 2.0 - 0.2*ORD(J); 
ENDSKJ = 0.2*ORD(J); 
ENDUKI = 0.2*ORD(K); 
ENDUKJ = 2.0 - 0.2*ORD(K); 
 
NI.L = 1; NJ.L = 1; 
MI.L = 1; MJ.L = 1; 
VI.L = 1; VJ.L = 1; 
SI.L = 1; SJ.L = 1; 
SVI.L = 1; SVJ.L = 1; 
SMII.L = 1; SMIJ.L = 1; 
SMJJ.L = 1; SMJI.L = 1; 
 
DEV = 1; 
 
LOOP(I$(DEV GT 0.0003), 
 
FNI = MAX(NI.L, 0.0001); 
FNJ = MAX(NJ.L, 0.0001); 
FMI = 0.0001; 
FMJ = 0.0001; 
FVI = 0.0001; 
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FVJ = 0.0001; 
TCS = 50; 
 
 
OPTION SOLPRINT = OFF; 
$INCLUDE BASE.GEN 
SOLVE BASE USING MCP; 
 
DEV = MAX(ABS(FNI-NI.L), ABS(FNJ-NJ.L), ABS(FMI-MI.L), ABS(FMJ-MJ.L), 
      ABS(FVI-VI.L), ABS(FVJ-VJ.L)); 
ITERN = ORD(I); 
 
); 
 
OPTION SOLPRINT = ON; 
$INCLUDE BASE.GEN 
SOLVE BASE USING MCP; 
 
REPORTN("ITERN", J, K) = ITERN; 
REPORTN("DEV", J, K) = DEV; 
REPORTN("NI", J, K) = MAX(NI.L, 0.0001); 
REPORTN("NJ", J, K) = MAX(NJ.L, 0.0001); 
REPORTN("MI", J, K) = MAX(MI.L, 0.0001); 
REPORTN("MJ", J, K) = MAX(MJ.L, 0.0001); 
REPORTN("VI", J, K) = MAX(VI.L, 0.0001); 
REPORTN("VJ", J, K) = MAX(VJ.L, 0.0001); 
REPORTN("XI", J, K) = MAX(XI.L, 0.0001); 
REPORTN("XJ", J, K) = MAX(XJ.L, 0.0001); 
REPORTN("SI", J, K) = MAX(SI.L+SMII.L+SMJI.L+SVJ.L, 0.0001); 
REPORTN("SJ", J, K) = MAX(SJ.L+SMJJ.L+SMIJ.L+SVI.L, 0.0001); 
REPORTN("EXI", J, K) = MAX(EXI.L, 0.0001); 
REPORTN("EXJ", J, K) = MAX(EXJ.L, 0.0001); 
REPORTN("ESI", J, K) = MAX(ESI.L, 0.0001); 
REPORTN("ESJ", J, K) = MAX(ESJ.L, 0.0001); 
REPORTN("ESVI", J, K) = MAX(ESVI.L, 0.0001); 
REPORTN("ESVJ", J, K) = MAX(ESVJ.L, 0.0001); 
REPORTN("PSKI", J, K) = PSKI.L/PUI.L; 
REPORTN("PSKJ", J, K) = PSKJ.L/PUJ.L; 
REPORTN("PUKI", J, K) = PUKI.L/PUI.L; 
REPORTN("PUKJ", J, K) = PUKJ.L/PUJ.L; 
REPORTN("WELI", J, K) = UI.L; 
REPORTN("WELJ", J, K) = UJ.L; 
 
); 
); 
 
DISPLAY DEV; 
$LIBINCLUDE XLDUMP REPORTN WORLDEC4 SHEET1!A3 
 
LOOP(J, 
LOOP(K, 
 
ENDSKI = 2.0 - 0.2*ORD(J); 
ENDSKJ = 0.2*ORD(J); 
ENDUKI = 0.2*ORD(K); 
ENDUKJ = 2.0 - 0.2*ORD(K); 
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NI.L = 1; NJ.L = 1; 
MI.L = 1; MJ.L = 1; 
VI.L = 1; VJ.L = 1; 
SI.L = 1; SJ.L = 1; 
SVI.L = 1; SVJ.L = 1; 
SMII.L = 1; SMIJ.L = 1; 
SMJJ.L = 1; SMJI.L = 1; 
 
DEV = 1; 
 
LOOP(I$(DEV GT 0.0003), 
 
FNI = MAX(NI.L, 0.0001); 
FNJ = MAX(NJ.L, 0.0001); 
FMI = 0.0001; 
FMJ = 0.0001; 
FVI = 0.0001; 
FVJ = 0.0001; 
TCS = 1.01; 
 
OPTION SOLPRINT = OFF; 
$INCLUDE BASE.GEN 
SOLVE BASE USING MCP; 
 
DEV = MAX(ABS(FNI-NI.L), ABS(FNJ-NJ.L), ABS(FMI-MI.L), ABS(FMJ-MJ.L), 
      ABS(FVI-VI.L), ABS(FVJ-VJ.L)); 
 
ITERN = ORD(I); 
 
); 
 
FNI$(NI.L LT 0.1) = 0.0001; 
FNJ$(NJ.L LT 0.1) = 0.0001; 
FMI$(MI.L LT 0.1) = 0.0001; 
FMJ$(MJ.L LT 0.1) = 0.0001; 
FVI$(VI.L LT 0.1) = 0.0001; 
FVJ$(VJ.L LT 0.1) = 0.0001; 
 
OPTION SOLPRINT = ON; 
$INCLUDE BASE.GEN 
SOLVE BASE USING MCP; 
 
REPORTE("ITERN", J, K) = ITERN; 
REPORTE("DEV", J, K) = DEV; 
REPORTE("NI", J, K) = MAX(NI.L, 0.0001); 
REPORTE("NJ", J, K) = MAX(NJ.L, 0.0001); 
REPORTE("MI", J, K) = MAX(MI.L, 0.0001); 
REPORTE("MJ", J, K) = MAX(MJ.L, 0.0001); 
REPORTE("VI", J, K) = MAX(VI.L, 0.0001); 
REPORTE("VJ", J, K) = MAX(VJ.L, 0.0001); 
REPORTE("XI", J, K) = MAX(XI.L, 0.0001); 
REPORTE("XJ", J, K) = MAX(XJ.L, 0.0001); 
REPORTE("SI", J, K) = MAX(SI.L+SMII.L+SMJI.L+SVJ.L, 0.0001); 
REPORTE("SJ", J, K) = MAX(SJ.L+SMJJ.L+SMIJ.L+SVI.L, 0.0001); 
REPORTE("EXI", J, K) = MAX(EXI.L, 0.0001); 
REPORTE("EXJ", J, K) = MAX(EXJ.L, 0.0001); 
REPORTE("ESI", J, K) = MAX(ESI.L, 0.0001); 
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REPORTE("ESJ", J, K) = MAX(ESJ.L, 0.0001); 
REPORTE("ESVI", J, K) = MAX(ESVI.L, 0.0001); 
REPORTE("ESVJ", J, K) = MAX(ESVJ.L, 0.0001); 
REPORTE("PSKI", J, K) = PSKI.L/PUI.L; 
REPORTE("PSKJ", J, K) = PSKJ.L/PUJ.L; 
REPORTE("PUKI", J, K) = PUKI.L/PUI.L; 
REPORTE("PUKJ", J, K) = PUKJ.L/PUJ.L; 
REPORTE("WELI", J, K) = UI.L; 
REPORTE("WELJ", J, K) = UJ.L; 
 
); 
); 
 
$LIBINCLUDE XLDUMP REPORTE WORLDEC4 SHEET2!A3 
 
LOOP(J, 
LOOP(K, 
 
ENDSKI = 2.0 - 0.2*ORD(J); 
ENDSKJ = 0.2*ORD(J); 
ENDUKI = 0.2*ORD(K); 
ENDUKJ = 2.0 - 0.2*ORD(K); 
 
NI.L = 1; NJ.L = 1; 
MI.L = 1; MJ.L = 1; 
VI.L = 1; VJ.L = 1; 
SI.L = 1; SJ.L = 1; 
SVI.L = 1; SVJ.L = 1; 
SMII.L = 1; SMIJ.L = 1; 
SMJJ.L = 1; SMJI.L = 1; 
 
DEV = 1; 
 
LOOP(I$(DEV GT 0.0002), 
 
FNI = MAX(NI.L, 0.0001); 
FNJ = MAX(NJ.L, 0.0001); 
FMI = MAX(MI.L, 0.0001); 
FMJ = MAX(MJ.L, 0.0001); 
FVI = 0.0001; 
FVJ = 0.0001; 
TCS = 50; 
 
 
OPTION SOLPRINT = OFF; 
$INCLUDE BASE.GEN 
SOLVE BASE USING MCP; 
 
DEV = MAX(ABS(FNI-NI.L), ABS(FNJ-NJ.L), ABS(FMI-MI.L), ABS(FMJ-MJ.L), 
      ABS(FVI-VI.L), ABS(FVJ-VJ.L)); 
 
ITERN = ORD(I); 
 
); 
 
FNI$(NI.L LT 0.1) = 0.0001; 
FNJ$(NJ.L LT 0.1) = 0.0001; 
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FMI$(MI.L LT 0.1) = 0.0001; 
FMJ$(MJ.L LT 0.1) = 0.0001; 
FVI$(VI.L LT 0.1) = 0.0001; 
FVJ$(VJ.L LT 0.1) = 0.0001; 
 
OPTION SOLPRINT = ON; 
$INCLUDE BASE.GEN 
SOLVE BASE USING MCP; 
 
REPORTI("ITERN", J, K) = ITERN; 
REPORTI("DEV", J, K) = DEV; 
REPORTI("NI", J, K) = MAX(NI.L, 0.0001); 
REPORTI("NJ", J, K) = MAX(NJ.L, 0.0001); 
REPORTI("MI", J, K) = MAX(MI.L, 0.0001); 
REPORTI("MJ", J, K) = MAX(MJ.L, 0.0001); 
REPORTI("VI", J, K) = MAX(VI.L, 0.0001); 
REPORTI("VJ", J, K) = MAX(VJ.L, 0.0001); 
REPORTI("XI", J, K) = MAX(XI.L, 0.0001); 
REPORTI("XJ", J, K) = MAX(XJ.L, 0.0001); 
REPORTI("SI", J, K) = MAX(SI.L+SMII.L+SMJI.L+SVJ.L, 0.0001); 
REPORTI("SJ", J, K) = MAX(SJ.L+SMJJ.L+SMIJ.L+SVI.L, 0.0001); 
REPORTI("EXI", J, K) = MAX(EXI.L, 0.0001); 
REPORTI("EXJ", J, K) = MAX(EXJ.L, 0.0001); 
REPORTI("ESI", J, K) = MAX(ESI.L, 0.0001); 
REPORTI("ESJ", J, K) = MAX(ESJ.L, 0.0001); 
REPORTI("ESVI", J, K) = MAX(ESVI.L, 0.0001); 
REPORTI("ESVJ", J, K) = MAX(ESVJ.L, 0.0001); 
REPORTI("PSKI", J, K) = PSKI.L/PUI.L; 
REPORTI("PSKJ", J, K) = PSKJ.L/PUJ.L; 
REPORTI("PUKI", J, K) = PUKI.L/PUI.L; 
REPORTI("PUKJ", J, K) = PUKJ.L/PUJ.L; 
REPORTI("WELI", J, K) = UI.L; 
REPORTI("WELJ", J, K) = UJ.L; 
 
); 
); 
 
$LIBINCLUDE XLDUMP REPORTI WORLDEC4 SHEET3!A3 
 
 
LOOP(J, 
LOOP(K, 
 
ENDSKI = 2.0 - 0.2*ORD(J); 
ENDSKJ = 0.2*ORD(J); 
ENDUKI = 0.2*ORD(K); 
ENDUKJ = 2.0 - 0.2*ORD(K); 
 
NI.L = 1; NJ.L = 1; 
MI.L = .0001; MJ.L = .0001; 
VI.L = 1; VJ.L = 1; 
SI.L = 1; SJ.L = 1; 
SVI.L = 1; SVJ.L = 1; 
SMII.L = 0; SMIJ.L = 0; 
SMJJ.L = 0; SMJI.L = 0; 
 
DEV = 1; 
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LOOP(I$(DEV GT 0.0003), 
 
FNI = MAX(NI.L, 0.0001); 
FNJ = MAX(NJ.L, 0.0001); 
FMI = 0.0001; 
FMJ = 0.0001; 
FVI = MAX(VI.L, 0.0001); 
FVJ = MAX(VJ.L, 0.0001); 
FNI$(NI.L LT 0.01) = 0.0001; 
FNJ$(NJ.L LT 0.01) = 0.0001; 
FMI$(MI.L LT 0.01) = 0.0001; 
FMJ$(MJ.L LT 0.01) = 0.0001; 
FVI$(VI.L LT 0.01) = 0.0001; 
FVJ$(VJ.L LT 0.01) = 0.0001; 
 
NI.L$(NI.L LT 0.01) = 0.000; 
NJ.L$(NJ.L LT 0.01) = 0.000; 
MI.L$(MI.L LT 0.01) = 0.000; 
MJ.L$(MJ.L LT 0.01) = 0.000; 
VI.L$(VI.L LT 0.01) = 0.000; 
VJ.L$(VJ.L LT 0.01) = 0.000; 
SI.L$(NI.L LT 0.01) = 0.000; 
SJ.L$(NJ.L LT 0.01) = 0.000; 
SMII.L$(MI.L LT 0.01) = 0.000; 
SMIJ.L$(MI.L LT 0.01) = 0.000; 
SMJJ.L$(MJ.L LT 0.01) = 0.000; 
SMJI.L$(MJ.L LT 0.01) = 0.000; 
SVI.L$(VI.L LT 0.01) = 0.000; 
SVJ.L$(VJ.L LT 0.01) = 0.000; 
TCS = 1.01; 
 
 
OPTION SOLPRINT = OFF; 
$INCLUDE BASE.GEN 
SOLVE BASE USING MCP; 
 
DEV = MAX(ABS(FNI-NI.L), ABS(FNJ-NJ.L), ABS(FMI-MI.L), ABS(FMJ-MJ.L), 
      ABS(FVI-VI.L), ABS(FVJ-VJ.L)); 
 
ITERN = ORD(I); 
 
); 
 
$ONTEXT 
FNI$(NI.L LT 0.1) = 0.0001; 
FNJ$(NJ.L LT 0.1) = 0.0001; 
FMI$(MI.L LT 0.1) = 0.0001; 
FMJ$(MJ.L LT 0.1) = 0.0001; 
FVI$(VI.L LT 0.1) = 0.0001; 
FVJ$(VJ.L LT 0.1) = 0.0001; 
$OFFTEXT 
 
OPTION SOLPRINT = ON; 
$INCLUDE BASE.GEN 
SOLVE BASE USING MCP; 
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REPORTY("ITERN", J, K) = ITERN; 
REPORTY("DEV", J, K) = DEV; 
REPORTY("NI", J, K) = MAX(NI.L, 0.0001); 
REPORTY("NJ", J, K) = MAX(NJ.L, 0.0001); 
REPORTY("MI", J, K) = MAX(MI.L, 0.0001); 
REPORTY("MJ", J, K) = MAX(MJ.L, 0.0001); 
REPORTY("VI", J, K) = MAX(VI.L, 0.0001); 
REPORTY("VJ", J, K) = MAX(VJ.L, 0.0001); 
REPORTY("XI", J, K) = MAX(XI.L, 0.0001); 
REPORTY("XJ", J, K) = MAX(XJ.L, 0.0001); 
REPORTY("SI", J, K) = MAX(SI.L+SMII.L+SMJI.L+SVJ.L, 0.0001); 
REPORTY("SJ", J, K) = MAX(SJ.L+SMJJ.L+SMIJ.L+SVI.L, 0.0001); 
REPORTY("EXI", J, K) = MAX(EXI.L, 0.0001); 
REPORTY("EXJ", J, K) = MAX(EXJ.L, 0.0001); 
REPORTY("ESI", J, K) = MAX(ESI.L, 0.0001); 
REPORTY("ESJ", J, K) = MAX(ESJ.L, 0.0001); 
REPORTY("ESVI", J, K) = MAX(ESVI.L, 0.0001); 
REPORTY("ESVJ", J, K) = MAX(ESVJ.L, 0.0001); 
REPORTY("PSKI", J, K) = PSKI.L/PUI.L; 
REPORTY("PSKJ", J, K) = PSKJ.L/PUJ.L; 
REPORTY("PUKI", J, K) = PUKI.L/PUI.L; 
REPORTY("PUKJ", J, K) = PUKJ.L/PUJ.L; 
REPORTY("WELI", J, K) = UI.L; 
REPORTY("WELJ", J, K) = UJ.L; 
 
); 
); 
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Chapter 4: Modeling Entry and Operational Barriers to Trade in Producer 
and Business Services 
 
I. Introduction 
In this paper I will introduce a new CGE model which allows for the incorporation of both 
variable and fixed trade costs for services and also has two different service sectors entering the 
production processes. The objective is to present an alternative model for analyzing how barriers 
to the provision of professional and business services abroad affect the decisions of multinational 
companies and the factor prices in both countries. The model uses simulated data and is 
therefore more of a demonstration of a new way to capture the differences in consumption and 
production of professional services and the barriers that impact their provision from the theory 
guiding models for goods trade and FDI. Section II provides theoretical and empirical background 
and discusses data issues that impact the analysis of services trade and affiliate production. 
Section III and IV goes over the various regulatory restrictions that affect trade in services and the 
model’s background. Section V outlines the innovative aspects of the model while Section VI 
covers the models structure. Section presents four different experiments and Section VII 
concludes. 
 
II. Background 
The literature often assumes that business and “producer services” are purely 
intermediate goods. In the model presented below there are two separate services sectors, Y and 
B services.  Sector Y produces an intermediate service input into final goods production and it is 
also a final service consumed within the economy by individual consumers. This aspect of the 
model captures household consumption of business services which is often overlooked in 
modeling services.  Personal consumption of services is often restricted in economics literature to 
tourism, transportation, education and health services. While these are indeed important sectors 
for household consumption, the growth of the information communication technology sector has 
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allowed numerous additional business and professional services to be provided to the individual 
consumer in most developed countries as well as developing countries with solid technological 
infrastructure.  Many households routinely conduct transactions in financial, accounting, 
insurance, and computer services. The Y sector includes financial, banking, and insurance 
services, among others which can be consumed by households as well as firms. 
The other service sector in the model, B, is purely representative of intermediate services 
and is initially limited to be an input into the production of Y and not the manufacturing or 
agricultural sectors directly. This is intended to represent the usage of services such as research 
and development , computer and software engineering, architectural engineering and other highly 
skilled professional services not consumed by households. 
While the interactions of services types within the model presented below may seem at 
first to be overly complex, it is straightforward once the notation and model assumptions are 
understood. The different production and consumption behavior for professional and business 
services requires additions to traditional trade models that incorporate FDI and trade.  A number 
of assumptions concerning multinational activity have been found to be in contract to what is 
shown empirically where the data does not support the theory. For example, it is often maintained 
that cross-border supply of services and foreign affiliate sales of services are substitute methods 
of supplying services abroad. This is based on the contention that when a host country has high 
trade costs for an imported service,  a foreign exporting firm will establish a commercial presence 
to services the market (if it is a valuable market. Likewise, if there are high investment costs to 
establishing an affiliate, the firm will supply the services through exporting from the home country. 
It is a fact that data does support this tariff jumping activity of manufacturing multinationals; 
however, services multinationals encounter different restrictions to entry depending on the 
specific industry. Most restrictions to services are behind the border which creates a rationale for 
substitution from uncertainty surrounding the fixed costs of establishing commercial presence in 
the host country.  
The possibility of a complementary relationship between cross-border trade and foreign 
affiliate production has most often been discussed in terms of vertical multinational activity. 
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However, for business and professional services a new type of complimentarily has arisen for 
multinational firms. Multinationals which establish commercial presence in order to supply a 
particular service to the host economy may then more easily engage in selling of additional parent 
or affiliate produced services through cross-border trade. A German Bundesbank paper that 
utilized detailed bank level data found significant increases in cross-border sales of financial 
services through established foreign affiliates and also found evidence that the relationship 
between trade and FDI in financial services (with one of the two supplies already established) 
was significantly impacted by the regulatory regime in place in the host country. (Buch and 
Lipponer 2004) These modern trade complexities are even further advanced when the non-
regulatory types of trade barriers and restrictions are considered as affecting the supply of 
services abroad. 
One of the goals of the model in this paper is to simulate these various of relationships, 
and establish an important step in properly analyzing how the regulatory and other restrictions to 
trade and foreign affiliate sales of professional services impact the decisions of MNEs, factor 
prices, and subsequently the quality and cost of those services in the foreign country. This is the 
only way to determine what benefits may accrue from the removal or relaxation of the various 
types of barriers to each method of supply. 
Investment in services is the largest component of global and U.S. FDI and is also the 
fastest growing. Over the period 1990-2002 FDI in the primary sector doubled, tripled in the 
manufacturing sector, and quadrupled in services. Over the same period the share of 
manufacturing FDI fell from 42% to 32% while the share of services rose from 49% to 62%. 
(UNCTAD, 2004) The large size of the service sector is not unique to the U.S. Services make up 
57%% of middle income country’s GDP, compared to 72% of high income country’s GDP (UN 
WIR, 2005). This has facilitated multinational enterprises’ decisions to locate service affiliates in 
countries all over the world. Motivations for FDI in services are encompassed by the same 
general categories as FDI in goods: market-seeking, resource seeking, efficiency-seeking, and 
asset seeking. (Dunning, 2002) For U.S. outward FDI in services, most location decisions by 
MNEs were made for market or efficiency seeking reasons. (Dunning, 2002) FDI in producer 
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services is seen to be fulfilling both of these goals. Business and producer services include 
financial services, insurance services, and professional, technical, and scientific services. The 
latter encompass legal, insurance, accounting, engineering, architecture, advertising, R&D, 
consulting and marketing among others. These all are within the definition of producer services 
that assumes intermediate potential and an intensive use of skilled labor and other knowledge 
based assets. This area of investment is increasing in value and importance in world trade. 
Business services accounted for over one third of FDI stock in 2002, up from about 15 percent in 
1990. (UNCTAD, 2004) The unique element for FDI in producer services in that they serve both 
foreign and domestic companies and manufacturers. This range of firms utilizes these services 
creates a significant market for the MNEs supplying producer services.  
Investment in producer services has recently spawned a number of papers, lead by the 
theoretical analysis of Markusen, Rutherford, and Tarr (2005). The gravity model is used by a 
number of economists as they assess its use in predicting trade in services however empirical 
assessments in foreign affiliate activity in services are infrequent due to the lack of data. (Egger 
2005; Egger and Pfaffermayr 2004; Findlay and Warren 2000; Walsh 2006)   
The task of quantifying the possible benefits from liberalization is difficult with good data 
and this is certainly not the case for barriers to trade in services. The contribution of my model will 
hopefully encourage the use of available data while simulating interactions where the data is still 
lacking.  Eventually, incorporating actual data into this CGE approach it will be possible to 
quantify the effects on welfare through factor price changes as well as lost productivity through 
barriers to services investment and the informal sector in the industries being analyzed.  
III: Restrictions and barriers to trade and investment in Services  
As previously noted, the majority of barriers and restrictions to trade in services are 
difficult to observe and quantify due to the majority being behind the border elements of 
regulation and governance. Recently, international organizations and trade promoting agencies 
have begun to try to compile various measures of the regulatory barriers to trade in services as 
well as any non-regulatory trade costs imposed on services suppliers. Their job is complicated by 
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the use of various modes of supply for trade in services and the lack of data on the activity of 
foreign affiliates that I referred to earlier in this paper.  
There are many types of restrictions in service industries, any many are not easily 
observed or quantified. The major restrictions and relevant sub-categories of interest for potential 
future analyses, as well as the type of barrier they impose are: 
• Foreign ownership restrictions- Market access barriers 
o No foreign equity 
o Less than 30% foreign ownership 
o Between 30-50% foreign ownership 
o Between 50-100% foreign ownership 
• Citizenship and/or residency restrictions- Market access barriers 
o All workers 
o Chairman and all the Board of Directors 
o Required for professional license/certification 
o Percentage of board/managers 
• Anti-Competitive practices- Increase fixed and variable costs 
o Monopolies in service industries 
o Cartel behavior 
o Tax benefits or subsidies granted to domestic incumbents  
o No new firms allowed 
• Discriminatory practices/restrictive domestic regulation for all entrants – Market 
access barriers that also raise fixed costs of entry 
o Licenses and/or number of foreign firms restricted differently or not from 
domestic firms in the same industry 
o Restricted to certain economic zones or other geographic areas 
o Type of enterprise restricted for foreign firms 
o Economic needs test for foreign firms  
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• Financial restrictions – more of a developing country issue that can affect 
profitability due to the loss of earning interest on profits re-invested elsewhere 
o Capital controls 
o Restrictions on reinvestment 
• Resource waste and/or inefficiency causing restrictions – fixed cost inefficiency 
waste that may also affect cross-border trade (mode 1) 
o Rampant corruption 
o Excessive bureaucratic red tape 
o Lack of transparency in any of the required licensure or entry steps 
o Lack of mutual recognition for professional certifications 
o Other resource wasting restrictions ( bribery, etc) 
Obviously, this reads more like a regulatory data wish list under the current conditions of 
country/industry specific data availability. However, there is finally an understanding among 
international and national organizations of the importance of trade in services and if nothing else, 
a strong desire to obtain a clear and informative picture of the status quo concerning regulatory 
and other restrictions to the various modes of supplying services to other countries.  
Regulatory barriers to trade in services predominantly interact with the fixed costs of 
entry into the market. This is quite different from the ad valorem mark-up that has been used in 
the majority of research estimating the gains from liberalizing services trade. This is an area that 
is still in its infancy in terms of empirical estimations due to the data issues that by now may seem 
to sound like an excuse, however, the lack of panel data should not prohibit research into the 
proper accounting of restrictions to trade in services and the attempts to model the relationships 
using available economic modeling tools.  
 
IV: Background for model 
The CGE model I have created incorporates some of the newest “tricks” for modeling 
monopolistic competition and increasing returns to scale technology. These methods are 
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necessary due to the computer program’s method of obtaining equilibrium solutions. James 
Markusen is responsible for a great deal of the programming tricks introduced in this model, 
however, the incorporation of numerous sectors exhibiting IRS with monopolistic competition and 
product differentiation as well as both variable and fixed trade and inefficiency costs is my novel 
contribution to this area of work. 
I use GAMS software for the model and the model is programmed using a higher 
language written by Thomas Rutherford called MPS/GE, which stands for mathematical 
programming system for general equilibrium. MPS/GE uses the MCP solver in GAMS but permits 
extremely efficient shortcuts for modelers which greatly reduces human errors in coding as well 
as time spent typing out equations with multiple nests and complicated price indices. As a short 
introduction to those unfamiliar with these programs I will outline the most important aspects of 
using MPS/GE. First and most important for my model, the program has routines for calibrating 
and writing all constant-returns CES and CET functions with up to three levels of nesting each. 
The modeler specifies the nesting structure, substitution elasticities, and a representative point on 
the function, consisting of output quantities, input quantities and prices. This representative point 
and associated price vector uniquely determine the function, and MPS/GE then generates the 
cost function (or expenditure function).  
Additionally, many of the required market-clearing and income-balance equations are 
written automatically by MPS/GE so the modeler doesn’t have to worry about doing so which 
reduces the potential human errors that can easily occur when a modeler writes out dozens of 
equations. If there is a tax or markup, for example, the revenues must be assigned to some agent 
and will be allocated automatically to that agent by the income-balance properties of the coding. If 
you have incorrectly coded the activities, MPS/GE automatically checks for and ensures the 
product-exhaustion and income-balance requirements required for any CGE models and the 
modeler is forced to correct their mistakes before the model will pass to the solver. My use of the 
MPS/GE language will become even clearer as we get into the specifics of the model.  
As I previously mentioned, incorporating economic realities of producer services 
production is not as straightforward as one might expect. While methods of incorporating 
 102
monopolistic competition have been successfully used in a number of studies (Konan & Maskus; 
Markusen, Rutherford and Tarr; Konan and Van Assche) methods for incorporating Dixit-Stiglitz 
differentiation have been largely unsuccessful once the model is expanded beyond simple 2 good 
2 country models with only one firm type. James Markusen discovered a method that allows the 
model to incorporate endogenous numbers of differentiated services into the MPS/GE 
programming language.  
This technique relies on two steps. The first is the consumers are endowed with a least a 
fraction of every potential good. This does not affect the calibrated solution but prevents the 
demand price from going off to infinity and crashing the model. The second and more 
complicated step involves the production sectors of goods or services which have differentiated 
services inputs. First the model solves for homogeneous goods equilibrium with a fixed markup 
as given in the monopolistic-competition framework and with free entry and exit of firm given this 
markup rule.  
After solving the homogeneous goods case, the equilibrium number of firms is used to 
adjust the quantity field on output of a group to reflect the value of product differentiation within 
the group. Box 1 below summarized how to get the right number of firms when solving the model. 
Differentiation is perfectly measured by the number of symmetric firms, and the value of this 
product diversity is exactly equivalent to a Hicks-neutral technical shift in the output quantity of 
the homogeneous good. The modeler sets an initial guess at the equilibrium number of firms and 
this is set equal to a fixed technology parameter on the production function and the model is 
solved.  
• The model solves for equilibrium with a fixed markup as given by monopolistic-
competition 
 
• The equilibrium number of firms adjusts the quantity field on output of a group to 
reflect the value of product differentiation. 
 
• Value of product diversity is exactly equivalent to a Hicks-neutral technical shift in the 
output quantity of the good.  
 
• Initial guess equilibrium number of firms =  fixed technology parameter and the model 
is solved 
 
• Parameter is adjusted again to equal the solution value of firm numbers, and the 
model is solved again.  
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Box 1: How to get the “Right” Number of Endogenous Firms? 
 
Then parameter is then adjusted again to equal the solution value of firm numbers, and 
the model is solved again. This iterative method is repeated in a loop until there is a close 
convergence between the technology parameter and the number of firms in the solution. This 
may take 10 iterations or it may take 50 iterations but a solution with convergence is an economic 
equilibrium.  
 
V: Model Specification 
 I will include the model’s code in the appendix but will go over the models components 
here in order to clarify the structure.  Figure 1 below can also be used for reference. 
Countries: Two countries I and J; endowments can be varied to illustrate various sized 
countries or asymmetric factor endowments 
Factors of production: L- low skilled labor; R-routinely skilled service workers; H-highly 
educated and highly skilled services workers 
Goods/Services Sectors: Three production sectors 
X: Final good for consumption, inputs include L labor and Y producer services. 
Y: Service sector which is a producer service into X production as well as a services for 
final consumption by individuals in the economy (representative consumers), inputs include R 
workers as well as B services. 
B: High skilled services sector which is only an intermediate input into Y production, 
inputs are both R service workers and H service workers. 
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Figure 1: Production Diagram for Model 
 
Firm Types: There are domestic (D) and multinational (M) firms for both Y and B   
services. X is only produced domestically but can be exported. Domestic B and Y firms also can 
export while M firms are engaging purely in horizontal multinational activity and selling their 
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services abroad as well as at home. X firms can source Y services from four different firm types: 
MYI, MYJ, DYI, and DYJ. Y firms can source B services from only two firm types as I make the 
assumption that Y firms only utilize home country B services. Therefore a multinational Y firm 
from country I (MYI) in country J can only purchase B services from country I’s domestic B firms 
(DBI) which export to J or from multinational B firms (MBI) who have established a commercial 
presence in J. 
Firm Owners: Y firms are “owned” by entrepreneurs who are really an agent used to 
receive mark-up revenue which is then spent on the fixed costs of establishing the firms-which is 
the sector that determines the number of firms in equilibrium. The B firms have similar agents 
which are the Business owners of the professional services firms.  
Consumers: Both countries have a representative consumer who is endowed with labor 
and demands the goods X and Y while also receiving utility from their consumption. 
Trade Costs/Investment Costs: There are three endogenous inefficiency costs which 
represent restrictions to trade and foreign affiliate sales in services Parameters FDIYI, FDIYJ, 
FDYBI, and FDIBJ are used to set a quantity of inefficiency costs in the fixed costs sectors for 
multinational firms in the Y and B sectors. Auxiliary variables and their associated constraints are 
used to keep the model in equilibrium. The quantity of this loss is then assigned to an agent-
BCAT or WASTE- for Y and B loss respectively and consumers are then endowed with this loss 
in order for all the income balance equations to be satisfied. . Refer to Figure 2 below for a visual 
interpretation of the waste allocation. 
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Figure 2: Allocation of the inefficiency waste within the model 
 
 
The B sector also has a fixed cost trade cost of exporting that is separate from 
the ad valorem variable trade cost. This is controlled by the parameters MODE1I and 
MODE1J reflecting the mode of supply in question and has an associated auxiliary 
variables of TRADEI and TRADEJ. This inefficiency loss is then assigned to an agent 
and then also endowed to consumers as BLOSSI/J. This may be a bit much to 
understand as written but will be helpful as you read through the model code in the 
appendix. 
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How to Increase Fixed Costs due to Market Access and Entry Restrictions? 
• Endogenous tax auxiliary variables are used for the foreign affiliate’s sales with the income 
from the tax being an input into the establishment sector (fixed costs) with a price (PINEFF, 
etc).  
• Each cost has a waste “agent” who also then demand another symmetric waste variable 
that is endowed to the consumers-this ensures market clearing and income balancing. 
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VI: FOUR EXPERIMENTS 
There are four simulations (of the dozens I initially did while working on this paper) that show the 
flexibility of the model. These four are summarized in Table 1 below and then discussed 
individually. In addition, summary tables (Tables 2 and 3) will provide a view of the impacts on the 
prices, wages, and welfare for country I and country j across the various simulations. 
Table 1: Four Experiments in Trade and Investment Costs in Professional and Business 
Services 
Experiment Endowments Trade Allowed 
FDI 
Allowed 
Trade 
Costs  
FDI 
Costs Simulation 
1 Identical Yes Yes Low Low 
Experiment 
reduces the 
variable trade 
costs for Y from 
100% to 1% 
modeling full trade 
liberalization for Y 
services. 
2 Identical No Yes N/A Simulated 
Experiment 
increases the Y 
services sector 
FDI inefficiency 
costs from1% to 
10% illustrating 
the impact of 
inefficiency when 
commercial 
presence is 
required for 
supplying services 
abroad. 
3 
Variable:  
Country i has 
3x more H 
workers and 
Country J has 
3x more R 
workers 
Yes Yes Low Low 
Experiment 
decreases the 
costs of FDI in B 
services from 10% 
to 1% modeling 
liberalization in the 
highly skilled 
services supply 
through 
commercial 
presence. 
4 Same as #3 Yes Yes Simulated Low 
Experiment 
reduces the 
variable trade 
costs for Y from 
100% to 1% 
modeling full trade 
liberalization for Y 
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services under a 
regime with low 
costs to FDI in all 
services. 
4 Same as #3 Yes Yes Simulated High 
Experiment 
reduces the 
variable trade 
costs for Y from 
100% to 1% 
modeling 
liberalization for 
traded Y services 
under a regime 
with high costs to 
FDI in all services. 
The first experiment I will discuss has the countries set with identical endowments. FDI 
inefficiency costs are very low in both sectors (B and Y) and Mode 1 entry costs are also very low 
(essentially zero). The variable trade costs for the B sector are high and the experiment consists 
of lowering the variable trade costs for the Y sector from 100% to 1% for both countries 
simultaneously. This experiment models situations where FDI is the preferred mode of supply for 
both Y and B services due to high variable trade costs in both types of services. In the model 
presented above, this simulation is done by specifying two loops, the first loop reduces the trade 
costs and then for each value of the trade costs the iterative firm solution loop performs 50 
iterations to arrive at a solution.  
The solution does not provide any surprises as exports of Y increase substantially as the 
trade costs are reduced. The higher level of exported Y services does not affect the price of Y 
services; however it does result in the price of X decreasing due to the increased flexibility in the 
availability of Y services for X production. The professional B services are solely produced by 
multinationals which also explains the decrease in the price of X from increased trade in Y 
services as the production of Y services requires B services from the same country of origin. The 
simulations show that returns to labor increase for all worker types and welfare for both countries 
increases about 8% from the combination of cheaper X goods and higher wages for all three 
worker types. Since the countries are identical, the welfare gains are also equal showing bilateral 
gains from trade liberalization. 
Experiment #2 
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The second experiment also assumes identical countries in terms of labor endowments 
and size. There is no trade in Y or B services allowed in the benchmark and this simulation 
illustrates the effects of regulations requiring commercial presence for the supply of a service. 
These are common across the globe as many developing and developed countries choose to 
regulate foreign supplied services by requiring the services to be produced within the borders.  
Initially, I assume FDI costs for B services to be low (as this is the only mode of supply) and then 
increase the inefficiency costs for FDI in Y services from 0% to 10% of Y services’ fixed costs. 
The initial production effects are that production of B and Y services increases and the 
production of X goods decreases. This occurs due to the wage effects from the increased 
inefficiency costs. High skilled workers in the B services sector are the biggest losers here as 
they experience significant wage decreases as their product becomes less expensive due to 
increased level of production.  Routine skilled workers also experience wage decreases and 
remain the lowest paid workers throughout the scenarios. Low skilled laborers do not escape the 
fallout and also see wage drops of over 40% due to their participation in the fixed cost sector of 
establishment (for services production through affiliates) and the decreased level of X goods 
production.  
The price of X increases 70% to account for the 100% price increase in Y, which is an 
important input into X production.  The production increases in the B sector are necessary to 
keep up with the likewise production increases in the Y sector, required to stay afloat with the 
increase in wasted resources on fixed costs. The effects of this resource waste is apparent as the 
number of multinational firms owned by each country in each country falls from a high of almost 
60 under a costless FDI regime to 1.76 (3.5 per country) firms under the 10% inefficiency cost. At 
the midpoint with inefficiency costs of 5% of fixed costs the number of firms has already fallen to 
8 firms from the initial 60 multinational firms that existed when there were no inefficiency costs for 
FDI in Y services.  
Experiment #3 
This experiment assumes that the countries have different factor endowments. While 
they both have the same endowment of low skilled labor, country I has three times the 
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endowment of high skilled service workers, while country J has three times the endowment of 
routine skilled service workers. Additionally, I have low variable trade costs, low FDI costs in Y, 
and low Mode 1 costs for B. The experiment reduces FDI inefficiency costs in B from 10% of fixed 
costs to essentially zero. This set up simulates the interactions between the many bilateral trading 
partners who have dissimilar but not opposite factor endowments. For example, a country such 
as India has high skilled engineers but has a much larger endowment of what I am calling 
routinely skilled workers. This endowment led to some companies choosing to offshore some 
back-office operations. Looking to the future, a country such as this can have a growing 
consumer base that can be a source of welfare gains for both sides of a bilateral trade/investment 
relationship. 
 
Table 2: Summary of Results from Experiments #1, #2, and #3 
Results on wages, prices, firms 
and welfare  
Experiment 
#1: Liberalize 
trade in Y 
Services 
Experiment 
#2: No trade 
allowed, 
Increase 
inefficiency 
costs for FDI 
in Y Services 
Experiment #3: Endowments of R and H 
are opposites (with Country I having more 
H and less R), decrease the costs to FDI in 
B Services from 10% to 1% 
Both 
Countries 
Both 
Countries Home Country i Host Country j 
High Skilled Workers Wages Increase ~10% Decrease 60% Increase Increase more than i 
Routine Skilled Workers Wages Increase ~10% Decrease 30% 
Increase more 
than j Increase 
Low skilled Workers Wages Increase ~10% Decrease 40% Increase Increase 
Price of X Decreases Increases 70% Decreases 15% Decreases 15% 
Price of Y Unchanged 
Increases 
100% Decreases 20% Decreases 20% 
Price of B Unchanged Unchanged Unchanged Unchanged 
Exports of Y Increase Zero Unchanged Unchanged 
Production of Y Increases Increases Increases Increases 
Exports of B Unchanged Zero Decrease Decrease 
Production of B Increases Increases Increases Increases 
Exports of X Unchanged Zero Unchanged Unchanged 
Production of X Increases Decreases Increases Increases 
Number of domestic Y firms Unchanged Zero Unchanged Unchanged 
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Number of domestic B firms 
All domestic 
firms either 
become 
mulitnationals 
or exit Zero Decreases Decreases 
Number of multinational Y firms Unchanged 
Decreases 
from 120 to 3.5 
total in each 
country (1.76 
owned by 
each) Increases Increases 
Number of multinational B firms Increases Unchanged Increases Increases 
Overall Welfare Increases 8% Decreases Increases Increases more than i 
 
The simulation results show that the number of B services multinationals increases from 
13 firms to 50 firms while the price of B services remains unchanged. This increase in the 
providers of B services results in the prices of both Y services and therefore X goods to decrease 
significantly as the variety of services is expanded. The production of both X and Y also increases 
as there is greater demand from consumers for both goods and services at the new lower prices. 
Wages for all workers increase 5-7% with the scarce workers in each economy (routine workers 
in country i and high-skilled in country j) seeing the largest gains. Overall, country J realizes 
higher welfare gains due to the scarcity of high skilled workers and the cross-border immobility of 
labor assumed in the model (which is reflective of actual mode 4 restrictions in many countries 
across the globe). 
Experiment #4 
The final experiment examined here has the same endowments as experiment 3 where 
country I has 3x more high-skilled workers than country J and country J has 3x more routinely 
skilled workers. For this simulation however, I reduce the variable trade costs in the Y sector 
under two different FDI regulatory regimes. The first regime has high inefficiency costs of FDI for 
Y and B services while the second regime has low inefficiency costs for multinational Y and B 
services production.  
Unsurprisingly, both scenarios see an increase in exports of Y services. The resulting 
country I exports however are only about half that of country J’s due to the endowment 
differences and the workers required for Y production. In the first FDI regime, the resulting B 
services firms are solely domestic due to the high costs of FDI. In addition, exports of B services 
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from country I decrease with the decrease in Y services trade costs due to the elimination of any 
Y multinational production (which would be the only foreign demand for B services from abroad). 
In the initial scenario with high trade costs, there was still a small level of Y multinational 
production, taking advantage of the scale economies from horizontal activity. The major welfare 
effect in this simulation is from the effect on the prices of X which decrease over 15% leading to 
welfare gains of about 4% for country I and 10% for country J.  
In the second scenario the B services firms are all multinational due to the same scale economies 
enjoyed through horizontal investment. Similar gains in welfare accrue from similar price 
reductions in the cost of good X. However, the wages in the second scenario are higher for 
everyone in both countries as all workers see significant increases in wages as the money 
allocated to wages is not being eaten up by the inefficiency fixed cost sectors associated with 
multinational production of Y and B services. 
Table 3: Summary of Results from Experiment #4 
Results on wages, prices, 
firms and welfare  
Experiment #4: Endowments of R and 
H are opposites (with Country I having 
more H and less R), FDI highly 
restricted for all professional and 
business services, trade costs for Y 
services are reduced 
Experiment #4: Endowments of R and H are 
opposites (with Country I having more H 
and less R), decrease the costs to FDI in B 
Services from 10% to 1% 
Home Country i Host Country j Home Country i Host Country j 
High Skilled Workers 
Wages Unchanged Unchanged Increase Increases more than i 
Routine Skilled Workers 
Wages Unchanged Unchanged Increases more than j Increase 
Low skilled Workers 
Wages Unchanged Unchanged Increase Increase 
Price of X Decrease 15% Decrease 15% Decrease 15% Decrease 15% 
Price of Y Decreases Decreases Decreases Decreases 
Price of B Unchanged Unchanged Unchanged Unchanged 
Exports of Y Increases Increases more than i Increases Increases more than i 
Production of Y Increases Increases more than i Increases Increases more than i 
Exports of B Decreases Decreases Decreases Decreases 
Production of B Decreases Decreases Decreases Decreases 
Exports of X Unchanged Unchanged Unchanged Unchanged 
Production of X Unchanged Unchanged Unchanged Unchanged 
Number of domestic Y 
firms Increase Increase Decreases Decreases 
Number of domestic B 
firms Decrease Decrease Decrease to zero Decrease to zero 
Number of multinational Y Decrease Decrease Increases Increases 
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firms 
Number of multinational B 
firms Decrease to zero Decrease to zero Increases Increases 
Overall Welfare Increases 4% Increases 10% Increases 4% Increases 10% 
 
This fourth experiment illustrates how the model can be used to contrast and compare 
various trade policy regimes, and create literally thousands of endowment and regulatory 
scenarios. 
 
VII: Conclusions 
The four experiments presented above show the impact that inefficiency costs in FDI 
have on prices, wages, levels of production and modes of supply for intermediate and final 
business and professional services. The simulations also allow differences in labor endowments 
and initial trade and investment regimes to be varied. While the model here has some limiting 
assumptions it can be adjusted and calibrated to use input-output, trade, and affiliate sales data 
in the future.  
As I previously explained, this paper presents a model which is a new tool available for 
analyzing the effects of regulatory barriers and other restrictions to the supply of services through 
cross-border trade as well as through foreign affiliate sales. The simulations presented here are 
not claiming to be representative of a particular economy; however, the model can be calibrated 
or adjusted to simulate many different observed bilateral relationships.  
As better bilateral data becomes available, this model be able to contribute to research 
that identifies and quantifies the relationships among the modes of supply and how various 
restrictions may impact firm’s decision to supply via a particular mode. Additionally, data on 
regulatory barriers themselves is beginning to be collected by the OECD and the World Bank and 
incorporating all of these various empirical elements will allow this model to be an important tool 
for policy modeling as well as for determining potential gains and losses to goods sectors, 
services sectors, and consumers.  
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Appendix I: CGE model Code 
   SIGMADI = 5; 
 SIGMADJ = 5; 
 RHODI   = 4; 
 RHODJ   = 4; 
 SIGMAMI = 5; 
 SIGMAMJ = 5; 
 RHOMI   = 4; 
 RHOMJ   = 4; 
 ENDLI = 1; 
 ENDRI = 1; 
 ENDLJ = 1; 
 ENDRJ = 1; 
 ENDHI = 1; 
 ENDHJ = 1; 
 YDIFFDI = 1/(SIGMADI-1); 
 YDIFFDJ = 1/(SIGMADJ-1); 
 BDIFFDI = 1/(RHODI-1); 
 BDIFFDJ = 1/(RHODJ-1); 
 YDIFFMI = 1/(SIGMAMI-1); 
 YDIFFMJ = 1/(SIGMAMJ-1); 
 BDIFFMI = 1/(RHOMI-1); 
 BDIFFMJ = 1/(RHOMJ-1); 
 SCYMI  = 6/10; 
 SCYMJ  = 6/10; 
 SCBMI  = 7/10; 
 SCBMJ  = 7/10; 
 YDIQ0   = 64/(4**(SIGMADI/(SIGMADI-1))); 
 YDJQ0   = 64/(4**(SIGMADJ/(SIGMADJ-1))); 
 YDIP0   = 80/(YDIQ0*4); 
 YDJP0   = 80/(YDJQ0*4); 
 YCIQ0   = 96/(4**(SIGMADI/(SIGMADI-1))); 
 YCJQ0   = 96/(4**(SIGMADJ/(SIGMADJ-1))); 
 YCIP0   = 120/(YCIQ0*4); 
 YCJP0   = 120/(YCJQ0*4); 
 BDIQ0   = 60/(2**(RHODI/(RHODI-1))); 
 BDJQ0   = 60/(2**(RHODJ/(RHODJ-1))); 
 BDIP0   = 80/(2*BDIQ0); 
 BDJP0   = 80/(2*BDJQ0); 
 YMIQ0   = 64/(4**(SIGMAMI/(SIGMAMI-1))); 
 YMJQ0   = 64/(4**(SIGMAMJ/(SIGMAMJ-1))); 
 YMIP0   = 80/(YMIQ0*4); 
 YMJP0   = 80/(YMJQ0*4); 
 BMIQ0   = 60/(2**(RHOMI/(RHOMI-1))); 
 BMJQ0   = 60/(2**(RHOMJ/(RHOMJ-1))); 
 BMIP0   = 80/(2*BMIQ0); 
 BMJP0   = 80/(2*BMJQ0); 
 
 MKYDI   = 1/(SIGMADI-1); 
 MKYDJ   = 1/(SIGMADJ-1); 
 MKBDI   = 1/(RHODI-1); 
 MKBDJ   = 1/(RHODJ-1); 
 MKYMI   = 1/(SIGMAMI-1); 
 MKYMJ   = 1/(SIGMAMJ-1); 
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 MKBMI   = 1/(RHOMI-1); 
 MKBMJ   = 1/(RHOMJ-1); 
 FDIYI   = 10.0001; 
 FDIYJ   = 10.0001; 
 FDIBI   = 5.0001; 
 FDIBJ   = 5.0001; 
 MODE1I  = .0001; 
 MODE1J  = .0001; 
 SUMI    = FDIYI+FDIBI+MODE1I; 
 SUMJ    = FDIYJ+FDIBJ+MODE1J; 
 DISPLAY YMIQ0, YMJQ0, YMIP0, YMJP0, BMIQ0, BMJQ0, BMIP0, BMJP0, 
         YDIQ0, YDJQ0, YDIP0, YDJP0, BDIQ0, BDJQ0, BDIP0, BDJP0; 
 SETS J   /1*10/ 
      C   /1*10/ 
      N   /1*30/; 
PARAMETERS 
REPORTN(*,C) 
REPORTC(*,C) 
$ONTEXT 
$MODEL:COMP_NEW 
$SECTORS: 
 XI   XJ 
 YDI  YDJ 
 YMII YMIJ 
 YMJJ YMJI 
 BDI  BDJ 
 BMII BMIJ 
 BMJJ BMJI 
 EYDI EYDJ 
 EBDI EBDJ 
 EXI  EXJ 
 DYI  DYJ 
 MYI  MYJ 
 DBI  DBJ 
 MBI  MBJ 
 UI   UJ 
 
$COMMODITIES: 
 PXI    PXJ 
 PYDI   PYDJ 
 PYMII  PYMIJ 
 PYMJJ  PYMJI 
 PEYDI  PEYDJ 
 PBDI   PBDJ 
 PBMII  PBMIJ 
 PBMJJ  PBMJI 
 PEBDI  PEBDJ 
 FCYDI  FCYDJ 
 FCYMI  FCYMJ 
 FCBDI  FCBDJ 
 FCBMI  FCBMJ 
 PRI    PRJ 
 PLI    PLJ 
 PHI    PHJ 
 PUI    PUJ 
 PINEFFYI 
 PINEFFYJ 
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 LOSSYI 
 LOSSYJ 
 PINEFFBI 
 PINEFFBJ 
 LOSSBI 
 LOSSBJ 
 PTCBI 
 PTCBJ 
 BLOSSI 
 BLOSSJ 
 
$CONSUMERS: 
 CONSI  CONSJ 
 ENTDI  ENTDJ 
 ENTMI  ENTMJ 
 BUSDI  BUSDJ 
 BUSMI  BUSMJ 
 BCATI  BCATJ 
 WASTEI 
 WASTEJ 
 BCOSTI 
 BCOSTJ 
 
$AUXILIARY: 
 REGYI 
 REGYJ 
 REGBI 
 REGBJ 
 TRADEI 
 TRADEJ 
$PROD:XI   s:1.0     a:5 
 O:PXI     Q:180 
 I:PLI     Q:100 
 I:PYMII   Q:YMIQ0    P:YMIP0    a: 
 I:PYMJI   Q:YMIQ0    P:YMIP0    a: 
 I:PYDI    Q:YDIQ0    P:YDIP0    a: 
 I:PEYDJ   Q:YDIQ0    P:YDIP0    a: 
 
$PROD:XJ   s:1.0     a:5 
 O:PXJ     Q:180 
 I:PLJ     Q:100 
 I:PYMIJ   Q:YMJQ0    P:YMJP0    a: 
 I:PYMJJ   Q:YMJQ0    P:YMJP0    a: 
 I:PEYDI   Q:YDJQ0    P:YDJP0    a: 
 I:PYDJ    Q:YDJQ0    P:YDJP0    a: 
 
$PROD:YDI  s:0.5     a:4 
 O:PYDI    Q:(160*NYDI**YDIFFDI) 
 I:PRI     Q:80                       A:ENTDI     T:MKYDI 
 I:PBDI    Q:BDIQ0    P:BDIP0    a:   A:ENTDI     T:MKYDI 
 I:PBMII   Q:BMIQ0    P:BMIP0    a:   A:ENTDI     T:MKYDI 
 
$PROD:YDJ  s:0.5     a:4 
 O:PYDJ    Q:(160*NYDJ**YDIFFDJ) 
 I:PRJ     Q:80                       A:ENTDJ     T:MKYDJ 
 I:PBDJ    Q:BDJQ0    P:BDJP0    a:   A:ENTDJ     T:MKYDJ 
 I:PBMJJ   Q:BMJQ0    P:BMJP0    a:   A:ENTDJ     T:MKYDJ 
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$PROD:YMII  s:0.5     a:4 
 O:PYMII   Q:(80*NYMI**YDIFFMI) 
 I:PRI     Q:40                       A:ENTMI     T:MKYMI 
 I:PBDI    Q:BDIQ0    P:BDIP0    a:   A:ENTMI     T:MKYMI 
 I:PBMII   Q:BMIQ0    P:BMIP0    a:   A:ENTMI     T:MKYMI 
$PROD:YMIJ  s:0.5     a:4 
 O:PYMIJ   Q:(80*NYMI**YDIFFMI)       A:ENTMI     N:REGYI 
 I:PRJ     Q:40                       A:ENTMI     T:MKYMI 
 I:PEBDI   Q:BDIQ0    P:BDIP0    a:   A:ENTMI     T:MKYMI 
 I:PBMIJ   Q:BMIQ0    P:BMIP0    a:   A:ENTMI     T:MKYMI 
 
$PROD:YMJI  s:0.5     a:4 
 O:PYMJI   Q:(80*NYMJ**YDIFFMJ)       A:ENTMJ     N:REGYJ 
 I:PRI     Q:40                       A:ENTMJ     T:MKYMJ 
 I:PEBDJ   Q:BDJQ0    P:BDJP0    a:   A:ENTMJ     T:MKYMJ 
 I:PBMJI   Q:BMJQ0    P:BMJP0    a:   A:ENTMJ     T:MKYMJ 
 
$PROD:YMJJ  s:0.5     a:4 
 O:PYMJJ   Q:(80*NYMJ**YDIFFMJ) 
 I:PRJ     Q:40                       A:ENTMJ     T:MKYMJ 
 I:PBDJ    Q:BDJQ0    P:BDJP0    a:   A:ENTMJ     T:MKYMJ 
 I:PBMJJ   Q:BMJQ0    P:BMJP0    a:   A:ENTMJ     T:MKYMJ 
 
$PROD:BDI   s:0.5 
 O:PBDI    Q:(60*NBDI**BDIFFDI)       A:BUSDI     N:TRADEI  
M:.01$EBDI.L 
 I:PRI     Q:40                       A:BUSDI     T:MKBDI 
 I:PHI     Q:20                       A:BUSDI     T:MKBDI 
 
$PROD:BDJ   s:0.5 
 O:PBDJ    Q:(60*NBDJ**BDIFFDJ)       A:BUSDI     N:TRADEJ  
M:.01$EBDJ.L 
 I:PRJ     Q:40                       A:BUSDJ     T:MKBDJ 
 I:PHJ     Q:20                       A:BUSDJ     T:MKBDJ 
 
$PROD:BMII   s:0.5 
 O:PBMII   Q:(30*NBMI**BDIFFMI) 
 I:PRI     Q:20                       A:BUSMI     T:MKBMI 
 I:PHI     Q:10                       A:BUSMI     T:MKBMI 
 
$PROD:BMIJ   s:0.5 
 O:PBMIJ   Q:(30*NBMI**BDIFFMI)       A:BUSMI     N:REGBI 
 I:PRJ     Q:20                       A:BUSMI     T:MKBMI 
 I:PHJ     Q:10                       A:BUSMI     T:MKBMI 
 
$PROD:BMJJ   s:0.5 
 O:PBMJJ   Q:(30*NBMJ**BDIFFMJ) 
 I:PRJ     Q:20                       A:BUSMJ     T:MKBMJ 
 I:PHJ     Q:10                       A:BUSMJ     T:MKBMJ 
 
$PROD:BMJI   s:0.5 
 O:PBMJI   Q:(30*NBMJ**BDIFFMJ)       A:BUSMJ     N:REGBJ 
 I:PRI     Q:20                       A:BUSMJ     T:MKBMJ 
 I:PHI     Q:10                       A:BUSMJ     T:MKBMJ 
 
$PROD:DYI    s:0.25 
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 O:FCYDI   Q:40 
 I:PRI     Q:10 
 I:PLI     Q:10 
 I:PHI     Q:20 
$PROD:DYJ    s:0.25 
 O:FCYDJ   Q:40 
 I:PRJ     Q:10 
 I:PLJ     Q:10 
 I:PHJ     Q:20 
 
$PROD:MYI  s:0.25 
 O:FCYMI      Q:(40*SCYMI+FDIYI) 
 I:PRI        Q:(5*SCYMI) 
 I:PLI        Q:(5*SCYMI) 
 I:PHI        Q:(10*SCYMI) 
 I:PRJ        Q:(5*SCYMI) 
 I:PLJ        Q:(5*SCYMI) 
 I:PHJ        Q:(10*SCYMI) 
 I:PINEFFYI   Q:FDIYI                  A:BCATI     T:1 
 
$PROD:MYJ   s:0.25 
 O:FCYMJ      Q:(40*SCYMJ+FDIYJ) 
 I:PRI        Q:(5*SCYMJ) 
 I:PLI        Q:(5*SCYMJ) 
 I:PHI        Q:(10*SCYMJ) 
 I:PRJ        Q:(5*SCYMJ) 
 I:PLJ        Q:(5*SCYMJ) 
 I:PHJ        Q:(10*SCYMJ) 
 I:PINEFFYJ   Q:FDIYJ                  A:BCATJ      T:1 
$PROD:DBI 
 O:FCBDI      Q:(20+MODE1I) 
 I:PHI        Q:20 
 I:PTCBI      Q:MODE1I                A:BCOSTI      T:1 
 
$PROD:DBJ 
 O:FCBDJ      Q:(20+MODE1J) 
 I:PHJ        Q:20 
 I:PTCBJ      Q:MODE1J               A:BCOSTJ       T:1 
 
$PROD:MBI     s:0.25 
 O:FCBMI      Q:(20*SCBMI+FDIBI) 
 I:PHI        Q:(10*SCBMI) 
 I:PHJ        Q:(10*SCBMI) 
 I:PINEFFBI   Q:FDIBI                A:WASTEI       T:1 
 
$PROD:MBJ     s:0.25 
 O:FCBMJ      Q:(20*SCBMJ+FDIBJ) 
 I:PHI        Q:(10*SCBMJ) 
 I:PHJ        Q:(10*SCBMJ) 
 I:PINEFFBJ   Q:FDIBJ                A:WASTEJ       T:1 
 
$PROD:EYDI 
 O:PEYDI    Q:(80*NYDI**YDIFFDI) 
 I:PYDI     Q:(80*NYDI**YDIFFDI*TCYI) 
 
$PROD:EYDJ 
 O:PEYDJ    Q:(80*NYDJ**YDIFFDJ) 
 122
 I:PYDJ     Q:(80*NYDJ**YDIFFDJ*TCYJ) 
$PROD:EBDI 
 O:PEBDI    Q:(30*NBDI**BDIFFDI) 
 I:PBDI     Q:(30*NBDI**BDIFFDI*TCBI) 
 
$PROD:EBDJ 
 O:PEBDJ    Q:(30*NBDJ**BDIFFDJ) 
 I:PBDJ     Q:(30*NBDJ**BDIFFDJ*TCBJ) 
 
$PROD:EXI 
 O:PXJ      Q:180. 
 I:PXI      Q:180.1 
 
$PROD:EXJ 
 O:PXI      Q:180. 
 I:PXJ      Q:180.1 
 
$PROD:UI s:1.0  a:5.0 
 O:PUI     Q:(300+SUMI) 
 I:PXI     Q:180 
 I:PYDI    Q:YCIQ0 P:YCIP0    a: 
 I:PYMII   Q:YCIQ0 P:YCIP0    a: 
 I:PEYDJ   Q:YCJQ0 P:YCJP0    a: 
 I:PYMJI   Q:YCJQ0 P:YCJP0    a: 
 
$PROD:UJ s:1.0  a:5.0 
 O:PUJ     Q:(300+SUMJ) 
 I:PXJ     Q:180 
 I:PYDJ    Q:YCJQ0 P:YCJP0    a: 
 I:PYMIJ   Q:YCJQ0 P:YCIP0    a: 
 I:PEYDI   Q:YCIQ0 P:YCIP0    a: 
 I:PYMJJ   Q:YCIQ0 P:YCJP0    a: 
 
$DEMAND:CONSI 
 D:PUI     Q:(300+SUMI) 
 E:PRI     Q:(130*ENDRI) 
 E:PLI     Q:(110*ENDLI) 
 E:PHI     Q:(60*ENDHI) 
 E:LOSSYI  Q: FDIYI 
 E:LOSSBI  Q: FDIBI 
 E:BLOSSI  Q: MODE1I 
 
$DEMAND:CONSJ 
 D:PUJ     Q:(300+SUMJ) 
 E:PRJ     Q:(130*ENDRJ) 
 E:PLJ     Q:(110*ENDLJ) 
 E:PHJ     Q:(60*ENDHJ) 
 E:LOSSYJ  Q:FDIYJ 
 E:LOSSBJ  Q:FDIBJ 
 E:BLOSSJ  Q:MODE1J 
 
$DEMAND:ENTDI 
 D:FCYDI 
 
$DEMAND:ENTDJ 
 D:FCYDJ 
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$DEMAND:ENTMI 
 D:FCYMI 
 
$DEMAND:ENTMJ 
 D:FCYMJ 
 
$DEMAND:BUSDI 
 D:FCBDI 
 
$DEMAND:BUSDJ 
 D:FCBDJ 
 
$DEMAND:BUSMI 
 D:FCBMI 
 
$DEMAND:BUSMJ 
 D:FCBMJ 
 
$DEMAND:BCATI 
 D:LOSSYI 
 E:PINEFFYI 
$DEMAND:BCATJ 
 D:LOSSYJ 
 E:PINEFFYJ 
 
$DEMAND:WASTEI 
 D:LOSSBI 
 E:PINEFFBI 
 
 
$DEMAND:WASTEJ 
 D:LOSSBJ 
 E:PINEFFBJ 
 
$DEMAND:BCOSTI 
 D:BLOSSI 
 E:PTCBI 
 
$DEMAND:BCOSTJ 
 D:BLOSSJ 
 E:PTCBJ 
 
$CONSTRAINT:REGYI 
 PINEFFYI =E= LOSSYI; 
 
$CONSTRAINT:REGYJ 
 PINEFFYJ =E= LOSSYJ; 
 
$CONSTRAINT:REGBI 
 PINEFFBI =E= LOSSBI; 
 
$CONSTRAINT:REGBJ 
 PINEFFBJ =E= LOSSBJ; 
 
$CONSTRAINT:TRADEI 
 PTCBI =E= BLOSSI; 
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$CONSTRAINT:TRADEJ 
 PTCBJ =E= BLOSSJ; 
 
 
$OFFTEXT 
$SYSINCLUDE MPSGESET COMP_NEW 
 
COMP_NEW.ITERLIM = 5000; 
OPTION MCP = PATH; 
OPTION SOLPRINT = ON; 
*PUI.FX = 1; 
YDIQ0=YDIQ0/0.9999; 
YDJQ0=YDJQ0/0.9999; 
BMIQ0=BMIQ0/0.9999; 
BMJQ0=BMJQ0/0.9999; 
YMIQ0=YMIQ0/0.9999; 
YMJQ0=YMJQ0/0.9999; 
BDIQ0=BDIQ0/0.9999; 
BDJQ0=BDJQ0/0.9999; 
 
ENDHI = 1.5; 
ENDHJ = .5; 
ENDRI = .5; 
ENDRJ = 1.5; 
ENDLI = 1; 
ENDLJ = 1; 
TCBI = 1.01; 
TCBJ = 1.01 ; 
TCYI = 1.01; 
TCYJ = 1.01; 
 
LOOP(C, 
TCYI = 2-.1*ORD(C); 
TCYJ = 2-.1*ORD(C); 
 
LOOP(N, 
NYDI = MAX(DYI.L, 0.0001); 
NYDJ = MAX(DYJ.L, 0.0001); 
NYMI = MAX(MYI.L, 0.0001); 
NYMJ = MAX(MYJ.L, 0.0001); 
NBDI = MAX(DBI.L, 0.0001); 
NBDJ = MAX(DBJ.L, 0.0001); 
NBMI = MAX(MBI.L, 0.0001); 
NBMJ = MAX(MBJ.L, 0.0001) ; 
IF (ORD(N) EQ CARD(N), OPTION SOLPRINT =ON; 
ELSE OPTION SOLPRINT = OFF; ); 
$INCLUDE COMP_NEW.GEN 
SOLVE COMP_NEW USING MCP; 
); 
DISPLAY YDIFFDI, YDIFFDJ, BDIFFDI, BDIFFDJ, YDIFFMI, YDIFFMJ, 
BDIFFMI, BDIFFMJ; 
REPORTN("DYI",C)   = DYI.L; 
REPORTN("DYJ",C)   = DYJ.L; 
REPORTN("MYI",C)   = MYI.L; 
REPORTN("MYJ",C)   = MYJ.L; 
REPORTN("DBI",C)   = DBI.L; 
REPORTN("DBJ",C)   = DBJ.L; 
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REPORTN("MBI",C)   = MBI.L; 
REPORTN("MBJ",C)   = MBJ.L; 
REPORTN("YMI",C)   = YMII.L+YMIJ.L; 
REPORTN("YMJ",C)   = YMJJ.L+YMJI.L; 
REPORTN("BDI",C)   = BDI.L; 
REPORTN("BDJ",C)   = BDJ.L; 
REPORTN("YDI",C)   = YDI.L; 
REPORTN("YDJ",C)   = YDJ.L; 
REPORTN("BMI",C)   = BMII.L+BMIJ.L; 
REPORTN("BMJ",C)   = BMJJ.L+BMJI.L; 
REPORTN("EYDI",C)  = MAX(EYDI.L, .0001); 
REPORTN("EYDJ",C)  = MAX(EYDJ.L, .0001); 
REPORTN("EBDI",C)  = MAX(EBDI.L, .0001); 
REPORTN("EBDJ",C)  = MAX(EBDJ.L, .0001); 
REPORTN("PHI",C)   = PHI.L/PUI.L; 
REPORTN("PHJ",C)   = PHJ.L/PUJ.L; 
REPORTN("PRI",C)   = PRI.L/PUI.L; 
REPORTN("PRJ",C)   = PRJ.L/PUJ.L; 
REPORTN("PLI",C)   = PLI.L/PUI.L; 
REPORTN("PLJ",C)   = PLJ.L/PUJ.L; 
REPORTN("WELI",C)  = UI.L; 
REPORTN("WELJ",C)  = UJ.L; 
REPORTN("NYDI",C)  = NYDI; 
REPORTN("NYDJ",C)  = NYDJ; 
REPORTN("NYMI",C)  = NYMI; 
REPORTN("NYMJ",C)  = NYMJ; 
REPORTN("NBDI",C)  = NBDI; 
REPORTN("NBDJ",C)  = NBDJ; 
REPORTN("NBMI",C)  = NBMI; 
REPORTN("NBMJ",C)  = NBMJ; 
REPORTN("PTCBI",C) = PTCBI.L; 
REPORTN("PTCBJ",C) = PTCBJ.L; 
REPORTN("XI",C)    = XI.L; 
REPORTN("XJ",C)    = XJ.L; 
REPORTN("TRADEI",C)= TRADEI.L; 
REPORTN("TRADEJ",C)= TRADEJ.L; 
REPORTN("LOSSBI",C)= LOSSBI.L; 
REPORTN("LOSSBJ",C)= LOSSBJ.L; 
REPORTN("LOSSYI",C)= LOSSYI.L; 
REPORTN("LOSSYJ",C)= LOSSYJ.L; 
REPORTN("BLOSSI",C)= BLOSSI.L; 
REPORTN("BLOSSJ",C)= BLOSSJ.L; 
REPORTN("REGYI",C) = REGYI.L; 
REPORTN("REGYJ",C) = REGYJ.L; 
REPORTN("REGBI",C) = REGBI.L; 
REPORTN("REGBJ",C) = REGBJ.L; 
REPORTN("PXI",C)   = PXI.L; 
REPORTN("PXJ",C)   = PXJ.L; 
REPORTN("PYDI",C)  = PYDI.L; 
REPORTN("PYDJ",C)  = PYDJ.L; 
REPORTN("PYMII",C) = PYMII.L; 
REPORTN("PYMJI",C) = PYMJI.L; 
REPORTN("PYMIJ",C) = PYMIJ.L; 
REPORTN("PYMJJ",C) = PYMJJ.L; 
REPORTN("PBDI",C)  = PBDI.L; 
REPORTN("PBDJ",C)  = PBDJ.L; 
REPORTN("PBMII",C) = PBMII.L; 
 126
REPORTN("PBMJI",C) = PBMJI.L; 
REPORTN("PBMIJ",C) = PBMIJ.L; 
REPORTN("PBMJJ",C) = PBMJJ.L; 
REPORTN("FCYDI",C) = FCYDI.L; 
REPORTN("FCYDJ",C) = FCYDJ.L; 
REPORTN("FCYMI",C) = FCYMI.L; 
REPORTN("FCYMJ",C) = FCYMJ.L; 
REPORTN("FCBDI",C) = FCBDI.L; 
REPORTN("FCBDJ",C) = FCBDJ.L; 
REPORTN("FCBMI",C) = FCBMI.L; 
REPORTN("FCBMJ",C) = FCBMJ.L; 
); 
DISPLAY REPORTN; 
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Chapter 5: Relationships and Regulations: Interactions with Exports and 
Foreign Affiliate Sales of Business and Professional Services 
 
The rapid growth of trade and foreign affiliate sales in services has led to increased 
analysis and an increased interest in modeling the interactions between the different modes of 
supplying services abroad. Services have gone from being modeled as non-tradables to being 
modeled as intermediate inputs (producer services) and finally are now being considered as both 
a final service and an intermediate input into the production of goods as well as other services. 
This new treatment of services reflects what the data shows about sales of services and trade in 
services. Services made up 74% of OECD countries’ economies in 2007. For the United States, 
Exports of Private Services1 increased from $150,000 million in 2004 to $233,500 million in 2008. 
Business, Professional and Technical Services make up close to 50% of these traded services 
and financial services make up around 25%. Tables 1 and 2 contain the trade data over time 
along with the foreign affiliate sales of services data for a similar time period. Even more 
dramatically, sales of US Majority Owned Foreign Affiliates increased from $483,000 million in 
2004 to $1,026,000 million ($1.02 billion) in 2007 (see Figures 1 and 2 below). Clearly US foreign 
affiliate sales of services are outpacing exports in both absolute value and growth but exports are 
an important method of supplying services abroad. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 Private Services as defined by the BEA are: Education, Finance, Insurance, Telecommunications and 
Business and Professional Services (BPT). BPT Services include: Computer and Information Services; 
Management, Consulting and Public Relations Services; R&D and Testing Services; Construction, 
architecture and engineering services; Industrial Engineering Services; Advertising; Operational Leasing 
Services; Legal Services and other business services. 
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Figures 1 and 2 
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While it is most definitely the case that countries which have relatively more trade with 
each other, also are more likely to have more foreign affliates and engage in FDI in one another. 
Taking this to be true, do restrictions on one mode of service provision results in substituting with 
the other or restricting those services altogether? What regulations or institutions encourage both 
trade and affiliate sales? Does a liberalization of restrictions in one type of service lead to 
increases in both types of services provision? Providing answers to the preceeding questions is 
not a straightforward exercise, yet this paper will begin to try to answer them, at least in terms of 
US firms. The contribution of this paper is an initial empirical analysis of how barriers to cross-
border trade and FDI in professional services affect the complementarity or substitutability of 
these types of service provision to affiliated firms, unaffiliated firms and end users.  
In this paper I will be examining the data on foreign affiliate sales in services, which is the 
true measure of what GATS terms MODE 3. Most analysis using FDI stocks/flows as the 
measure of this, which has been proven to be a huge overstatement (Brainerd, 2006). I will also 
look at US unaffiliated and affiliated trade in services between the same set of countries and 
attempt to determine where the data shows relationships between the types of services supply 
abroad. This requires various statistical and theoretical challenges as causality between trade 
and FDI exists, as well as causality among different restrictions (i.e. a country with monopolies in 
certain industries will also have entry restrictions and is more likely to have cartel behavior in 
other industries). I will explore the intuition behind different techniques, including simultaneous 
probit equations, SEM modeling and the benefits of 3SLS over 2SLS in the analysis of the 
relationships between foreign affiliate sales and cross border trade in services.  
I will also try to reveal which types of barriers to trade and foreign affiliate sales are 
impacting how US services firm choose to supply the services abroad. In order to do this I will use 
panel regression techniques to separate the impacts of country level and sector level barriers, 
restrictions, and regulations; the existence of supplies of service by the opposite mode, as well as 
correct for gravity variables and other fixed effects.  
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Section II discusses the recent literature on trade and FDI as substitutes or complements, 
Section III presents the data and the estimation strategy, Section IV provides an overview of the 
estimation results and Section V concludes. 
Table 1: Unaffiliated and Affiliated Trade in Business and Professional Services 
 
Exports 
Year Total Unaffiliated 
Affiliat
ed Education 
Financia
l 
services 
Insuran
ce 
Telecom
municati
ons 
Business, 
professional, 
and technical 
services 
Other 
Servic
es 
1999 103,934 71,684 32,250 9,616 19,433 3,053 4,549 51,494 15,790 
2002 122,207 40,513 81,694 12,626 24,496 4,415 3,890 60,177 16,602 
2005 160,051 
          
48,001  
112,05
0 14,021 39,878 7,566 4,748 76,487 17,351 
2008 233,529 158,978 74,551 17,796 60,190 10,756 9,163 113,525 22,099 
Percentage 
Change 
1999-2008 
124.69% 121.78% 
131.17
% 85.07% 209.73% 252.34% 101.43% 120.46% 39.96% 
 
         
Imports 
Year Total Unaffiliated 
Affiliat
ed Education 
Financia
l 
services 
Insuran
ce 
Telecom
municati
ons 
Business, 
professional, 
and technical 
services 
Other 
Servic
es 
1999 55,510 30,387 25,123 1,807 8,280 9,389 6,601 28,773 659 
2002 72,604 29,443 43,161 2,702 8,963 21,926 4,233 34,185 596 
2005 97,818 
          
37,826  59,992 3,992 12,126 28,710 4,519 46,924 1,547 
2008 153,267 92,505 60,762 5,204 19,143 42,939 7,193 76,284 2,505 
Percentage 
Change 
1999-2008 
176.11% 204.42% 
141.86
% 188.04% 131.20% 357.32% 8.97% 165.12% 
280.12
% 
 
Table 2: MOFA Sales of Services to Foreign Persons [Millions of dollars] 
Industry of 
Affiliate Year All countries Canada Europe 
Latin 
America/ 
Caribbean Australia Japan 
Other 
countri
es 
All industries 1999 353,207 34,741 198,673 41,551 14,699 26,425 
37,11
8 
All industries 2007 1,025,841 100,498 564,796 118,772 36,566 60,026 
145,1
83 
Percentage 
Change 
1999-
2007 190.44% 189.28% 184.28% 185.85% 148.77% 127.16% 
291.1
4% 
Finance and 
insurance 1999 84,496 7,794 37,314 12,620 26,768 2,047 
13,64
6 
Finance and 
insurance 2007 230,186 12,195 115,323 37,556 65,112 8,661 
18,37
3 
Percentage 
Change 
1999-
2007 172.42% 56.47% 209.06% 197.59% 143.25% 323.11% 
34.64
% 
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Section II: Recent Literature on Services Trade and Foreign Affiliate Sales  
The decision whether to export or to establish a foreign affiliate to supply services to a 
foreign market has been discussed in the literature in terms of the firms’ productivity, (Melitz, 
Helpman and Yeaple, 2003) within the knowledge capital model of trade theory (Markusen 2005), 
as well as in CGE analyses, both simulated and numerical (Maskus and Konan, Balistreri et al., 
among others). There have been only a few papers (Christen and Francois, 2010; Fillat-Castejon, 
Francois and Woerz, 2008) that look at the data and how the prevalence of service trade and 
foreign affiliate production are more complex and intertwined than previously thought and the 
decision to trade or sell through an affiliate may be determined by the regulatory system in the 
host country and restrictions imposed on services providers that limit market access and/or create 
barriers to establish a commercial presence.  
Balistreri, Rutherford and Tarr (2009) find that when the regulatory barriers to foreign and 
domestic business services providers in Kenya are relaxed or eliminated, the gains are quite 
substantial. They model the barriers in terms of ad valorem equivalents as well as productivity 
effects on the business services sectors as well as all up and downstream sectors. The gains 
found from eliminating the restrictions to foreign and domestic production in business services 
derive from over 55 sectors and increase up to 50% of consumption in their long term solution. In 
this particular analysis, where the regulatory barriers are also very restrictive to domestic 
providers, the gains were even greater due to where the Kenyan economy is starting from. 
However, this model is one of the few to look at the impact of both non-discriminatory and 
discriminatory barriers to production in business services and the model’s calibration is quite 
sophisticated in the including of capital productivity effects and 55 different sectors.  
For comprehensive overviews of the literature around trade and foreign direct investment 
in services, Fontana and Picot (1999) provide an excellent resource. They make the good point 
that the level of analysis in important in determining this relationship as well as determining the 
assumptions about what the theory tells us. Trade theory surrounding multinational firms would 
contend that trade and foreign affiliate production are substitutes at the firm level however; they 
may be complements at a more macro-economy level. This aspect is discussed in Egger and 
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Pfaffermayr (2005) as they examine a three factors New Trade Theory model which assumes 
distance affects both trade and FDI through transportation costs and plant set up costs 
respectively.  They find that trade and FDI are complementary with respect to distance as well as 
additional exogenous determinants. Fontagné and Pajot (1999) have attributed the apparent 
complementarity and substitutability of trade and foreign affiliate sales to the different level of 
analysis (firm, industry/sector, economy) as well as to the lack of clarification between vertical 
and horizontal FDI. The latter point, in the analysis sections to follow, is related to whether the 
services are final or intermediate in nature and further what is the trade or affiliate sales 
relationship (ex: trade from parent to affiliate is intra-firm and vertical whereas affiliate sales to 
unaffiliated local parties is likely horizontal).  
The discussion of vertical vs. horizontal FDI is not a new area of discussion or research 
and is discussed in Zarotiadis and Mylonidis (2005) and Egger and Pfaffermayr (2005) as it 
relates to services and many others as it related to manufacturing. It may be the case that 
complementarity between trade and FDI is stronger, which is associated with vertical FDI and 
rather low trade costs. This is intuitively compelling given that the majority of FDI takes place 
between high developed countries, where vertical FDI is expected to play a greater role than 
between partners at different levels of economic development. I believe that there is a great deal 
of horizontal and vertical FDI among high income countries as vertical FDI in services may also 
serve downstream manufacturing firms already established.  
 
There are countless ways that foreign affiliate sales and exports may be combined, such 
as the two hypothetical situations below and presented in Figure 3 in the appendix. 
1.  Home County Firm which has an affiliate established can sell services produced 
at the affiliate to both consumers and firms in the host country,  
AND can import additional services from the US,  
AND can also export those services directly to consumers and firms in the host country 
using the knowledge/relationships that have been made through the established affiliate. 
2.  Home Country Firm may want to establish an affiliate but the regulatory barriers 
are too costly and so the firm supplies firms, consumers and other affiliates by exporting services 
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to those firms abroad. If the regulations are lifted the firm may establish an affiliate to sell services 
abroad and/or continue to export the services. 
Professional and Business Services are some of the most differentiated industries in that 
some services within these industries are similar and related while others are completely 
unrelated and are used in vastly different ways and by different types of end users. This results a 
firm to have the ability to supply differentiated services to both affiliated and unaffiliated firms as 
well as end consumers. For example: an insurance company can offer various types of insurance 
which are an input into an insurance package for a firm and are a final service demanded by 
individuals and families. The same applies for financial services, legal services, and engineering 
services to name a few examples. The complexity from this differentiation also implies a more 
complex decision process for firms choosing to supply services abroad.  
I will assume that service suppliers of BPT services which engage in trade or establish 
foreign affiliates can do either at any time. This paper is not about the actual choice to invest or to 
export which is modeled nicely in an oligopoly context by Christen and Francois (2010). 
Professional and Business services (including finance, insurance, and information services) 
industries often have a small number of firms that are responsible for a very high percentage of 
the sales. Services are most often modeled using monopolistic competition due to the 
differentiated nature of the services and the fact that there are numerous different firms providing 
the services. This also allows for theory determining productivity levels required for a firm to be 
able to export, and an even high productivity level for firms to be able to establish a commercial 
presence abroad and have a foreign affiliate sell the services.  
There have been a few studies using extensive firm level data shared by the country 
being analyzed (Eby Konan and Van Assche 2007, Balistreri et al. 2009). The literature is lacking 
an acknowledged method of modeling the impacts on trade and foreign affiliate sales in 
professional services of the various regulatory barriers. More importantly for this paper, the 
literature is largely lacking in answering the question:  what is the current relationship between 
unaffiliated trade, affiliated trade and FDI in the business and professional services sectors and 
industries and how are these relationships affected by the various barriers? If we know that entry 
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barriers to services also result in decreases in both unaffiliated and affiliated cross border trade 
this means that liberalization of the fixed cost increasing barriers will have even larger benefits as 
trade in services would increase for both intra-firm, inter-firm, and end user servicing trade. 
At a true macro level, there are three elements of services supply that are related to the 
analysis in the following sections: United States (parent country) supply and consumption of 
services; United States (or other home country) supply of services abroad in a chosen foreign 
economy (host country); host country’s supply and consumption of services. I am most concerned 
with the first two, although an analysis of al three is desirable for future work. These are easily 
theoretically with both countries having domestic and multinational service providers which can 
supply the domestic economy, can export abroad, or in the case of MNEs can also supply 
services in a foreign economy by establishing an affiliate. When looking at the data, these 
different sources of consumption and supply and important to keep in mind as variables such as a 
host countries imports or exports of services to the US may have an impact of the level of US 
owned affiliate sales of services in that country. Likewise, US exports of services to a host 
country may act as substitutes for affiliate sales in some cases and as complements in others. It 
is also entirely likely that some of these relationships are not consistent enough to show up in the 
data available for analysis. 
The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) identifies four modes to trade in 
services. These are: 
Mode 1: Cross-border supply: when a service crosses a national border. An example is 
the purchase of insurance by a consumer from a producer abroad. 
Mode 2: Consumption abroad: when a consumer travels abroad to consume from the 
service supplier, such as in tourism, education, or health services. 
Mode 3: Commercial presence: when a foreign owned company sells services (e.g. 
foreign branches of banks). 
Mode 4: Temporary movement of natural persons: when independent service providers 
or employees of a multinational firm temporarily move to another country. 
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Countries have made commitments through the WTO rounds of negotiations that apply to 
specific modes of supply and further, apply to national treatment and/or market access for foreign 
suppliers. National treatment implies that foreign providers of services will not be treated any 
differently than domestic providers. This includes quotas or licenses which may be restrictive as 
these barriers fall into the market access article within GATS. National treatment is a critical area 
of liberalization for many services industries as the discrimination foreign service providers 
encounter prevents entry and/or access to the consumers and firms within the country.  
Market Access is the other GATS article under which countries are supposed to 
guarantee rights for foreign service suppliers. Market Access entails guaranteeing unrestricted 
access to consumers and firms within the country for foreign service suppliers which meet the 
domestic standards for supplying each service. Often, national treatment restrictions are used to 
restrict market access and therefore commitments in one but not the other are still very harmful. 
Data on who has commitments in GATS is not useful as the list of commitments is a positive list, 
not a negative list. This means that countries list who they promise to guarantee market access 
and/or national treatment but not those which they will not guarantee these rights, whereas the 
latter is important for any analysis to be meaningful. The GATS data also has the problem in that 
it is difficult to determine whether the pledged commitments are a change from the status quo and 
if they are a change there is no mention of what the differences? 
Christen and Francois (2010) provide a comprehensive look at the modes of delivery of 
services using a new theoretical framework using oligopoly to model the production of services 
both at home and abroad. While there may be a high number of firms in each industry the authors 
point out that in many of these industries the top 8 firms account for 45-80% of all sales. 
Therefore, oligopoly firm theory has been used for more recent work in the area. 
They find that the interdependence among the various modes of supply will allow 
liberalization in one mode to have significant spillover effects onto other modes of supply and 
therefore increases the gains from such liberalization. They also use manufacturing affiliate sales 
as a determinant of services affiliate production and find it to be significant. In my analysis, I will 
not include this data in order to eliminate interactions between the manufacturing data and 
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various services trade and affiliate sales values in the analysis. I believe that the existence of 
prior manufacturing FDI is a determinant and will be picked up in the country effects. 
The analysis in the sections that follow in this paper focuses on Mode 1 and Mode 3 in 
GATS terminology; however, Mode 4 is also important yet will not be explicitly modeled due to a 
lack of data that is specific to Mode 4. In many cases, the temporary movement of persons is 
needed to provide services under Mode 3 when the foreign affiliate needs to fly over workers from 
the home country to either be employed at the affiliate temporarily or to work to provide a service 
for a given contract/project. Additionally, prior Mode 4 services provision may provide needed 
information for setting up an affiliate and working with the foreign government and foreign 
companies. While this paper will not look at any restrictions to Mode 4 specifically (or measure 
Mode 4 sales), previous work has found “that a 10 per cent increase in the temporary movement 
of people increases services imports (exports) under Mode 1 by 4.7 (2.9) per cent, and it is 
correlated to a 8.0 (approximately 7) per cent higher inflows (outflows) of foreign direct 
investment (a proxy for trade in services under Mode 3).” (Jansen and Piermartini, 2004) 
Due to extensive data limitations relating to the expense of collecting, aggregating, 
measuring and publishing data on barriers as they relate to the Modes of supply the questions 
whether the relationships between modes complementary or substitutable is addressed sparingly 
with in the literature. Brandstetter et al. cover the current state of data available for the analysis of 
services trade and FDI in their August 2010 NBER working paper which illustrates the need for 
continued cooperation among organizations to create a true dataset of services trade and affiliate 
production sales as well as measures of the barriers encountered at the border as well as the 
various behind the border types of restrictions.  As mentioned previously, Fortagné (1999) and 
Magaläes and Africano (2007) are resources at the macro level while Hejazi and Safarian (2001) 
and Bos and van de Laar (2004) are good sources on the complementarity in services trade and 
foreign direct investment. Sector specific studies are numerous and include Buch and Lipponer 
(2007) for German banks and financial services trade/affiliate sales, Moshirian (2001) and 
Moshirian et al (2005) for intra-industry trade in banking and Fink, Mattoo and Rathindran (2003) 
for telecommunications among others. 
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Section III: Data and Analysis Specification 
I am using United States trade and foreign affiliate sales data from the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis (BEA) for the years 1999-2008 (2007 for foreign affiliate sales data). I will 
utilize both import and export data in all the sub-categories within the BEA’s “Other Private 
Services” classification which includes and Business, Professional and Technical Services. The 
other categories within Other Private Services as defined by the BEA are: Education, Finance, 
Insurance, Telecommunications and Business and Professional Services (BPT). BPT Services 
include: Computer and Information Services; Management, Consulting and Public Relations 
Services; R&D and Testing Services; Construction, architecture and engineering services; 
Industrial Engineering Services; Advertising; Operational Leasing Services; Legal Services and 
other business services.  
Export data is separated for Affiliated and Unaffiliated and is then also broken down by 
country. Data by country and industry for 1999-2005 is limited to unaffiliated trade only so I will 
also keep this data separate for the whole time series within the panel data analysis. US majority 
owned foreign affiliate import data for intermediate services is also available and so these will 
proxy the affiliated exports from the US. The foreign affiliate sales data I am using is the total 
sales of US Majority Owned Foreign Affiliates in the following industries: financial services; 
insurance services; information services; and professional, scientific and technical services 
(PST). PST services include architectural and engineering services; computer system design and 
related services; management, scientific and technical consulting services; legal services; 
accounting services; research and development services; advertising services, and other 
professional, scientific and technical services not contained in the prior categories. 
The analysis will include a set of sector-year indicators related to the dependent variables 
(ex: foreign ownership restrictions if the dependent variable is foreign affiliate sales), country-year 
indicators (ex: corporate tax rate and GDP), country time-invariant indicators (distance, 
language). In addition, a set of “other-mode of supply” variables will be included in order to 
 138
determine what the impacts of the other supply (one year lagged) and the barriers that are 
particular to that mode of supply. Data definitions and sources are available in Appendix I and the 
variables are contained in Table 3.  
We would expect to see that trade has a positive effect on foreign affiliate sales as the 
existence of trade in a particular service means that there is entry into the market and there is 
demand in the foreign market. This where the simultaneous probit analysis may lend additional 
insight if properly specific as we can try to determine when foreign affiliates are established given 
the trade level that exists in a particular service industry. 
The addition of intra-firm trade data and US multinational trade data in all professional 
and business services adds additional questions to the theory. It may be the case that US 
multinational exports have a negative effect on the establishment of foreign affiliates in those 
same services. In addition, US multinationals’ intra-firm trade in services is likely a substitute for 
those services being provided outwardly as the firms are using the services in other affiliates at 
home, in the host country, or even in a third country.   
The estimation techniques used here are rather straightforward as this is demonstrating 
an initial analysis of the relationships among the data and the impact of various regulatory 
barriers on these relationships. However, examining methods for finding accurate instruments 
and estimating these relationships again with bilateral data in a structural equation model is 
desirable. I will explain this in the following paragraph while admitting that the lack of bilateral 
trade and foreign affiliate sales data for the panel makes a meaningful (in terms of coefficient 
translation into actual dollars) approach to simultaneous models difficult and therefore I leave 
much of it for future research.  
The equations for analysis are as follows: 
FAijnt = B0 +B1 +X1ijt +X2jnt + X3ij + IM ijnt-1 +EX ijnt-1 + CD + YD +Ɛijnt  
IMijnt = B0 +B1 +X1ijt +X2jnt + X3ij + FA/OTijnt-1 + CD + YD +Ɛijnt 
EXijnt = B0 +B1 +X1ijt +X2jnt + X3ij + FA/OTijnt-1+ CD + YD +Ɛijnt 
FAijnt = B0 +B1 +X1ijt +X2jnt + X3ij + IM ijnt-1 +EX ijnt-1 + CD + YD + Ɛijnt 
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Where the vectors are defined as: 
FA:  Logged foreign affiliate sales in the sector n of analysis from country i (US) to 
country j (host country) in year t. 
X1:  Vector of country pair time variant indicators (GDP difference, skill difference, tax 
rate differences). Also includes macro regulatory indicators which are time variant 
X2:  Vector of sector specific variables which are time variant (for the regulatory 
analysis in Section IV.B) 
X3:  Vector of country specific variables which are time invariant (distance, language, 
etc.) 
FA/OT: Vector of other modes of supply (foreign affiliate sales, other trade in services, 
etc) which is lagged one year to prevent collinearity. 
CD: Country dummy variables used in most specification. When not used, a basic 
country variable with additional NAFTA and OECD variables used to pick up fixed effects. 
YD: Year dummy variable used in most specifications. In short samples, simple year 
variable used to pick up all year fixed effects. 
: Error term which is clustered at the country or country year level 
 
As we will see later in this section the dependent variables are highly correlated with one 
another in some cases, the error terms are also correlated in these cases. This means I need to 
explore the use of simultaneous equations in determining the relationship between trade and 
foreign affiliate sales in services. I will explain the future benefits of using simultaneous probit 
models with one continuous and one dichotomous variable, simultaneous equations within a 
structural equation model, and 3SLS using panel regressions. Initial regressions with traditional 
gravity variables and lagged opposite mode are done as well where they make sense with the 
theory. By utilizing the lagged on the right side for such cases, I will be able to use panel 
regression techniques rather than a 2SLS or other SEM model for these initial determinants. The 
analysis includes the logged values for exports, imports, affiliate sales, GDP, etc. as there are a 
number of different scales within the explanatory variables and in my initial analysis I found that 
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the coefficients did not make sense in due to the scaling issue. Zero-one dummy variable will not 
be transformed and neither are percentage variables (ex: trade as a % of GDP, labor force 
percentage with tertiary education). Also, I will employ lagged variables wherever collinearity or 
endogeniety present a bias if current year is utilized in the specification. 
The data analysis is separated into two exercises. The first focuses on the relationships 
among the various modes of supply without the sector level regulatory variables included. This 
will allow for some initial inferences about the supply and the consumption of financial, 
information, and professional services within a traditional gravity model framework.  
The second part of the analysis focuses on how the barriers to each mode of supply 
affect the sales by affiliates and/or the exports. What does theory tell us about which types of 
restrictions affect fixed variable or entry costs and therefore affect the various modes of supply for 
services? The initial analysis allows these comparisons to be made more easily as it provides a 
baseline where the regulatory impacts are captured in the country and year fixed effects.  
The outcomes of the analysis, rather than aim at policy recommendations or 
confirmations of new theoretical models serve instead to guide the next steps in the process of 
redefining how trade and investment in professional and business services (particularly focused 
on the various modes of supplying services abroad) interact with regulatory barriers, restrictive 
policies, institutions, and also prudent regulatory policies (having an independent regulatory body, 
requiring a professional exam, etc.) in these sectors. This type of analysis can be done using 
simulations but would be best done in a calibrated CGE model with selected country pairs. The 
relationships described in the analysis below provide a challenge in adapting the theory to 
incorporate the intermediate and final good nature of business and professional services as well 
as the determinants of a firm’s choice of supplying these services abroad. 
 
Section IV.A Relationship Analysis and Discussion of Simultaneous Modeling 
Approaches 
In order to handle the causality between the existence of trade and the increased 
probability of foreign affiliates established in the country of question there are a few different 
techniques that can be established. 
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The relationships in question can be analyzed for the three individual sectors using the 
following variables of interest: MOFA sales (foreign affiliate sales), unaffiliated exports/imports 
(exports are the other mode of supply and we use unaffiliated US exports/imports to reduce the 
effects from endogeneity), exports of other private services by US parent companies (not 
restricted to intra firm trade) and exports of services to their affiliates (purely intra-firm trade).  
It is obvious that the data analysis would be more robust under a simultaneous equation 
setup due to the correlation between exports and foreign affiliate sales of services and the fact 
that the exogenous or pre-determined variables impact both modes of supply as well. This is why 
I do not include exports of services as a dependent variable in the analysis. There are some 
available methods of modeling these relationships within the statistical software packages, 
however, they are limited when using panel data. One method would be to assume that one 
variable (exports) is continuous and the other (foreign affiliate sales) is dichotomous and 
therefore taking a zero or one value only. This analysis would be answering a different question 
however and would not be the ideal method for determining how various barriers impact trade 
and foreign affiliate sales simultaneously. A more conventional approach would utilize a 3SLS 
approach (such as Hausman-Taylor) which requires the model to incorporate instrument 
variables. This is an approach that definitely merits further research into valid instruments. 
The best candidate for modeling these relationships is using a the non-IV fixed effects 
approach taken by Plumper and Troger (2007). This model allows for time-invariant as well as 
time-variant effects and does not run the risk of weak instrumentation. This approach also would 
benefit from a larger panel and more complete panel. There are both true zeros as well as non-
disclosure zero in the trade and foreign affiliate sales data and these are problematic. Having a 
complete dataset will allow this structural model to be applied and for the interactions of the 
barriers introduced in this paper to be estimated.  
 
For this initial anlaysis, looking foreign affiliate sales as the dependent variable, the 
regressions are performed with data separated into country-sector-year panels (35 countries, 10 
years, 4 sectors). The analysis is done on the Finance, Information and Professional Services 
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sectors separately and then the fourth sector is really All Private Services which includes the 
other the three sectors. 
Table 3 includes the variable names and their descriptive statistics across the entire 
panel. Some of the variables are only included for OECD countries (as the source is the OECD) 
and other variables are only included for the All Private Services category (as this is the level that 
the BEA provides this data publicly). 
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Table 3: Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
English 1560 0.282051 0.450143 0 1 
Total US 
Parent 
Sales 
from 
Affiliates 311 717.2683 1540.563 0 10956 
Distance 1560 8393.4 3749.158 548.3946 
16180.
3 
Total US 
Unaffiliate
d Sales 
from 
Affiliates 291 291.4421 678.8832 0 
4061.0
6 
Regulatory 
Impact 882 0.206467 0.097512 0.029 0.44 
Sales to 
Local 
Affiliates 
from US 
Affiliates 380 86.19202 78.06559 
0.8320
33 
488.44
4 
Tax 1552 30.67502 7.173443 12.5 52.3 
Sales to 
Local 
Unaffiliate
d Persons 
from US 
Affiliates 380 163.0782 135.6815 
0.7232
52 
1090.0
4 
% of Labor 
Force with 
Secondary 
Education 1056 28.93392 13.82379 3.3 84 
Sales to 
unaffiliate
d third 
country 
persons 
by US 
Affiliates 380 106.4236 82.1654 
1.1030
85 
313.62
3 
School 
Enrollment 
in Tertiary 1296 53.06164 21.66635 6.566264 
98.091
7 GDP 1560 9.95E+11 2.00E+12 
2.00E+
10 
1.32E+
13 
% of Labor 
Force with 
Tertiary 
Education 1036 41.99846 15.97839 7.2 79.1 
GDP per 
capita 1560 21244.56 16362.22 
542.52
87 
88414.
1 
OECD 
Market 
Share in 
Service 
Sector 847 3.667425 5.455678 0 
29.411
8 
GDP 
difference 1560 1.14E+13 3.29E+12 0 
4.74E+
13 
Skilled 
Labor 1600 37161.68 99610.67 153.9 774160 
GDP 
Difference 
Squared 1560 1.40E+26 1.27E+26 0 
2.25E+
27 
MOFA 
Sales 1472 8718.772 38003 0 556276 
Unaffiliate
d Exports 553 333.93 294.6323 
-
29.57574 
1728.6
2 
Parent 
Exports: 
Intra-firm 1254 1612.994 6993.766 0 
73713.
1 
Exports of 
Other 
Private 
Services 966 237.9572 615.7378 0 4991 
Parent 
Imports: 
Intra-firm 1277 1774.288 9017.253 0 101212 
Imports of 
other 
private 
Services 884 162.7831 546.79 0 
6393.9
7 
  
 
 
IV.A.i Information Services  
Information services have become an absolute necessity for consumers and producers 
alike. Information services include information and data processing, publishing (including 
software) as well as broadcast and telecommunications services. The distribution of sales among 
these industries shows that Publishing has the largest amount of total sales, with data processing 
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and information services close behind, when it is available, however, due to the disclosure rules 
preventing the identification of individual firms, much of the information services and data 
processing industry data is not available at the industry level.  
Table 4 shows the correlation coefficients for the various types of supply of information 
services by the US abroad as well as the importation of these services. It can be seen here that 
the endogeniety discussed above is apparent between unaffiliated services exports and affiliate 
sales. This correlation is not surprising, however the highly positive nature is a first sign of what 
may arise later in the analysis. The question remains whether this positive correlation is due to a 
complementary relationship, is driven by larger markets where demand for all services is great, or 
is defined by a combination of trade being a substitute mode of supply at some times and a 
complement at others (which is becoming the predominant opinion in the literature). Interestingly, 
unaffiliated exports are also highly correlated with intra-firm trade, but specifically, US parent 
company imports from their foreign affiliates. This may be the results of a parent company 
establishing an affiliate for intermediate services production abroad where the market for final 
services is largely services by exports. In the case of information services, the regulation and 
monopoly power within broadcasting, internet services and publishing (including software) also 
has an impact on this correlation. 
 In terms of the impacts of the gravity model variables I find that the availability of skilled 
labor has a positive effect on affiliate sales and the GDP per capita of the host country does as 
well in most of the regressions. The variable for the difference in GDP is not significant in most of 
the regressions and when it is it is negative which implies affiliates are more prevalent in 
countries that are similar in economic size to the United States, while GDP per capita (normalized 
and corrected for PPP) is significant and positive in the analysis furthering that contention. 
English speaking country dummies were significant and positive and distance was usually 
significant unless country dummies were excluded. Imports of goods and services as a % of GDP 
(and exports) are used in many of the regressions as country level variables and the higher the % 
of imports of goods and services for a host country, the higher the value of total affiliate sales in 
information services. This can be thought of as a proxy for excess demand in the economy 
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(excess in that it cannot be served by domestic producers). I also use trade as a % of GDP in 
some of the analysis as it does not decrease the panel dimensions as the data is more complete 
across the panel. It is interesting as we might interpret this as a signal that imports are the 
preferred mode of supply for services in the host country but the model’s results are saying 
otherwise.  
Table 4: Correlation Coefficients for Information Services 
 
  
Intra 
Firm 
Exports 
Intra 
Firm 
Imports 
Unaffiliated 
Exports 
Unaffiliated 
Imports 
Exports 
Other 
Services 
Imports 
Other 
Services 
Intra Firm 
Exports 1           
Intra Firm 
Imports 0.6265 1         
Unaffiliated 
Exports 0.5967 0.8585 1       
Unaffiliated 
Imports -0.0325 0.0425 0.4498 1     
Exports Other 
Services 0.4956 0.3926 0.544 0.2716 1   
Imports Other 
Services -0.1707 
-
0.1112 0.1496 0.565 -0.0288 1 
 
  
MOFA 
Sales 
Intra 
Firm 
Exports 
Intra 
Firm 
Imports 
Unaffiliated 
Exports 
Exports 
Other 
Services 
Imports 
Other 
Services 
MOFA Sales 1           
Intra Firm 
Exports 0.3649 1         
Intra Firm 
Imports 0.4983 0.6282 1       
Unaffiliated 
Exports 0.8706 0.5629 0.8163 1     
Exports Other 
Services 0.6604 0.4826 0.3813 0.5814 1   
Imports Other 
Services 0.406 -0.1823 
-
0.1115 0.1933 0.0256 1 
 
The first set of regressions in Table 5 I include lagged US Unaffiliated Exports as an 
independent variable and these demonstrate the findings above but also demonstrate the positive 
and significant effect of unaffiliated trade in information services. Parent exports of other private 
services are also found to have a positive effect on affiliate sales (second panel in Table 5) which 
lends credit to the idea that trade and affiliate sales in business and professional services is 
complementary. This is not new information as Brainard (1997), Graham (1999), Clausing (2000), 
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Egger & Pfaffermayr (2004) as well as Fontagne & Pajot (1997) have all found results in line with 
this complementary view of trade and FDI, however, most studies use FDI Stocks and/or Flows 
rather than foreign affiliate sales which is the truer measure of the supply of services through a 
foreign affiliate. 
Table 5: Information Services Regressions 
 
Dependent Variable: MOFA sales in 
Information Services 
Dependent Variable: MOFA sales in Information 
Services 
R-squared 0.9706     R-squared 0.9391     
Variable Coef. 
T-
Stat P> t Variable Coef. 
T-
Stat P> t 
Lagged 
Unaffiliated 
Exports 0.5475673 3.27 0.003 
Lagged Parent 
Exports of Other 
Services 0.4457249 2.85 0.013 
GDPDiff -2.427392 
-
1.32 0.197 
Lagged Parent 
Imports of Other 
Services 
-
0.0071931 
-
0.07 0.947 
Skill Diff 7.464261 3 0.006 
Tertiary Share of 
Labor Force 0.0168684 2.23 0.043 
GDP per Capita 1.34587 2.77 0.01 Trade% of GDP 
-
0.0038589 
-
0.87 0.399 
Distance -1.31148 
-
2.29 0.031 GDPDiff 0.7825723 0.31 0.76 
English 0.804788 0.68 0.503 Skill Diff -1.70925 
-
0.53 0.605 
Trade% of GDP 0.0098455 1.76 0.09 GDP per Capita 1.100223 2.29 0.038 
Constant -15.24115 
-
0.53 0.604 Distance 
-
0.3652441 -2.4 0.031 
        English 0.4315286 1.43 0.176 
        Constant -45.44962 
-
0.33 0.747 
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IV.A.ii  Financial Services 
Financial services have been more thoroughly analyzed in the last decade than any other 
business services. They have also experienced more liberalization than the others, which will 
make the second part of the analysis more difficult for these services. The economic crisis of 
2008-2009 put financial services in the limelight and there are already quite a few published 
papers on the impact of the crisis on trade and FDI in both services and manufacturing. Borchert 
and Mattoo (2009) show that services trade weathered the crisis much better than expected or 
than thought initially, however, the resulting regulatory onslaught on financial sectors at both 
national and global levels will likely need another couple years until to determine any resulting 
impacts (good or bad).  
The correlation coefficients are shown in Table 6 and do differ from the information 
services sector. Firstly, unaffiliated exports are not correlated with affiliate sales which illustrates 
the very different nature of the financial services industry and points also to the high level of 
services differentiation. Second, parent exports to affiliates (intra-firm) are not significantly 
correlated with affiliate sales either, which may demonstrate MNE motives as purely horizontal or 
vertical when they establish a financial services affiliate abroad. Parent exports of private services 
(other private services in BEA’s classification are a sub-category of Private Services and do not 
include Travel, Tourism and Trade related services) are highly correlated with affiliate sales which 
makes sense in terms of the evidence that Banks and other Financial Services firms which 
establish affiliates abroad also export additional services to the same country. 
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Table 6: Correlation Coefficients for Financial Services (including Insurance) 
 
  
MOFA 
Sales 
Intra 
Firm 
Exports 
Unaffiliated 
Exports 
Exports 
Other 
Services 
Imports 
Other 
Services 
MOFA 
Sales 1         
Intra Firm 
Exports 0.1125 1       
Unaffiliated 
Exports 0.4172 0.0602 1     
Exports 
Other 
Services 0.7967 0.1577 0.2586 1   
Imports 
Other 
Services -0.1745 -0.0729 -0.2456 -0.217 1 
 
 
  
MOFA 
Sales 
Intra 
Firm 
Exports 
Intra 
Firm 
Imports 
Exports 
Other 
Services 
Imports 
Other 
Services 
MOFA 
Sales 1         
Intra 
Firm 
Exports 0.0437 1       
Intra 
Firm 
Imports 0.1687 0.8437 1     
Exports 
Other 
Services 0.9548 0.1706 0.2762 1   
Imports 
Other 
Services -0.1355 0.0394 0.0202 -0.1266 1 
 
Table 7 shows the results of the regression analysis and the shows that parent exports of 
other private services have a significant and positive impact on affiliate sales in financial services. 
GDP and skilled labor differences have negative signs while GDP per capita has a positive sign 
and all are significant in line with the gravity model theory.  It is likely that almost all financial 
services firms which export services from the US are MNEs so this will also include the 
unaffiliated exports of financial services (and therefore I do not include this in the specification). 
Of note, for most the financial services regressions is English as an official language is negative 
for the regressions with affiliate sales while English as a commonly spoken language (from the 
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CEPII gravity dataset) is positive and significant. The openness proxy of trade as a percentage of 
GDP has a positive and significant sign and a variable indicating if countries have a lower 
marginal tax rate than the US shows a positive sign for this indicating that this is something 
companies find attractive when setting up an affiliate and financial services firms may even be 
more responsive to differences, all other things equal. 
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Table 7: Financial Regressions with Foreign Affiliate sales in Financial and Insurance 
Services as the Dependent Variable 
 
Dependent variable: MOFA Sales Dependent variable: MOFA Sales 
R-squared 0.82   R-squared 0.89    
Variable Coef. T-Stat P> t Variable Coef. T-Stat P> t 
GDP Diff -1.86 -2.19 0.04 GDP Diff 1.04 0.82 0.42 
GDP per 
Capita 0.19 1.83 0.08 GDP per Capita 0.79 1.42 0.17 
Distance 0.09 0.71 0.48 Distance 0.24 2.05 0.05 
Lagged Exports 
Private 
Services 
 
0.58 7.79 0.00 
Lagged Exports 
Private Services 0.44 5.63 0.00 
English -0.16 -0.54 0.59 English 0.25 1.12 0.28 
Trade % of 
GDP 0.00 0.29 0.77 Trade % of GDP 0.06 1.79 0.09 
Skill Diff -0.79 -1.84 0.08 Skill Diff -3.63 -2.53 0.02 
country 0.01 0.58 0.57 Imports % of GDP -0.09 -1.40 0.18 
year 0.06 2.19 0.04 year -0.05 -0.51 0.62 
Constant 
-
61.70 -1.37 0.18 Lower Tax 0.45 2.00 0.06 
  Country 0.00 0.35 0.73 
Country and Year Dummies Suppressed 
OECD Market 
Share 0.03 1.80 0.09 
 Constant 125.51 0.74 0.47 
 
IV.A.iii Professional Services 
 Professional services are fully labeled as Professional, Scientific and Technical services 
by the BEA as I mentioned above. These services represent those which are the most highly 
regulated, both out of need and out of tradition. Trade in these services usually requires a face to 
face interaction but more and more is facilitated by ICT networks to be able to be completed 
across borders as well. Thinking about the various modes of supply professional services can be 
supplied by a US to a foreign firm and consumer with or without having someone travel to the 
foreign country, however, in the case that this is required it is not clear how the service is 
accounted for as Mode 4 is really a description of a method used in conjunction with another 
mode of supply.  
A firm may establish an affiliate and yet may still fly professionals from the US to service 
firms or countries or the firm may have workers from the host country working at the affiliate 
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company for short terms (due to visa requirements this is often the case) and this may still be 
categorized as a Mode 4 supply of services. In the other case we are concerned with, a firm in 
the US which does not have a service affiliate may provide the services from the US utilizing all 
the various modes of communication available today. The firm may also then send an employee 
for a final check or to do the actual service once the terms and contracts have been agreed upon. 
Professional services are rapidly growing sections of trade and like Financial services 
have many opportunities for complex trade and FDI relationships with the broad range of services 
supplied and types of consumers which require them. In the next section, regulatory barriers for 
professional services will be discussed and their positive or negative effects on trade and affiliate 
sales will be estimated.  
In Table 9 the correlation coefficients for the professional services dataset are shown. We 
see that like financial services, unaffiliated exports are not highly correlated with affiliate sales 
(.10) and lagged unaffiliated exports are even less correlated (-0.01). Parent exports to their 
affiliates and over US MNE exports of private services are mildly correlated with affiliate sales but 
not correlated with each other.  
Table 9: Correlation Coefficients for Professional Services 
 
  
Intra 
Firm 
Exports 
Intra 
Firm 
Imports 
Unaffiliated 
Exports 
Unaffiliated 
Imports 
Exports 
Other 
Services 
Imports 
Other 
Services 
 Intra Firm 
Exports 1           
Intra Firm 
Imports 0.3896 1         
Unaffiliated 
Exports -0.0265 0.021 
 
 
       
Unaffiliated 
Imports 0.1669 0.0301 0.6407 1     
Exports 
Other 
Services 0.197 0.124 0.2568 0.5105 1   
Imports 
Other 
Services -0.0452 
-
0.1845 0.2465 -0.0786 
-0.0687   
1.0000 1 
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MOFA 
Sales 
Exports 
Other 
Services 
Imports 
Other 
Services 
Unaffiliated 
Exports 
Unaffiliated 
Imports 
MOFA Sales 1         
Exports 
Other 
Services 0.5672 1       
Imports Other 
Services 
-
0.1218 -0.047 1     
Unaffiliated 
Exports 0.1088 0.1891 0.1892 1   
Unaffiliated 
Imports 0.2005 0.2497 0.2558 0.43 1 
 
In Table 10 the regression with foreign affiliate sales as the dependent variable finds 
lagged unaffiliated exports of professional services which are positive and significant. This may 
be evidence of trade and affiliate sales being complementary but this complementarity could be 
the outcome of various situations. One that this paper is interested in is if this is evidence that 
countries which allow affiliate sales in professional services also import other business and 
professional services which they restrict from being produced within the borders. Both GDP per 
capita and GDP differences are found to be positive and significant as is trade as a percentage of 
GDP. 
Table 10: Professional Relationship Regression Results 
 
Dependent Variable: Foreign Affiliate Sales in Services 
R-Squared 0.95     
Variable Coef. T-Stat P> t 
GDP Diff 1.354213 2 0.064 
GDP Per Capita 1.254946 2.68 0.017 
Distance 0.7631882 1.26 0.225 
Lagged Unaffiliated Exports 0.1300269 2.15 0.048 
English -2.002359 -1.08 0.299 
Trade % of GDP 0.0898036 1.75 0.1 
Antireform exports 0.1867325 1.68 0.113 
Skill Diff -0.3268758 -0.7 0.496 
Imports % of GDP -0.1469935 -1.4 0.182 
Year 0.0632749 1.3 0.214 
School Enrollment in Tertiary -0.5980769 -1.31 0.209 
Higher Tax -0.5104222 -1.25 0.23 
Constant -209.5111 -2.08 0.055 
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IV.A.iv  All Services 
This section uses data from all sales of services by US majority owned affiliates as the 
values for total sales. It does not include any values for intra firm trade but does have the ability 
for descriptive purposes to break down the sales of services into the type (affiliated/not affiliated) 
and the location (US, local market, and third country market) which are illustrated in Figure 3 and 
Table 11. 
Table 11: Sales of Services by Foreign Affiliates by Destination 
 
Sales in 
Millions of 
US Dollars All Sales 
Sales to 
Affiliated 
Persons 
Sales to 
Unaffiliated  
Persons 
Percentage 
of Total 
Sales To 
Local 
Market 
Local Total 
Sales 
Local 
Affiliate 
Sales 
Local 
Unaffiliat
ed Sales  
1999 $372,853 $38,435 $334,418 86.01% $320,686 $9,790 $310,896  
2003 $840,795 $147,138 $693,657 73.76% $620,167 $30,742 $589,425  
% Change 
from 1999-
2008 125.50% 282.82% 107.42% -14.24% 93.39% 214.01% 89.59% 
 
 
Sales in 
Millions of 
US Dollars 
Percentage 
of Total 
Sales to 
US Market 
Total US 
Sales 
Sales to 
US Parents 
Sales to 
Unaffiliated 
US 
Persons 
Percentage 
of Total 
Sales to 
Third 
Countries 
Total 
Third 
Country 
Sales 
Third 
Country 
Affiliated 
Sales 
Third 
Country 
Unaffiliat
ed Sales 
1999 5.27% $19,646 $14,779 $4,867 8.72% $32,520 $13,866 $18,654 
2003 7.85% $65,990 $41,534 $24,456 18.39% $154,638 $74,862 $79,776 
% Change 
from 1999-
2008 48.95% 235.90% 181.03% 402.49% 110.87% 375.52% 439.90% 327.66% 
 
I’ve included the data on US MNEs’ imports and exports of other private services and 
included unaffiliated exports and imports of other private services as well. This means that the 
services included in the dependent variable are all potential services and this analysis looks at 
the relationship of business and professional services (including information, finance and 
insurance, and all the professional, scientific and technical services) have with affiliate sales of all 
services.  
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Therefore the results are not to be compared with those of the prior three sections as 
they are not showing the same types of relationships. The added destination breakdown of this 
data is why I’ve included it here as it lends to illustrating the current interactions between trade 
and affiliate sales as well as the magnitude of affiliate sales abroad, sold back to the US and sold 
to third countries (often referred to as export platform FDI).  
Figure 3 
Professional Services 
Multinational Firm 
headquartered in the 
United States 
Services affiliate in host 
country 
Unaffiliated firm in 
foreign country: uses 
services as input 
Manufacturing affiliate in 
foreign country: uses 
services as input 
 
End user in home or 
foreign country 
Third Country Affiliated 
firm 
Third Country 
Unaffiliated firm  
Third Country end User 
Unaffiliated firm in 
foreign country: uses 
services as input 
Manufacturing affiliate in 
foreign country: uses 
services as input 
Third Country 
End User 
Mode 1: 
Services 
supplied 
abroad from 
the affiliate in 
host country 
 
Mode 1: Cross border trade in services from the US 
parent 
Mode 3: Supply services 
abroad through an 
established commercial 
presence (affiliate firm) 
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The results of the relationship analysis are contained in Table 12. The table shows that the 
lagged level of parent exports of other private services and finds that those exports are positive 
and significant in determining the sales of other private services by foreign affiliates. This shows a 
true complementary relationship at the aggregated business and professional services level. 
GDP, English as an official language and GDP per capita all have positive effects on affiliate 
sales in other private services.  
Table 12: All Services Relationship Results 
 
Dependent: MOFA Sales 
R-squared 0.9123     
Variable Coef. T-Stat P> t 
Lagged Exports Other Services 0.6671943 8.12 0 
GDP 0.3208533 2.52 0.02 
Skill Diff -0.031793 -0.08 0.94 
GDP Per Capita 0.1383868 1.61 0.12 
Trade % of GDP -0.001085 -1.32 0.2 
Distance -3.32E-05 -0.91 0.37 
English 0.6155592 1.99 0.06 
year 0.0265773 1.99 0.05 
country -0.01405 -2.11 0.04 
Constant -57.28412 -2.28 0.03 
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Section IV.B.  Regulatory Indicators Analysis 
As previously discussed, the various barriers encountered by services suppliers abroad 
are often difficult to quantify and this author has tried numerous methods, none of which achieved 
satisfactory conclusions. Therefore, in this paper I will use available data from extensive surveys 
performed by the OECD over the past 15 years which focuses on the restrictiveness of policies 
and regulations as they pertained to specific industries. In addition, country level and aggregate 
services level data in included from sources such as the UN, the World Governance Report 
published by the World Economic Forum and CEPII.  
The measurement of barriers to services trade and the related literature is summarized 
by Hoekman in his 2006 literature review and I will not revisit this discussion here as I am not 
advocating any new method of measuring and quantifying barriers to trade and affiliate 
establishment in the business and professional services industries 
The first caveat with the data for this analysis is that it is not available annually for all 
sectors. This is common in survey datasets due to the amount of time it takes to refine and 
aggregate the survey data received but adds gaps to the dataset which then greatly reduces the 
number of observations. In addition, the data is only available for OECD countries which restricts 
the analysis to those countries which both the BEA and the OECD have data for during the period 
of 1999-2008. There were countries from both sources which did not overlap and there was a 
decrease from 35 to 29 countries in the dataset for the analysis below. The regulatory indicators 
are described in Appendix II and the methodology is thoroughly explained in OECD Working 
papers 419 and 530 for the overall and professional indicators respectively.  
In addition to the indicators from the various surveys described below, there is a sector 
specific variable called Regulatory Impact which is a variable that measures the “knock on” 
effects of regulatory barriers in sectors that are inputs into the sector in question. The variable 
captures the impact of anti-competitive regulation in sectors which are inputs into the production 
of the service in question. The variable is constructed using data from the OECD input-output 
 157
matrices in order to factor in the importance of the input sector in the production of the final good 
or service (OECD Economics Working Paper 530).  
The variable therefore defined as  RIkt  =∑j Rjt * wjk where wjk = the total input requirement 
of sector n for intermediate inputs from sector k, and R is the anti-competitive regulation in sector 
k measured by OECD surveys and additional sources. This variable captures an important 
missing piece in the current theory surrounding barriers to supplying services abroad through 
foreign affiliates. It’s expected that the regulatory impact variable will have a negative impact on 
the level of foreign affiliate sales as it introduces added costs for sourcing necessary inputs. It 
may also be the case that a firm will choose to export rather than establish a foreign affiliate due 
to the intermediate effects of anti-competitive policies in those sectors.  
The variables for professional services include indicators on entry regulation (licensing, 
education requirements and quotas and economic needs tests) as well as what the OECD terms 
conduct regulation (prices and fees, advertising, form of business and inter-professional 
cooperation). In terms of where these impact the decision of a firm to supply services abroad 
through an affiliate as well as the costs for that firm each indicator can be treated separately as 
well as the aggregates. Form of business restrictions as well as quotas would be taken as 
significant barriers for entry for firms unwilling to abide by the allowed business forms. Education 
requirements and licensing are more likely expected costs for firms establishing foreign presence 
in professional services and therefore, may impact the fixed costs of entry but would not be seen 
as an ongoing barrier. Due to this, it is more likely that overall regulation on entry may limit the 
firms able to enter the market due to increased fixed costs but does not constitute a market 
access barrier (expect in the case of quotas) while form of business restrictions may constitute a 
complete barrier to entry for many firms. In additional, governmental regulation of prices and fees 
would be an on-going operating concern and would need to be considered on a country-sector 
level basis by the firm to determine if the pricing regulation was prohibitive.  
The set of regulatory indicators from the PMR, STRI, and NMR surveys include low-level 
indicators which are at the question level, mid-level indicators, and then an aggregate indicator. 
There may be different impact of low-level indicators on foreign firms’ decision to supply services 
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through trade or through an affiliate due to the impacts on different costs as well as on risk. These 
indicators include the following 26 different variables (in addition to the professional services 
specific indicators discussed above): 
1. Administrative burdens for corporations 
2. Administrative burdens for sole proprietor firms 
3. Administrative burdens on startups 
4. Antitrust exemptions 
5. Barriers to competition 
6. Barriers to entrepreneurship 
7. Barriers to entry in services 
8. Barriers to FDI 
9. Barriers to trade and investment 
10. Communication and simplification of rules and procedures 
11. Discriminatory procedures 
12. Explicit barriers 
13. Government involvement in network sectors 
14. Involvement in business operations 
15. Legal barriers 
16. Licenses and permits system 
17. Other barriers 
18. Price controls 
19. Product market regulation 
20. Public ownership 
21. Regulatory and administrative opacity 
22. Regulatory barriers 
23. Scope of public enterprise sector 
24. Sector specific administrative burdens 
25. State control 
26. Tariffs 
 
While all the information collected is useful, not all these indicators are truly relevant at 
their specific level and are better as inputs into an aggregated variable. In terms of barriers that 
impact the decision to export or establish foreign presence, variables which measure barriers and 
burdens are more indicative of increased costs (administrative burdens, regulatory barriers) while 
other variables are more institution based (product market regulation, licenses and permits 
system). In the table below I’ve separated the barriers into three different categories. The barriers 
which have the largest potential impact on the decision of a firm to export or to supply services 
through an affiliate are those that impact the costs of operation or establishment. Regulatory 
institutions may be a signal of a more efficient marketplace or one that protects consumers. 
Barriers to competition will likely have impacts across the board and therefore need more 
disaggregated data with bilateral country data.  
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Therefore I focus on the Cost Increasing Policies/Barriers in the analyses below, which 
again is a preliminary analysis which would benefit from a simultaneous equation analysis 
described above, which will be the next step in this research. 
Cost increasing 
Policies/Barriers Regulatory Institutions Anti-Competitive 
 Administrative burdens for 
corporations  Licenses and permits system  Barriers to competition 
 Barriers to trade and investment 
 Communication and 
simplification of rules and 
procedures  Barriers to entrepreneurship 
 Discriminatory procedures  Product market regulation  Antitrust exemptions 
 Administrative burdens for sole 
proprietor firms  Legal barriers 
 Government involvement in 
network sectors 
 Regulatory and administrative 
opacity  Tariffs  Price controls 
 Regulatory barriers  Explicit barriers  Public ownership 
 Sector specific administrative 
burdens   
 Scope of public enterprise 
sector 
 Administrative burdens on 
startups   
 Involvement in business 
operations 
 Barriers to entry in services     
 Barriers to FDI     
 
In the sections below, the impacts of the various regulatory institutions, policies and 
barriers are added to the model specifications and refined to determine which are significant for 
the US trade and affiliate sales variables discussed above for each sector and relevant results 
are presented in Table 13 below. 
 
IV.B.i  Information Services 
The analysis done in part A is redone with the addition of the variables that measure 
regulatory restrictiveness as well as regulatory policies. The model specification was completed 
by testing each restriction, then including all restrictions and removing those which were 
insignificant. Errors are clustered by country-year and the regression analysis includes fixed 
effects for countries and years. Due to the fact that there is only data for 4 different years, which 
are not consecutive (1999, 2003. 2005, 2008) I do not included lagged variables. Also, for 
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unaffiliated trade regressions there is no data for 2008 as the BEA does not separate unaffiliated 
and affiliated data for 2006-2008.  
The gravity model variables are similar as before with GDP difference and distance being 
negative and significant while common language and GDP are positive and significant. 
Regulatory barriers and restrictions categorized as administrative burdens on corporations and 
start-ups are found to have a significant negative impact on affiliate sales in information services. 
The overall regulatory impact variable is also found to be negative and significant so countries 
with policies that have a greater impact on economic activity, especially trade, will deter foreign 
affiliate production of information services. The other regulatory variables range from 1-6 with 6 
being the most restrictive.  
Table 13 includes the various regressions for information, financial, and professional 
services with the former having the results above. The second specification has unaffiliated 
exports of services as the dependent variable and here only the overall regulatory barriers to 
services indicator was significant which is an aggregate of entry barriers, administrative barriers, 
government control/ownership, competition/entrepreneurship barriers and regulatory/legal 
barriers. This is logical as exporting to a country is less impacted by the regulatory regime in 
place (other than trade licensing/fees, etc.) than is the action of establishing a foreign affiliate.  
 
IV.B.ii  Financial Services 
 The analysis on financial services finds that administrative burdens on sole 
proprietorships and corporations have significant negative impacts as they did for information 
services. In addition, barriers to trade and investment, FDI, and restriction on entry in the services 
industries are all found to have a negative impact on affiliate sales in financial services. Explicit 
barriers to trade and investment such as legal barriers which are clearly specific are found to be 
positive and significant perhaps due to the transparency in these restrictions. 
IV.B.iii Professional Services 
Professional services have additional measures of regulation that are specific to the 
industries within the category (sector is a bit misleading of a terminology since it really is a BEA 
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classification based on sector breakdowns but not exact). These indicators are also included in 
Appendix 2. In this analysis I first looked at only the professional indicators and then also included 
the services and whole economy regulatory indicators. Table 13 includes this model as well as an 
additional specification with unaffiliated exports of professional services as the dependent 
variable. The first specification in Table 13 shows that GDP per capita, English as an official 
language and host country GDP al have positive and significant effects while differences in skilled 
labor and distance have negative signs and are also significant in their effect on the level of 
affiliate sales in professional services.  
In terms of professional services restrictions there were two aggregate indicators and 
they are both significant; overall regulatory barriers to economic activity in professional services 
industries has a negative sign while the overall entry regulations variable is positive and 
significant. Entry regulations in professional services are not necessarily discriminatory and are 
also present in almost every country as these are professions where certifications, certain levels 
of education and independent regulatory bodies often exist to protect the country’s citizens. As 
was found for financial services above, explicit regulatory restrictions also do not seem to impede 
professional services produced by US foreign affiliates.  This specification also finds that 
regulatory opacity and administrative burdens on corporations negatively impact affiliate sales in 
professional services which are two areas of barriers that tend to be very problematic in any 
sector for foreign firms trying to enter the market, and even more so for firms attempting to 
establish an affiliate within the borders. The results of this estimation reveal that a reduction in the 
Overall Regulatory Restrictions in Professional Services (the point values are explained in 
Appendix 2 as the answers to the questions on the survey determine which value the country has 
for that indicator) would result in 43% increase in foreign affiliate sales in professional services. 
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Table 13: Regulatory Results 
 
Dependent Variable: Affiliate Sales in Information 
Services 
Dependent Variable: Affiliate Sales in Financial 
and Insurance Services 
R-squared 0.8415     R-squared 0.9049     
Variable Coef. T-Stat P> t Variable Coef. T-Stat P> t 
Skill Diff 0.7858664 1.06 0.3 GDP Per Capita 0.3801868 1.57 0.13 
GDP Diff -0.333425 -1.74 0.1 Skill Diff -0.288978 -1.87 0.07 
Distance -0.621736 -2.27 0.03 Distance -0.517601 -2.09 0.05 
GDP   1.078421 4.27 0 GDP   1.12139 13 0 
English 1.648569 2.82 0.01 English 1.992708 8.04 0 
Regulation 
Impact -12.48201 -2.56 0.02 
Overall Entry 
Barriers 0.1171386 1 0.33 
State Control -0.271937 -0.72 0.48 
Admin Burdens 
Corp 1.290462 6.67 0 
Admin 
Burdens 
Star-ups 1.122781 2.04 0.05 
Admin Burdens 
Sole -0.564653 -4.59 0 
Admin 
Burdens 
Corps -1.08273 -1.74 0.1 
Barriers to Trade 
and 
Investment -1.021182 -3.03 0.01 
Year -0.067726 -0.92 0.37 
Barriers to 
Services Entry -0.256871 -3.15 0 
Country -0.009174 -0.68 0.5 Explicit Barriers 0.6608681 2.55 0.02 
Constant 121.9791 0.96 0.35 Barriers to FDI -0.629445 -3.7 0 
        State Control -0.158169 -0.94 0.36 
        Year -0.073149 -2.84 0.01 
        Country -0.011122 -1.14 0.27 
        Constant 131.5161 2.73 0.01 
 
Dependent Variable: Affiliate Sales in Professional Services 
R-squared 0.9137     
Variable Coef. T-Stat P> t 
GDP per Capita 0.9344351 5.8 0 
Skill Diff -1.244472 -2.32 0.03 
Distance -0.594911 -2.99 0.01 
GDP   0.8549387 7.58 0 
Regulatory Opacity -0.941481 -3.87 0 
Overall Entry Barriers 0.2831074 2.21 0.04 
Admin Burdens Corp -4.627728 -5.37 0 
Admin Burdens Sole 5.138404 5.37 0 
English 1.280352 6.78 0 
Overall Regulatory Restrictions 
in Professional Services -0.502114 -1.94 0.07 
Explicit Barriers 0.4528645 2.55 0.02 
Form Of Business -0.085853 -1.07 0.3 
Gov't Involvement 0.1830943 1.69 0.1 
Year 0.0132842 0.56 0.58 
Country -0.010829 -1.19 0.25 
Constant -31.6834 -0.64 0.53 
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Section V: Conclusions and Next Steps 
The preceding discussion and analysis focused on the relationships between affiliate 
sales, unaffiliated US trade, intra-firm trade and US multinational trade (both affiliated and 
unaffiliated) in professional, financial, information and other private services. The relationship 
analysis shows that US unaffiliated trade in services and US foreign affiliate sales in the same 
services are complementary. US multinational exports of other private services are also found to 
be positively related with foreign affiliate sales. The analysis looking into the reverse effect was 
also consistent which shows that for countries where the US has foreign affiliate sales in business 
and professional services there is also unaffiliated trade in services and US multinationals trade 
other private services  
The regulatory analysis finds that administrative burdens, entry barriers, and aggregate 
barriers to services most impact foreign affiliate sales while barriers that are explicit in nature and 
transparent do not seem to have an impact on affiliate sales or trade as they are expected and 
are known. The next steps are using this information to calibrate models of affiliate sales and 
trade in services using what we have learned about the interdependencies of the different types 
of data. In addition, exploring the theoretical foundations of firms’ choices to export and establish 
affiliates to supply services abroad is an area that needs additional research. For now, it is no 
longer a question whether trade and affiliate sales are complements because in any opportunity 
where both trade and affiliate production is possible, we see complementary relationships. 
Utilizing the improvements to data that are expected, these relationships will be able to be 
explored more clearly at the firm and industry level where the true relationships and regulatory 
impacts will be able to be explored. 
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Appendix 1: Data Descriptions 
 
MOFA Sales: Majority Owned Foreign Affilitate sales in the services sector specified from the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis website for years 1999-2008 and all available countries. 
Parent Exports/Imports of Other Private Services: Exports by US Parent companies abroad to 
both affiliated and unaffiliated recipients (or Parent imports of other private services from any 
party abroad). Downloaded from the BEA website for 1999-2008 for all available countries and for 
the selected services sectors. 
Parent Imports/Exports From/To Affiliates: Intra-firm exports and imports between the US 
Parent and their majority owned foreign affiliate in the sector being analyzed. 
Sales of Services to US/Local/Third Country Affiliated and Unaffiliated Persons: Total sales 
of services by majority owned foreign affiliates to the specified type of destination. BEA data for 
all the years in the sample and for most of the countries. 
GDP and GDP per capita: Data is from the World Bank online indicators and is available for all 
years and countries in the dataset. Data is in US dollars, both current and constant 2005 dollars. I 
use current dollars and adjust the data to be in 2005 dollars using the appropriate CPI index for 
each country before the data is used in the analysis. 
Trade of GDP: Total goods and services trade as a percentage of GDP. World Bank online 
database. 
Imports of GDP / Exports of GDP: Total imports or exports of goods and services as a 
percentage of GDP. World Bank online database. 
English: English as an official language. This is taken from the CEPII gravity variable database 
available at: http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm and I use two separate variables 
for this. Common language: Official and Common Language: Ethno, the latter is from the 
ethnologue database that CEPII uses and is an indicator for if 20% of more of the population 
speak the language. 
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Skilled Labor: The skilldiff variables are the difference in the highskilled labor available between 
the US and the host country. The data is from the International Labor Organization and is the sum 
of professional categories 1-9 for each country. 
Additional Skilled Labor Variables: Labor Force percentage with Secondary Education, Labor 
Force percentage with Tertiary Education, and Gross school enrollment in tertiary education were 
all downloaded from the World Bank database. 
Tax: The highest marginal corporate tax rate for that year. World Bank Database 
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Appendix 2: Regulatory Barriers 
The regulatory indicators used came from the OECDs PMR indicators. The overall "integrated 
PMR indicator" integrates the indicators of regulation in non-manufacturing sectors (NMR) and 
the FDI regulatory restrictiveness index and covers thus to a larger extent than was done in the 
past information on sector-specific regulation.1) It replaces the "old" economy-wide PMR indicator. 
The individual low-level indicators and the places where the sector-specific information has been 
integrated are as described in the tree structure below. 
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Integration of sectoral information (NMR+FDI-Index)
Scope of public 
enterprise
(0.33)
Direct control 
over business 
enterprises
(0.33)
Licenses and 
permits system
(0.50)
Communication 
and 
simplification 
of rules and 
procedures
(0.50)
Sector-specific 
administrative 
burdens
(0.33)
Legal barriers
(0.25)
Antitrust 
exemptions
(0.25)
Discriminatory 
procedures
(0.33)
Regulatory 
barriers
(1.0)
Gov’t involvement 
in network sectors
(0.33) Barriers in 
network sectors
(0.25)
Barriers in 
services
(0.25)
Barriers to FDI
(0.33)
Product market regulation
Tariffs
(0.33)
Admin. burdens 
for corporations
(0.33)
Admin. burdens 
for sole 
proprietor firms
(0.33)
Price 
controls
(0.50)
Use of 
command 
and control 
regulation
(0.50)
State control
(0.33)
Other 
barriers
(0.50)
Explicit barriers 
to trade and 
investment
(0.50)
Barriers to 
competition
(0.33)
Regulatory and 
administrative 
opacity
(0.33)
Involvement 
in business 
operations
(0.50)
Public 
ownership
(0.50)
Barriers to trade and 
investment   (0.33)
Barriers to entrepreneurship
(0.33)
Administrative 
burdens on 
start-ups
(0.33)
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